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This project has had its own paths. One way to tell its story starts from the 
notion that the role of equality in theories of democratic deliberation 
procedures puzzled me, and it took a few years to find a focus for this after my 
Master’s thesis on Iris Marion Young’s, Seyla Benhabib’s, and Chantal 
Mouffe’s conceptions of democracy and difference. What disturbed me was the 
fact that there was something blurry, something to be further analyzed in a 
systematic manner in order to understand better the dynamics between 
democratic procedures and equality. In addition, the questions connected to 
ideal and non-ideal theorizing in justifications of democratic procedures 
bothered me in relation to these themes. It also seemed that getting clarity on 
these relations would enable the employment of procedural deliberative 
theories in a more purposeful and informed manner.  
Now, if I think back, I can see that a certain tipping point along this path 
were seminars and personal discussions with Jerry Gaus in 2005–2006 at the 
University of North Carolina/Chapel Hill’s wonderful Department of 
Philosophy, and then, later, a few times in Helsinki as well. Jerry is an excellent 
teacher. He raised several difficult questions both in relation to texts that were 
already familiar to me, but which I had read from a different angle, and in 
relation to my own writings. He jotted an almost frustrating number of red 
marks in the margins of my texts. While Nordic egalitarian values have shaped 
my core intuitions, those questions of his have been vitally influential for this 
process in provoking new trains of thought. Jerry also gave me the valuable 
hint that Tom Christiano had a manuscript for the Constitution of Equality 
that might be following the same line of thought as I was. Besides, Jerry has 
been one of the most encouraging philosophical figures along this path, also 
stressing that, when it comes to philosophy, being quick does not matter very 
much after all; some of us need more time to mature our ideas. I owe cordial 
thanks to Jerry for all the support, friendliness, and generosity, for the letters 
of recommendation – and for those red marks in the margins. 
Nonetheless, the ideas discussed in this thesis started to develop further, in 
a different form, in 2009–2010 when I was not working but taking long walks 
several times a day, which gave me the time and opportunity to brew up the 
composition of the thesis. Then I wrote some of the first versions of the critical 
parts. However, being merely critical did not seem sufficient – critique seemed 
to require a constructive counterpart, an alternative option: a coherent line of 
thought from the critical thoughts to substantial defense. Yet it was not until 
2012 that my constitutive interpretation of intrinsic value got its first 
formulation in a paper for a MANCEPT Workshop on the Procedural 
Dimension of Justice. Inspiring and instructive discussions with the organizer 
of the workshop, Emanuela Ceva, at the University of Manchester, and later 
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also in Helsinki and Turku, and her brilliant writings, had a major influence 
on the further evolution of the work.  
After 2011–2013, progress on the thesis was rather sporadic, as I took a 
completely different, full time professional role in the academic community in 
August 2013. But in late spring, early summer 2017, I dedicated three full 
months to the project and wrote the current version.  
This thesis focuses on democratic deliberation, an indefinitely continuing 
process. During the process there are, nonetheless, occasional practical 
requests for decisions even if the deliberation has not reached its finale. In a 
somewhat similar manner, the development of these ideas into a more mature 
shape is an ongoing process, but this PhD thesis brings together and then 
unpacks the various themes that have been occupying my mind. During the 
final states of this thesis, the generous support I received from my supervisors 
Kristian Klockars and Eerik Lagerspetz has been truly valuable. Besides their 
highly useful comments, their encouragement has perhaps been even more 
important; they managed to convince me that it was time to regard the work 
as finished. I am truly grateful to both. Without Kristian and Eerik I would not 
have been able to submit this work. I also feel genuine gratitude to the official 
pre-examiners, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen and Juha Räikkä, for their highly 
constructive comments, which also helped to convince me that the ideas were 
ready to be defended, meanwhile giving me invaluable insights about how to 
develop the work even further afterwards. I am also deeply honored that 
Kasper has promised to be my opponent in the public defense of this thesis. 
The longer description of the path to this point should maybe start, 
however, from Kristian’s and Susanna Snell’s excellent seminar, Current 
debates in social and political philosophy, that I took during my Master’s 
studies, which was ultimately very influential in the development of my 
thinking. While this thesis is not so much about Young, whose work I came 
across for the first time in the seminar, I do recognize now that Young’s texts 
have affected my gut intuitions more than I realized. Even though I do not 
explicitly cite her work very much, the echoes of her thought can be heard 
throughout the composition. Later on, during my Master’s studies and few 
times after, Tuija Pulkkinen’s reading group, Politics of philosophy, and her 
philosophical views, also had a significant influence on my thinking. 
Furthermore, I might never have started on the path leading to this thesis 
without Heta Aleksandra Gylling. She strongly encouraged me to start PhD 
studies and offered me a place in her research project. Her determination also 
prompted me to go abroad for a while, and her advice has been valuable in 
relation to wide variety of themes.  
Thanks are due to everyone who has contributed to enabling the project. As 
the path has been a long one with several side tracks, the group is ample and 
mixed, and I cannot mention everyone, but thank you for being there. I 
especially wish to thank Johanna Oksala, Iivi Anna Masso, Floora Ruokonen, 
Annamari Vitikainen, Petri Ylikoski, and Susanna Snell for many fruitful 
discussions and comments and their support. Our Egalitarianism group with 
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Arto Laitinen, Jukka Mäkinen, and Simo Kyllönen has provided me with 
broader philosophical perspectives on the equality literature. I wish to thank 
current and former scholars and personnel from both philosophy units of the 
University of Helsinki including (in random-ish order) my custos Antti 
Kauppinen, Timo Airaksinen, Raimo Tuomela, Aki Lehtinen, Pekka Väyrynen, 
Pekka Mäkelä, Nora Hämäläinen, Jaakko Kuorikoski, Samuli Reijula, Tomi 
Kokkonen, Jussi Backman, Sanna Tirkkonen, Säde Hormio, Sirkku Hellsten, 
Raul Hakli, Jussi Suikkanen, Juhana Lemetti, Ville Paukkonen, Malin Grahn-
Wilder, Laura Werner, Hanne Appelqvist, Johan Strang, Vilma Venesmaa, 
Virpi Lehtinen, Maria Svanström, Marion Godman, Adrian Walsh, Caterina 
Marchionni, Lilian O’Brien, Simo Vehmas, Tuukka Tanninen, Vili 
Lähteenmäki, Liuda Kocnovaité, Olli Loukola, Marjukka Laakso, Tuula Pietilä, 
Ilpo Halonen, Karoliina Kokko-Uusitalo, the late Juha Sihvola, and many 
others. I also wish to thank Demo group members Suvi Ervamaa, Eeva 
Luhtakallio, and Tuomas Ylä-Anttila for more empirically grounded insights 
on democratic theories, and the Studies of Public Sphere network and its 
members including Piia Letto-Vanamo, Hannu Nieminen, Henrik Stenius, 
and others for many rich discussions and its valuable multidisciplinarity. 
Current and former scholars of the charming University of Turku have 
provided many splendid philosophical discussions for which I am grateful. 
Besides Eerik Lagerspetz and Juha Räikkä, and their greatly inspiring yearly 
workshop on political philosophy, I have been lucky to get to know Kaisa 
Herne, Daniel Weyermann, Susanne Uusitalo, Maija Setälä, and many others. 
Via Maija’s deliberation experiments I also came across many valuable 
empirical points of view that I might have otherwise missed. Thanks are also 
in order to Tampere folks including Tampere expatriate, Sami Syrjämäki. 
I am truly grateful to Geoff Sayre-McCord for his generous invitation (and 
Michael Smith for the encouragement to accept the invitation) to visit Chapel 
Hill’s philosophy department with its both philosophically and socially 
stimulating atmosphere. I wish to thank all the lovely people there, including 
both Geoff and Happy Sayre-McCord whose hospitality was overwhelming, 
and also dear Ingra Schellenberg and Ronald Oertel, Francisca Reines, 
Anabella Zagura, Katie Elliot, Emily Given, Amy and Mark Phelan, Bryce 
Huebner, Matthew Chrisman, Julinna Oxley, Jesse Prinz, Joshua Knobe, 
Bernard Boxill, Nicole Hassoun, Ben Fraser, and our Rawls reading group with 
Ariela Tubert, Clair Morrissey and Meg Wallace, as well as Jerry’s and Geoffrey 
Brennan’s Tetlock reading group with Piers Turner, and many others. 
Moreover, many rich discussions in various conferences and workshops have 
influenced the process a lot, but that list would be even longer. I also thank our 
lovely team at research services, and former and current colleagues for all their 
support. In addition, I wish to thank Marie-Louise Karttunen for her 
professional help in making the linguistic form of the thesis much more fluent 
and understandable. 
Certain people have remained important during the length of the project. I 
should thank friends I studied with, especially our peer group Kaisa Heinlahti, 
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Anna Lahelma, Miia Rainne, and Henriikka Tavi, and also Jarno Rautio, 
Varpu Rantala, and Kitti Suoranta. I also wish to thank all my dear friends 
including Mili Kaikkonen, Sari Väkelä, Inka Brackenridge, Elena Drakos, 
Reetta Salonen, Mari Kimanen, Eino Kivisaari, and everyone else.  
My mother Reetta and father Vesa have both always cultivated an 
independent and critical way of thinking, raised us, me and my sister Saara, to 
ask questions, even complicated ones, and encouraged curiosity, for which I 
am more than grateful, as well as for their vast intellectual and emotional 
support. Besides all that, my mother has also provided hugely valuable help 
that has enabled me to finish the process in very practical terms. I also wish to 
thank their spouses, especially Matti, my relatives, and particularly my late 
great-grandmother Anni and grandmother Terttu, both for their influential 
examples and wise thoughts concerning democratic society. Moreover, I am 
grateful to my wonderful parents-in-law, Tarja and Veijo, for their support, 
and also my siblings-in-law and their families. Sincere thanks belong to my 
dear sister Saara for all the sisterly and also academic encouragement, and 
wise, rational and sometimes positively provocative thoughts. 
My most heartfelt thanks are due to my loved ones, my life-long partner 
Teemu and son Vilho Toppinen, for their endless support, patience, and 
inspiration. Teemu has shared with me both the realm of philosophy and all 
the other realms of life. He has been there for the better and the worse 
moments, always willing to listen to my thoughts and discuss them, affording 
greatly valuable reflections on my ideas in different stages – providing true 
companionship. And Vilho, my dear, inquisitively minded, bright and lovely 
son. Eventually I got the thesis written before the thought-scan-based-thesis-
writing-machine was ready to be tested, but I highly value the idea anyway – 
it tells the story of the encouragement I have been so lucky to receive. Thank 
you both for making everything and every day of my life meaningful. 
 
I also wish to thank the Academy of Finland, the Finnish Cultural Foundation, 
and the University of Helsinki which have made this project possible by 
financing the work. 
 
I dedicate the thesis to the idea of the Nordic welfare state. 
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[I]t [is not] clear how to arrive at a univocal answer to the question of 
what is a fair way of adjudicating conflicting demands that arise from 
conflicting moral viewpoints, where the very answer to what counts 
as such a fair way and indeed what counts as a reasonable answer 
may well be in dispute among such viewpoints.    
— Steven Lukes (2003, 39) 
Democracies are widely considered to be in a state of crisis, while even 
interpretations of proper democratic means provoke vibrant quarrels. Yet it is 
essential that we understand the grounds of democracy, for both critical and 
constructive purposes. Arguably, the means to deepen democracy or make it 
more legitimate depend on how democratic decision making is justified, but it 
seems that the normative complexity of deliberative theories that became 
popular in 1990s has potentially blurred the vision. The relationship between 
normative deliberative ideals and democratic practices is less straightforward 
than it might appear. That said, I do not wish to argue against the many 
valuable empirical studies of the ways we deliberate together, but, rather, to 
return to normative ground and ask what justifies democracy.  
1.1 THE LURE OF PROCEDURAL 
A major question for contemporary political philosophy is how heterogeneous 
values and moral and practical disagreement should be taken into account in 
pluralist societies. These are core questions for philosophical debates on 
democratic deliberation. As Thomas Christiano and Sameer Bajaj (2017) put 
it: “Deliberative democracy is a field of democratic theory that studies the 
contribution of public discussion, argumentation, and reasoning to the 
normative justification of democratic decision making”. Since the 1990s, 
theories of democratic deliberation have been one of the key themes in 
democratic theorizing – in studies that range from the highly practice-oriented 
to the theoretical.1 Deliberative theories arise from the consciousness of 
pluralism and the idea that people who disagree with each other on 
fundamental concerns should nonetheless be able to make decisions together 
in normatively justified ways. The ideal of deliberative democracy refers to 
decision making by means of a collective public reasoning process, one that 
takes into account all the different points of view. The condition of 
                                               
1 The term “deliberative democracy” was first used by Joseph Bessette in his 1980 article, 
“Deliberative democracy. The majority principle in republican government.” The idea of making 




disagreement lies at the heart of deliberative democracy, yet the relationship 
is complex. This is the space which this thesis explores.  
Current democratic theory is torn in two directions: the aim of substantially 
just outcomes pulling it towards the epistemic pole, and political disagreement 
over its substance taking it in a procedural direction – although this proposed 
continuum misses something by virtue of its two-dimensionality. (By 
democratic procedures I refer to collective, political, decision-making 
practices.2) Interpretations of sources of value for democratic procedures vary 
respectively. Roughly put, “epistemic proceduralists” defend democratic 
procedures on substantial grounds, that is, because of their tendency to 
produce decisions that are “good”, “right”, or “‘just” according to certain 
independent standards; in other words, they place the main emphasis on the 
fairness of the outcomes. Decision-making procedures are seen as valuable 
because of the expected outcome, whereas both pure and intrinsic 
proceduralists put more emphasis on the values of democratic procedures and 
disagreement over the standards of justice of outcomes. “Pure proceduralists” 
would argue, for example, that something could be valuable just because it is 
a product of certain procedures, while “intrinsic proceduralists” defend the 
idea that procedures can realize in themselves something valuable that would 
not exist independently of the procedures. Yet these competing modes of 
justification – substantial and procedural – often provide a foil for each other 
and most views are hybrids of some kind. The essential difference between 
them typically lies in the weighting and valuing of the elements.  
Non-constrained public use of reason as a way of making decisions is often 
considered a remedy both for a lack of rationality and a democratic deficit. 
Besides being free, deliberation should be equal. However, even though 
equality plays one of the elementary roles in the deliberative ideal, the 
relationship between deliberative democratic procedures and equality has 
remained rather ambiguous. What kind of equality is required, and why?3 The 
main contribution of this thesis is to clarify the role of equality in democratic 
deliberation procedures and in their justification.4 It seems to me that in order 
                                               
2 By “democratic decisions” I refer to collective decisions that bind members of society and 
determine many important relations between them, such as rights, duties, liberties, what counts as 
crime, retribution, fair contracts, duties, ownerships, contributions to collective enterprises, 
redistribution, criteria of membership in a community, modes of exit, etc. 
3 Despite the disagreements, conditions of political equality lie at the core of normative conceptions 
of democratic legitimacy. Charles Beitz (1989, 17) defines the role of political equality as “serv[ing] as the 
chief regulative principle of democratic political competition by defining fair terms of participation in 
it”. Theorists disagree, however, when specifying the content of this regulative principle: “Its content 
admits of a variety of interpretations, each corresponding to a particular understanding of ‘fair terms of 
participation.’” 
4 What is the difference between democratic legitimacy and justification? In this thesis the 
distinction does not play a role, yet typically normative political legitimacy can be interpreted as relating 
to political authority, coercion, or political obligations. If interpreted as a justification for authority, it 
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to understand deliberative proceduralism, and attain a better recognition of 
how to facilitate the conditions for democratic deliberation, one should 
understand in a more detailed manner the kind of equality upon which 
deliberation builds, and why equality is relevant for democratic deliberation 
procedures in the first place. The answers to these questions vary, and the 
three prominent views analyzed in Chapters Two, Three, and Four, as well as 
the fourth variant suggested in Chapters Five and Six, each provide a different 
perspective upon the theme.  
The increased attention to democratic theories since the early 1990s has 
been at least partly motivated by growing awareness of the cultural and 
political pluralism brought to the fore by globalization. Deliberative theories 
with a strong procedural emphasis seemed to offer a potential solution to the 
challenge of pluralism. Yet, as it has turned out, the tension between 
procedures and substance is one of the core difficulties in the deliberative 
framework. Different procedural approaches discussed in this thesis differ in 
how they interpret the relationship between democratic deliberative 
procedures and substantial values such as justice. Some see justice as 
constituted in the deliberative process (justificatory proceduralism, Chapter 
Two), some understand deliberative processes as means to indicate a form of 
justice that is independent of procedure (epistemic proceduralism, Chapter 
Three), while, for others, justice is realized in the procedures themselves 
(intrinsic proceduralism, Chapters Four, Five, and Six).  
In this thesis I bring together three key types of procedural approaches and 
provide an evaluation of the prominent versions of these approaches as 
defended by Joshua Cohen, David Estlund, and Thomas Christiano. I study 
the relationship between procedures and substance in each, analyze their 
strengths and weaknesses, and ultimately defend a further variant of the third: 
a minimal interpretation of intrinsic proceduralism. Analysis of these 
procedural approaches also encapsulates the different stages of the procedural 
debate. Cohen’s approach is an exemplar of the 1990s’ phase, Estlund’s and 
Christiano’s approaches summarize the relevant themes of the next phase, 
whereas the intrinsic phase is currently ongoing.  
Two of the main themes connected with deliberative procedures are the 
idea of public reasoning and a strong commitment to public equality, to 
acknowledging each other as equals in the public political realm (see Peter 
2017b). This thesis analyses the relationship between substance and procedure 
in light of the roles of equality and practical disagreement, thereby clarifying 
these relations and bringing key tensions to the fore. While the democratic 
                                               
references the difference between de facto authority and legitimate authority. Understood in relation to 
coercion, it is taken to justify the use of coercive power: how rightful use of political power constitutes 
political authority. Historically it has been an element of legitimate political authority entailing political 
obligations. Nonetheless, I wish the minimal intrinsic proceduralism defended later in this thesis, to be 
robust enough to stand up to various interpretations (Peter 2017a especially section 2; for a more 




procedures discussed here are mainly deliberative (albeit occasionally 
incorporating discussion of democratic procedures on a more general level), it 
is arguable that the same considerations apply to democratic procedures more 
generally (although that is not reviewed in this thesis). As I see it, a deliberative 
focus with an emphasis on free and equal public reasoning and justification 
procedures makes these relations and tensions more apparent; certainly, the 
intrinsic worth of democratic procedures becomes more perceptible in a 
deliberative context. 
Before going into greater detail, a few words are required to delineate the 
types of answer I seek. I do not concentrate on current electoral institutions of 
democracy, for instance, but on the ideals that lie behinds those institutions.5 
Further, I concentrate on views that employ the idea of democratic 
deliberation as part of political decision making, leaving out those employing 
deliberation as a device for defining what is just on a more general level. In 
contemporary societies the justification of democratic procedures should be 
open to different conceptions of good, and not dependent on potentially 
controversial value commitments. In other words, the justification should be 
nonsectarian. It should preferably also have a wide reach and be robust in 
relation to contingent elements. Furthermore my approach here is partial (cf. 
Robeyns 2008) in the sense that I do not offer a systematic enquiry into how 
democratic decision making is related to other domains of society. 
A pertinent element of democratic procedures is a condition of 
disagreement. Many contemporary political philosophers, who theorize about 
decision making in the face of disagreement, focus on normative conditions 
for legitimate democratic procedures for reasonable decision-makers. The 
assumption of reasonability is widely shared among deliberative democrats 
and epistemic proceduralists, as well as among liberal theorists more generally 
(e.g., Cohen, Estlund, Rawls, Barry, Scanlon, etc.). Furthermore, the emphasis 
tends to be on solving disagreements between these reasonable actors. On the 
other hand, some theorists take conflictual power dynamics and irresolvable 
differences as their starting point, regarding democratic procedures as 
offering a way to reduce antagonism. This group is composed of what could be 
called conflict theorists, who are sceptical towards to idea of moral objectivity 
(e.g. Hampshire 2000; Honig 1993; Mouffe 2000), and Hobbes-inspired 
realists (see, for example, Bellamy 1999; Gray 2002), yet what both groups 
have in common is skepticism about difference-solving and an attention to 
                                               
5 Sen (2009, 322–323) distinguishes between the “institutional structure of the contemporary 
practice of democracy” that is “largely the product of European and American experience over the last 
few centuries” and the ideals of democracy. He defends the idea that democracy is a universal value. The 
institutions of electoral conflict, such as competitive elections, secret ballots, political parties, etc., are 
simply the means to institutionalize fundamental ideals of “political participation, dialogue and public 
interaction” (ibid, 326) that Sen sees as universal in their appeal. When the institutions of electoral 
conflict are seen merely as the means to attaining the latter ideals, then it becomes clear that their 
presence does not prove that a satisfactory level of democracy has been achieved. 
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conflictual dynamics. However, assuming either reasonability or endemic 
conflict has left the area lying between them understudied. Obviously the two 
poles encompass the major part of the matter, yet this space between presents 
vital viewpoints addressed by the form of intrinsic proceduralism defended in 
this thesis (see also Ceva 2011, 2016; Christiano 2008.) 
1.2 THREE ROLES OF DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURES 
Approaches to relations between procedural and substantial aspects vary in 
terms of justification of democratic procedures and the role accorded to 
democratic deliberation. The three approaches discussed in the first part of the 
thesis (Chapters Two–Four) all take a different perspective, which I refer to as 
justificatory, epistemic, and intrinsic respectively. None of them defends pure 
proceduralism, the idea that democratic procedures could be independent of 
all substantial elements. The first – Cohen’s ideal, discussed in Chapter Two – 
is what I regard as a mainstream deliberative view. He defends the notion of 
mirroring, according to which there is an ideal deliberative process; 
democratic legitimacy rests on the idea that actual social and political 
institutions should mirror the ideal situation and hence attain legitimacy, 
because they seem to replicate what people agree on ideally. In Chapter Three 
I analyze Estlund’s template view, according to which the ideal deliberative 
situation should be used as a template with which an actual deliberative 
situation should be compared. Finally, in Chapter Four, I discuss Christiano’s 
wide view on deliberation, according to which deliberation processes are 
conditioned by practical disagreement and therefore it is essential to focus on 
procedural equality. In the second part (Chapters Four–Six) I discuss intrinsic 
proceduralism, meaning that discussion of Christiano’s approach is also the 
first chapter of this latter section. 
Before outlining the content of the chapters, a few words about some basic 
questions and distinctions behind the themes discussed is timely. I do not 
directly discuss whether there exists a “moral truth” or some other substantial, 
morally fundamental standard of “good” or “just” that could be known (I 
substitute “truth” for “moral truth or some other fundamental moral standard” 
in the interest of abbreviation; I assume a certain moral objectivism, but take 
no stance on metaethical debates concerning the nature of moral truth; 
furthermore, I also assume practical disagreement over content6). Rather, I 
                                               
6 John Kekes (2000, 5) has distinguished various senses of pluralism (see also Ceva 2016, 27). 
According to him pluralism “may be ontological, having to do with the ultimate constituents of reality; 
epistemological, concerning the standards of reasonable belief; axiological, pertaining to the values that 
make lives good; anthropological, regarding the cultural forms that human lives may take; or political, 
advocating arrangements that recognize the legitimacy of many conceptions of a good life”. By practical 
disagreement I refer to a similar idea that Ceva discusses under the label “actual pluralism”. She defines 




discuss whether such a substantial standard is independent or dependent on 
the democratic deliberation process. If the standard is dependent on the 
process, what kind of relation is there between the two? Some, substantially 
inclined scholars (see, for example, Estlund 2002, 6–7) hold that there is a 
certain substantial, procedure-independent standard according to which 
democratic outcomes can be evaluated, whereas others, procedurally inclined, 
hold that there is a standard, but it is not independent of deliberation 
procedures. Another question is whether the standard is accessible in practice 
and, connected to that, whether democratic decisions tend to be right on the 
basis of it. Some deliberative theorists, defending a substantial, deliberation-
independent standard, maintain that outcomes of proper democratic 
procedures track that substantial standard; they claim that if members of a 
demos deliberate, they are more likely to realize the moral standard than if 
they do not. According to this approach, the tracking potential is what 
motivates the deliberation process (see Estlund 2008, 173). These questions 
are intertwined with that of whether the relationship between deliberative 
process and moral standard is considered an indicative or a constructive one. 
Theorists who understand deliberation as collaborative reasoning often 
interpret ideal deliberation as an indicative process when it comes to “truth” 
(understood broadly as a substantive moral standard). An ideal collaborative 
reasoning process is seen as an instrument for approaching this moral 
standard (see Estlund 2008). Others conceive of a public deliberation process 
in a more constructivist way, with some defending a “weak” interpretation 
according to which there is a deliberation-independent moral standard and 
others advocating the “thicker” interpretation that deliberation-independent 
moral standards do not exist. According to this latter interpretation, moral 
“truth” (or some other moral standard) can be attained only via a specific ideal 
deliberation procedure. These questions are connected to the role of ideal 
deliberation in relation to actual democratic procedures.  
In Chapter Two I analyze Joshua Cohen’s deliberative ideal, introducing 
the main themes of the debate that will be deepened in later chapters. While 
Cohen defends the role of actual democratic participation, he justifies 
democratic procedures on the basis of hypothetical consent given under ideal 
conditions, namely, in an ideal deliberative situation. Thus he locates the 
source of legitimacy in the idea of public reason and in a theory of democratic 
participation. This formulation is particularly interesting because it is one of 
the paradigmatic philosophical deliberative accounts and, moreover, both 
procedural and substantial simultaneously. In Cohen’s approach, ideal 
deliberative reasoning as a core of the deliberative process has a sort of four-
dimensional character; it functions as an ideal but also as something that 
                                               
practical circumstances in contemporary societies people are loyal to different values and value systems 
which affect their interpretations and how they assign weight to different justifications and reasons. 




actual democratic practices should mirror. It is also a unique combination of 
procedural yet substantial elements: deeply procedural, yet involving a 
hypothetical substantial element. Nonetheless, I argue that this justificatory 
version of deliberative proceduralism has its complications in relation to 
disagreement and inclusion, especially because of the consensus requirement 
and that of mirroring the ideal decision-making procedure in the actual 
democratic setting. The practical limitations of the deliberative setting, such 
as limited knowledge, limited cognitive resources, and time, also play a part in 
this, as I maintain in Chapter Two. Although Cohen’s ideal highlights the 
relevant features of ideal democratic procedures, the substantial basis of the 
ideal does not appear robust. Furthermore, Cohen’s interpretation of 
procedural values seems too thin to serve for justificatory purposes, while it is 
not clear why procedural and substantial elements should be considered 
jointly, as Cohen suggests (see Chapter 2.4). 
The third chapter has a more substantial take on procedures, focusing on 
the epistemic proceduralism that Estlund defends in his Democratic 
Authority: A Philosophical Framework (2008).7 Estlund challenges the 
purely procedural justifications of democracy and defends the importance of 
substance, maintaining that if it is available it should have primacy over 
procedures. According to Estlund, abiding by mere procedural fairness is 
always a retreat from substance. He argues that the challenge of political 
disagreement is not sufficient reason to reject all procedure-independent 
standards. He seeks to combine as many epistemic elements as possible with 
those of procedures. Political authority is not built on the actual correctness of 
decisions, he claims, but on a procedure’s tendency to produce just decisions. 
The normative essence of the view lies in the idea of public reason: legitimate 
political authority must be based on justifications that are acceptable to all 
reasonable – or, as Estlund prefers – qualified points of view. The idea of 
normative consent forms the basis for his account of democratic legitimacy 
(see also Peter 2017a). However, while he himself questions whether 
alternative procedural versions succeed in justifying actual democratic 
deliberation procedures, it seems that his own view is prone to the same 
criticism because of the hypothetical nature of the justification and the 
instrumental role given to democratic procedures. Another relevant question 
concerns whether there is enough substance available to justify considering 
democratic equality as unnecessary. Besides defending epistemic 
proceduralism, Estlund also convincingly argues against purely procedural 
alternatives. He asserts that there is no such thing as pure procedures, that all 
procedures involve substantial commitments. Nevertheless, he also argues 
against hybrid views that combine both epistemic and procedural elements.8 
                                               
7 Other proponents of epistemic proceduralism include José Luis Martì, Cheryl Misak, William 
Nelson, and Fabienne Peter among others. See, for example, Episteme 5/1 2008. 
8 Estlund considers fair deliberative proceduralism (the label that he uses to refer Christiano’s view, 




According to Estlund, these views are both unstable and also unable to explain 
the role of democratic deliberation. In the later chapters of the work my aim is 
to counter these epistemic criticisms, in addition to those which are 
instrumental.  
Chapter Four introduces intrinsic proceduralism – the topic of the latter 
half of the work – via Thomas Christiano’s approach. As Christiano observes 
(2015b), democracy can be evaluated either by reference to outcomes or, 
intrinsically, by reference to the inherent qualities of the process: on the basis 
of “whether there is something inherently fair about making democratic 
decisions on matters on which people disagree”. By intrinsic proceduralism I 
refer to the idea that procedures can be valuable as such, in addition to their 
instrumental value. Christiano’s approach starts with practical conditions of 
disagreement, fallibility, and cognitive biases, and proceeds to argue for 
procedural equality. In other words, his theory is motivated by practical 
disagreement.9 If these practical limitations of decision making are taken into 
account, he argues, then democratic procedures should treat all members of 
society as equals. One main challenge for this type of hybrid view, however, 
which rests on a procedural footing, lies in explaining the nature of 
deliberation. I discuss Estlund’s criticism of non-epistemic approaches, 
according to which proceduralists must rely on procedure-independent 
criteria in order to avoid argument based on leveling down. Yet it seems that 
the basis of argument relies on too thin an interpretation of procedural 
equality, which should be regarded as sensitive to context and the matter that 
is distributed. Another critique of this sort of approach questions the role of 
deliberation. How could public deliberation be justified on the basis of 
democratic equality? Christiano defends a wide view of deliberation, 
according to which participants should not limit their justification by a narrow 
notion of reasonability, but instead defend their views on the basis they 
personally consider the most compelling. Some have claimed that Christiano’s 
view is too idealistic, but its advantage seems to be that the relation between 
the ideal and the aspirational (i.e., what is aspired to) varies both from Cohen’s 
justificatory and Estlund’s epistemic version, in that there is less difference 
between the two levels. As I argue, this is one of the benefits of Christiano’s 
intrinsic view. One question that remains indeterminate here is the currency 
of equality. Christiano defends equality of wellbeing but even if his version of 
intrinsic proceduralism were otherwise defended, it seems that one could 
support other types of equality. This will be discussed in part 4.5.  
In the fifth chapter I diverge in order to analyze the idea of intrinsic value. 
The main point for an intrinsic proceduralist approach, and for this thesis, is 
to show that democracy can be understood in a plausible and meaningful way 
as a good in itself (in addition to its potential instrumental value), and, 
                                               
9 It seems that practical disagreement is one connecting element of those favoring intrinsic 
proceduralism (see also Ceva 2016, Ch. I), even if, as Christian Rostbøll (forthcoming) emphasizes, 
disagreement is a contingent factor, not a reason to favor the intrinsic view as such. 
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furthermore, that the value of democratic procedures plays an essential role in 
democracy’s justification. Chapter Five considers potential strategies for 
reaching this aim. On the basis of this exploration I maintain that democratic 
procedures can be justified intrinsically as constituting egalitarian relations. 
Here the version I defend differs from Christiano’s view. Moreover, I argue 
that this relational egalitarian justification can avoid both instrumental and 
epistemic challenges, and simultaneously be non-sectarian because of the 
constitutive justification. Essential for the latter is that democracy creates 
something unique that cannot be understood independently of its procedures: 
something that does not exist without democracy and something that we can 
understand only by referring to democratic institutions and practices. This 
unique idea, constituted by democracy, is a non-instrumentally just way for 
people to relate to each other in a democratic society. In the course of 
discussion I build on the recent work of Emanuela Ceva, Christian Rostbøll, 
and Niko Kolodny among others. 
In the coda, Chapter Six, I briefly draw the various lines together and reflect 
on the effects on deliberation of minimal intrinsic proceduralism and 
constitutive justification. In doing so, I lean heavily on Ceva’s recent work 
(2016). Her concept of interactive justice matches my intuitions concerning 
how deliberative procedures should be interpreted from the perspective of 
intrinsic proceduralism. To describe the objective of Chapter Six, it seems to 
me that the defense of intrinsic proceduralism should aim at minimalism in a 
justificatory sense; in other words, it should aim at principles that, as far as 
possible, could be independent of particular ethical outlooks, conceptions of 
good, and other value commitments. This would enable its wide applicability, 
especially since the scope of this thesis merely entails democratic procedures 
rather than a broader framework. Nevertheless, with regard to the possibility 
of objectivity, my attitude is not anti-foundationalist, relativist, or skeptical.  
In order to clarify the idea of minimal intrinsic proceduralism I study 
democratic deliberation from that perspective. Some of the themes to which 
intrinsic proceduralism gives rise have been studied in the field of peace 
studies (see Ceva 2016); however, the primary focus of theories of deliberative 
democracy is on decision making, whereas theories of conflict management 
aim to change dynamics from antagonistic to co-operative. Typically, 
deliberative theorists are also interested in procedures, but for epistemic or 
justificatory reasons. Consequently, the deliberative ideals they discuss are 
outcome-oriented in their justification even if procedural, while the 
deliberative procedures are designed with an eye to outcomes – to just 
decisions. However, as I will argue, a switch of the focus and re-interpretation 
is needed when these procedures are interpreted from an intrinsic perspective, 
especially the conditions of consensus and the narrow notion of reasonability 
discussed in earlier chapters. In the sixth chapter I maintain that the focus of 
deliberation should be shifted from consensus to understanding 
disagreement as a shared condition. As Ceva emphasizes, antagonistic 




operating on morally acceptable terms. Ultimately, I maintain that the 
deliberation process can be interpreted in terms of interactive justice, which 
refers to regulated democratic procedures guided by principles of procedural 
equality (Ceva 2016). Democratic interaction procedures should be inclusive 
and characterized by relative equality.10 
1.3 METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK – 
IDEALIZATIONS IN DEMOCRATIC THEORIES 
The approaches discussed in this work accord the notion of deliberation 
different functions, employing it in the search for the ideal solution and/or in 
guidance for practical decision making. They vary in how ideal deliberation is 
defined and how it is related to practical democratic procedures. Indeed, 
debates on democratic deliberation procedures frequently fail to lock horns 
because wide variation in definition blurs the terms of discussion. In order to 
understand these dynamics, a few comments on the role of idealizations are of 
assistance. These following insights concerning normative analysis are 
particularly relevant to discussions of isomorphism between ideal and actual 
deliberation in Chapters Two–Four (see especially parts 2.3.2, 3.3.2, and 4.4). 
(By isomorphism I refer to the notion that ideal and actual deliberation should 
resemble each other, one that I problematize later in the work.) 
Political philosophy is a form of applied philosophy very broadly 
understood. Christiano and Bajaj (2017, 383) assert that philosophical 
theorizing about deliberative democracy is applied in two distinct ways: 
philosophers should be able to give a manageable description of the problem 
under discussion; they should also be able to adjust, rethink, and redesign 
normative principles in a way that is sympathetic to the nature of the political 
contexts under evaluation. Therefore, the relationship between universal 
ideals and empirical reality is methodologically relevant to this study. Some 
theorists work in a top-down fashion, whereas others prefer a bottom-up style 
when examining the relation between theory and empirical reality. As Kasper 
Lippert-Rasmussen (2017, 8) describes, top-down approaches first seek out 
the basic, non-contingent philosophical principles, and then study their 
practical implications. The more naturalistically minded maintain that 
philosophy should start from empirical facts. In the case of democratic theory, 
starting from the middle seems fruitful. The aim remains to seek out general 
principles, yet these should be informed by, reflected upon, and revised on the 
                                               
10 Yet I do not wish to defend relational equality as a monistic project. Along the lines suggested by 
Lippert-Rasmussen (2015), I prefer to consider egalitarian justice as a pluralistic account, in which a 
luck egalitarian dimension concerning questions related to distribution plays a role too. Although, in this 




basis of continuously growing practical knowledge of human beings and 
society.  
Gerald Gaus (2016, 22) writes: “All principle-based theories ‘worth our 
attention’ are sensitive to their social realizations.” Following this line of 
guidance, I do not wish to discuss abstract ideals as such, even if they offer 
interesting philosophical questions. Why is that? Gaus (2016, 12–13) points to 
some relevant worries:  
Dream … is unrelated to the pursuit of justice in nonideal social worlds. 
[It is a] view of ideal justice that not only proposes an unattainable 
ideal, but is willing to admit that this ideal may be, and often is, 
entirely irrelevant to improvements in justice in nonideal conditions. 
… [P]olitical philosophy that is unable to describe any but the top, ideal 
social state, is of little use in helping us sort through the options for 
justice that confront us. It is as if we have developed a clear conception 
of the ideal square, but are unable to say which of three drawings, a 
square, a rectangle, or a circle, is closest to it.  
 
These problematic elements are related to broader, general questions 
concerning normative theorizing and how it should be applied in the political 
sphere. Idealizations describe an ideal, something that is contra factual, and 
something to which to aspire. Normative ideals have various functions: they 
can be used as theoretical devices for evaluating the desirability of practices 
such as behavior or institutional arrangements; they may provide justificatory 
purposes; and they can be regarded as prescriptive – that is, action guiding – 
models that agents or institutions should seek to resemble. This latter function 
requires (at least some kind of) feasibility in terms of the ideal.11 The 
justificatory function of the theories discussed in this work also requires that 
the justification should fit its intended scope. These dimensions are relevant 
when considering normative democratic ideals. Even though I criticize certain 
views on the basis of their prescriptive potential, I definitely do not wish to 
deny that there is a need for ideal normative theorizing. Ideal theorizing 
(without feasibility constraints) enables creative critical thinking and thought 
experiments, which are valuable tools. Giving up all ideal theories in the name 
of feasibility could lead to an unbearable degree of realism from which hope is 
absent. Starting with feasibility constraints in mind imposes excessive limits 
on the imagination. Furthermore, what seems unfeasible at first sight might 
ultimately emerge as feasible after all. The practical limitations of a particular 
ideal might turn out to be flexible. Yet it seems that it is definitely an asset for 
a normative ideal focusing on democratic procedures if it is somewhat feasible 
in the end, or takes into account the core features of the sphere for which it is 
destined.  
                                               
11 The meaning of this is currently topical. For example, Gilabert & Lawford-Smith (2012) have 
developed an interesting test according to which the feasibility of normative political theories and their 




Rawls has famously stated that normative political theories should be 
“realistic utopias”: “utopias” so that ideals are appealing and “realism” so that 
they are feasible (Rawls 2001, 4–5). Yet the feasibility does not have to be 
direct, that is, something that can be performed under current circumstances. 
Instead, what may be more interesting is diachronically indirect feasibility: 
something that might be brought about after something else has been 
achieved. This requires, nonetheless, that both of these “somethings” are 
within the scope of natural human ability, as defended by Mark Jensen (2009). 
Thus, a state of affairs can be feasible even if it is not possible to bring it about 
in the current conditions, as long as the path to that situation could be 
accessible under other conditions.  
There are two sorts of constraints to feasibility relevant here: hard and soft 
constraints (or strong and weak as they were originally labeled in Räikkä 
1998).12 Hard constraints, such as logical, nomological, physical, and 
biological constraints, rule out a possible state of affairs permanently. Soft 
constraints are more complicated; they rule out nothing permanently, but 
render a state of affairs comparatively less feasible. Cultural, economic, 
institutional, psychological, and motivational constraints limit the likelihood 
of certain outcomes, but the limits are not permanent or absolute. Soft 
constraints are often probabilistic; the infeasibility in question does not mean 
strict impossibility, but, rather, that the probability of a particular state of 
affairs occurring is not very high. They are also malleable. They vary over time, 
for example; something that is infeasible now can be more feasible in the 
future or vice versa. Current constraints can be overcome and things can 
transform, sometimes in a more predictable, sometimes in a more imaginative 
or even strange direction. Soft, malleable constraints are interesting, 
especially for political philosophy. As Holly Lawford-Smith and Pablo Gilabert 
(2012, 815) maintain, “not including them leads to impotent idealism seeking 
desirable but extremely improbable outcomes”. Yet, as they note, 
psychological and motivational constraints are complicated, and it is not clear 
how they should be interpreted. Pathological psychological constraints are 
clear, but what about other psychological factors? Normative theorizing 
should not collapse into cynical realism, as normative theories can serve in the 
process of changing people’s desires and behavior. On the other hand, as 
Lawford-Smith and Gilabert put it, “whether a proposal might succeed, it 
seems crazy not to factor in citizens’ resistance or political apathy, even when 
these fall short of pathology” (Lawford-Smith & Gilabert 2012, 813; see also 
Räikkä 1998; Robeyns 2008.)  
Soft constraints are certainly crucial when considering equality of 
opportunity. Even if there are no hard constraints on equality of opportunity 
in a given situation, soft constraints might be responsible for causing a certain 
amount of friction (cf. friction in economics) leading to inequality even in the 
                                               
12 “Hard” and “soft” constraints used by Lawford-Smith & Gilabert (2012) refer to a distinction 
made by Juha Räikkä in his 1998 article. The original labels used by Räikkä are “strong” and “weak”. 
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absence of hard constraints. It seems to me that friction is a beneficial concept 
in understanding feasibility and malleability in political contexts, and when 
considering empirical exploration of actual equality of opportunity on a large 
scale. 
When evaluating normative political ideals, on the one hand one can 
question whether the ideal as such is desirable or appealing; on the other, 
whether it could serve as an aspirational ideal. Could the ideal be 
approximated, sought after? In many cases these questions are intermixed, yet 
they are separate sets of questions: the ideal as ideal, and the ideal as 
something to aim for. An ideal could be a desirable aim in certain ideal 
conditions, but ill-fitting to current non-ideal circumstances. Some ideals 
might even have devastating consequences if applied under certain kinds of 
non-ideal conditions. Even if the theorist in question limits application of the 
ideal in either of these dimensions, theories can and often do have a life of their 
own in the hands of others. Therefore it is a matter of good scientific practice 
to communicate intended uses of theorization clearly, specifying what 
complications there might be if it is applied to other contexts. This theme will 
be relevant to all the ideals discussed in this thesis. 
One more relevant point to consider is a theme discussed under the labels 
of best and second-best. If the ideal or best alternative is for some reason 
unreachable, what state of affairs should one then aim for? What would the 
second-best alternative look like? It is not an easy task to identify second 
best.13 As Juha Räikkä notes (2014, 33), “The option that may seem to be the 
second-best before further investigation need not actually be the second-best.” 
The task involves not just identifying both a coherent and desirable state of 
affairs, but also recognizing potentially competing alternatives and ensuring 
that the selected state is the second, not the third or fourth best, and, 
furthermore, figuring out justified reasons for ordering these “ordinal bests”. 
That is complicated. What seems on first sight to be the closest approximation 
of the best might actually turn out to be rather distant after more detailed 
analysis.14 A large part of the work in this thesis is essentially about identifying 
                                               
13 David Wiens (2016) refers to Lipsey and Lancaster’s classic theorem of the second best, updating 
it slightly: “if one of the principles that characterize a fully just state of affairs remains unsatisfied, then 
the best state of affairs under the circumstances does not necessarily satisfy as many of the remaining 
principles as possible.” And additionally (2016): “the theory of second best poses a stiff anti-
approximation warning: if a political ideal remains unrealized, then an approximate realization of that 
ideal is not necessarily the best thing under the circumstances”. Wiens notes, however, that isomorphism 
between theorem and normative political analysis has not been studied thoroughly. 
14 There are different ways to order the approximations of an ideal alternative if it is unreachable, 
depending on what types of principles are used as a basis for the ordering. Räikkä (2014, 33—38) 
distinguishes (1) a condition-based conception of approximation; (2) a degree-based conception of 
approximation; and (3) a denial-based conception of approximation. According to a condition-based 
approximation the number of conditions for an ideal situation that can be reached is relevant, i.e., the 




the second best, and discussing and evaluating different intuitions related to 
that.15 
The role of idealization in normative political theories is currently actively 
debated using a plurality of pairs. Laura Valentini (2012), for instance, 
identifies three dichotomies: (1) full compliance versus partial compliance 
theory; (2) utopian versus realistic theory; (3) end-state versus transitional 
theory. Alan Hamlin and Zofia Stemplowska (2012) identify four different 
dimensions: (1) full versus partial compliance; (2) idealization versus 
abstraction; (3) fact sensitivity versus insensitivity; and (4) perfect justice 
versus local improvements. As Gaus notes, philosophy is unfortunately often 
messy, and these different pairs and dimensions are intertwined in many 
discussions related to these themes (Gaus 2016, Ch. 1). Therefore, while it 
would be nice to have sharp definitions and limited dimensions in play in this 
thesis, that does not happen, although these dimensions are present in the 
analysis, some implicitly, some more explicitly.  
This is why political philosophy also carries an ethical burden: because of 
its practical subject. In the case of normative theorizing in political philosophy, 
even if the resulting ideals are not meant to be applied in practice, the 
probability that this will be done, maybe without understanding the 
consequences, is higher than in other areas of philosophy. Therefore, one 
should pay attention to the level of clarity, and also to explaining explicitly if 
and why ideals should not be applied and what kind of risks could be involved 
in their application. Ingrid Robeyns expresses concern (2008, 360) in relation 
to the dangers of ideal theories in a stronger tone:  
[Ideal theorists] sometimes play with real-life examples that create the 
false impression that their theories could be applied in nonideal 
circumstances, where the idealizations are not a reality. I think that 
the dangers of not being much more explicit about the kind of theory 
one is producing, and whether or not it can be applied to the real 
                                               
ideal can be reached, the better, whereas a denial-based conception would advise behaving as if there 
were no obstacles preventing the attainment of the ideal. However, it often seems that it would be better 
to be sensitive to obstacles, rather than denying their existence. These principles hint at intuitively 
interesting considerations to be taken into account. Yet, as Räikkä has argued, using them as a basis for 
choosing a second-best alternative is rather complex. Since they are rather simplistic, and rarely a match 
for practical choice situations, they provide a rather unreliable basis for decisions (Räikkä 2014, Ch. 3; 
see also Brennan & Pettit 2005 for a slightly contrary view). Nonetheless, understanding the wide variety 
of relevant elements can assist in analyzing the complexities related to ideals and aspirational 
alternatives and offer a better understanding of the role of ideal deliberation, how it is related to practical 
contexts, and how these vary in different approaches. 
15 Räikkä points out (2014, 33) that the problem of second best is not only relevant for public 
decision-making and the ideal realm; a lot of everyday decision-making also involves considerations of 
second best. Let us say, for example, that I order a cup of clear, unflavored tea in a café; if that is not 
available, in a second choice between Earl Grey tea and a juice I would select the latter, as I am not a 
huge fan of bergamot in my cup of tea. 
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world, are dramatically underestimated. These dangers include 
potentially harmful policies and actions in the real world, but also a 
counterproductive development in the literature on theories of justice, 
where scholars are talking at cross-purposes and where limited time 
and energies are directed towards developing critiques that are 
missing the mark. 
 
This reflects the responsibility that normative theorizing about elements of the 
practical realm brings with it. This responsibility carries perhaps the most 
complex components related to research integrity for the normative theorist. 
Which questions are to be discussed at a universal level; which should be kept 
closer to the context? What practical limitations are relevant; what are 
irrelevant? This interplay is complex, and often there seems to be no single 
right choice. Evaluating whether one is idealizing responsibly is complicated, 
as are comparisons between theories operating on different levels of 
idealization. Hence, I should note that sometimes, when I am critical of certain 
theories, it might be that they are not shown in the best light from the 
perspective I have chosen and there might be good reasons to approach the 
subject differently. This possibility notwithstanding, the theories I have 
chosen to discuss here all highlight some vital elements for the thesis. 
1.4 TOWARDS PROCEDURAL VALUE 
Mainstream deliberative proceduralism has been very influential both among 
philosophers, and also within the more empirical political sphere. Epistemic 
proceduralism has lately emerged as perhaps the most popular approach in 
the field, with intrinsic proceduralism offering a less common alternative.16 
There might be several empirical reasons for this: firstly, the latter does not 
properly fit common taxonomies currently used as heuristic tools to perceive 
the horizon of alternative forms of proceduralism; it might also initially appear 
tautological to some, as if one were claiming democracy to be valuable because 
it is democratic. Furthermore, most attempts to defend the idea that 
democracy has intrinsic value seem to be prone to instrumental or epistemic 
critique. One might understand the essence of procedural equality in a thin 
format, as prospective fairness, for example.  
That said, a few accounts that employ a constitutive form of justification 
have recently been published. In this study, I refer to recent work by Ceva 
(2016), Rostbøll (forthcoming), and Kolodny (2014a & b). I personally also 
suggested constitutive understanding as an alternative strategy in an early 
sketch in 2012, even though it did look quite different back then.17 The minimal 
                                               
16 Even the most recently revised (summer 2017) entry on political legitimacy (Peter 2017a) in the 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy refers briefly to Kolodny and Christiano when discussing pure 
proceduralism, but not intrinsic proceduralism. 




intrinsic proceduralism that I defend in this thesis combines a number of 
different elements, especially those from two recent accounts: Rostbøll’s non-
instrumentalism (forthcoming) and Ceva’s interactive justice (2016) that is 
discussed in more detail in Chapters Five–Six, although the view I defend 
differs slightly from those of both of these scholars.18 Additionally, the way in 
which this thesis combines the analysis of Cohen’s, Estlund’s, and Christiano’s 
theories in defense of intrinsic proceduralism is unique. As I see it, analyses of 
all these theories are valuable as such, and, in combination, draw a larger 
picture of the different ways to understand the relationship between 
procedures and substance in current democratic theories. 
The points I make at the end concerning intrinsically revised deliberation 
are not surprising. As I see it, however, the framing of the question and the 
combination of the themes enable better understanding of how these points 
relate to justification of democratic procedures. They also illuminate the 
fundamental elements of justification in relation to deliberative procedures. 
The thesis combines what I understand to be the most relevant current 
philosophical perspectives from which to consider the interplay of procedural 
and substantial themes in a democratic context. The thesis also provides 
theoretical insights that could be employed for more empirical approaches.  
I defend here the thesis that democratic procedures can have intrinsic value 
– value that is not merely outcome-oriented or instrumental – and that they 
are special in the sense that they can have intrinsic value in addition to 
instrumental value. I do not argue here that other kinds of procedures could 
not have intrinsic value, yet Martha Nussbaum’s parody of a procedure-
oriented mindset is thought-provoking. Nussbaum (2006, 83) caricatures a 
procedure-oriented theorist in her example of a cook in love with her pasta 
machine:  
[I]t seems to the outcome-oriented theorist as if the cook has a fancy, 
sophisticated pasta-maker, and assures her guest that the pasta made 
in this machine will be by definition good, since it is the best machine 
on the market. But surely, the outcome theorist says, the guests want 
to taste the pasta and see for themselves.  
 
Nussbaum’s example points towards a common view that procedures are mere 
machines, valuable only instrumentally because of their outcomes; and that 
even thinking otherwise is somehow comical. In the case of the pasta-maker it 
seems that the outcomes dictate. However, whether would one rank for 
example the value of the Japanese tea ceremony, the Way of Tea, according to 
                                               
18 In relation to Rostbøll’s Kantian non-instrumental freedom argument, I seek more minimal 
normative commitments. I would consider it an asset if the approach had a certain robustness in relation 
to normative ethical theories. Ceva’s defense of procedural theory of interactive justice focuses broadly 
on conflict management and interactive justice in the political sphere. But her theory also covers many 
of the themes discussed in the latter parts of this work in which her views are influential. These are 
discussed in Chapters Five and Six. See especially 5.5 for reflection on the differences. 
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the taste of the tea seems like a slightly different question, although there is an 
instrumental element present, of course. The tea ceremonies are described as 
a “Way” in Zen arts, and hence they do involve an instrumental element. They 
are paths to enlightenment. At the same time the Way can be translated as “the 
inner essence of reality”. According to Zen the enlightenment can be 
interpreted as emptiness or nothingness. “Efforts to master the intricate 
discipline of tea … constitute a process of self-realisation, whereby one so 
thoroughly incorporates the form that it … no longer requires one’s conscious 
attention.” (Kondo 1985.) Nonetheless, there is also the rituality that is not 
outcome-oriented. The Way of Tea creates a ritual domain, a distilled form of 
experience (Kondo 1985). I am obviously not suggesting that the relational 
equality of citizens constituted by democratic procedures should be considered 
parallel with the Way of Tea. I simply wish to raise the salience of procedural 
value by suggesting how procedures might also have intrinsic value in addition 
to their instrumental, consequential value. 
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2 COHEN’S PROCEDURAL AND 
SUBSTANTIAL IDEAL DELIBERATION 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyses the version of the deliberative ideal first defended by 
Joshua Cohen in his 1989 article “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy”. 
In it Cohen introduces what now seems like a mainstream philosophical view 
of the deliberative ideal, one which is deeply procedural yet involves a 
hypothetical substantial element. It combines components from the 
Rawlsian19 and Habermasian frameworks into a new and original view, 
thereby bringing the two major theoretical perspectives of the political 
philosophers of the previous generation into the sphere of democratic theory. 
Before implementing deeply proceduralist Habermasian elements, Cohen 
(1986) defended a more epistemic approach, but after positing ideal 
deliberative reasoning as a core of the deliberative process, his view became a 
unique combination of the procedural and substantial (Cohen 2009a).  
In Cohen’s deliberative proceduralism, substantial and procedural 
elements are tied together into a deliberative ideal (an ideal that is to be 
applied to democratic politics). His work has had a major influence, not just 
on political philosophy but also empirical research. However, even though I 
value his work highly, and its underlying motivation even more, I take a critical 
approach to his formulations here. I argue that the substantial basis of the 
ideal does not appear robust enough, and yet according to Cohen himself the 
procedural values are, as such, too thin for justificatory purposes. 
Furthermore, actual democratic deliberation seems in the end disconnected 
from the hypothetical justification. It also seems questionable that 
justification of procedures and justification of outcomes should be connected 
in the way Cohen suggests.  
Nonetheless, Cohen’s view is not just one of the major versions of the 
deliberative ideal; it also highlights many of the issues that are relevant for my 
thesis. Therefore Cohen’s deliberative ideal and the questions it provokes 
function effectively as a background for the later chapters of this study, setting 
the stage for the questions discussed. What is the role of procedures and 
substance in deliberative views? How are they related? Can the democratic 
process be radically democratic or does it necessarily rely on procedure-
independent standards? This chapter and Chapters Three and Four form the 
first part of the thesis, analyzing three different kinds of procedural 
understandings of democratic deliberation and justification. Chapter Four 
plays a double role, as it is also the first chapter of the second part of the thesis, 
                                               
19 A historically interesting detail is that Cohen was a student of Rawls. 
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which focuses on procedural equality and the possibility of intrinsic worth of 
democratic procedures.  
2.2 THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION  
Deliberative democracy refers to decision making via a public, free, and equal 
deliberation process. It is an ideal model for organizing the collective exercise 
of power in the major institutions of a society, enabling decisions concerning 
the wellbeing of its members to be made by free and equal public reasoning 
processes between citizens.20 Democracy is understood as a process of 
practical reasoning of citizens, a form of communicative rationality. The 
deliberative ideal depicts members of society as committed to solving their 
common, shared problems via reasoning (see, for example, Cohen 1989). As 
Jürgen Habermas writes (1996[1992], 285): “We need not confront reason as 
an alien authority residing somewhere beyond political communication.”  
Since the 1990s theories of democratic deliberation have more or less 
dominated democratic theorizing.21 Deliberative ideas have been discussed at 
various levels, all the way from very practice-oriented studies to the 
theoretical.22 Many have used bold wording, such as “a change of democratic 
paradigm”, “a democratic turn”, or “a crisis of democratic theory”, to describe 
the theoretical move of the focus (see, for example, Sandel 1996; Benhabib 
1996a; Fraser 1997a; Shapiro & Hacker-Cordón 1999; Dryzek 2000; Shapiro 
2003; Mouffe 2000 etc.). Yet, even with a less grandiose attitude, this growing 
theoretical interest in discursive ideals of decision making might be 
interpreted as a sign that these questions are considered relevant for 
                                               
20 Even if I use language that references the nation-state decision-making context (e.g., “citizen” and 
“society”), I do not claim that democracy belongs merely to nation states or refers only to decision-
making at a national level. As I see it demos can take place in various contexts from local to global, with 
certain context-dependent conditions, and this definition is one essential horizon of democratic 
theorizing. It is crucial to discuss the scope of decision-making, especially for deliberative views, as many 
deliberative theories define demos functionally, i.e., requiring that decisions should be made by all those 
affected. This functionalist definition of demos is distinguished from the territorial definition i.e., from 
defining demos as a certain territory, such as a nation state with borders. Defining the borders of demos 
is also complex in practice. It could be said that the relationship between territories called democracies 
and democratic decision-making is paradoxical, as the borders of so-called “democracies” are not 
defined democratically, but by violent means. Yet I will not discuss questions related to defining demos 
in this work – although fundamental and all-encompassing, opening that horizon here would take us 
away from the focus of this work (for more on these themes see, for example, Dahl 1989; Dryzek 1990; 
Held 2000; Shapiro & Hacker-Cordón 1999; Young 2000, 236–270, etc.) 
21 As mentioned in the introduction, to my knowledge the term “deliberative democracy” was first 
used by Joseph Bessette 1980. 
22 Empirical research on the effects of different kinds of deliberative settings is currently a vast field 
in political science. 
Cohen’s Procedural and Substantial Ideal Deliberation 
 
30 
contemporary conditions of moral and cultural pluralism within societies and 
other democratic decision bodies.23 The questions arise from the realization 
that people with different world views and moral convictions should make 
decisions together, not just despite each other, and that the decisions should 
somehow take into account the wide variety of viewpoints. Implementing 
multiple perspectives in a joint reasoning process has also immense creative 
potential.  
Deliberative theories are often explained in comparison to an ideal called 
“aggregative democracy”24 defended, for example, by social choice theorists25 
(e.g., Bohman & Rehg 1997, ix–xiii; Cohen 1989, 17; Estlund 2008, 87–88; 
Dryzek 2000; Kymlicka 2002, 287–290; Shapiro 2003; Young 2000, 18–23; 
Elster 1997[1986] among others.) The ideal of aggregative democracy refers to 
decision making via a process of aggregation in which individual votes are 
combined and the option gaining more votes than the others is chosen. As Jon 
Elster (1997[1986]) describes, aggregative models conceive of democracy as 
similar to a “market” of rational agents choosing maximum satisfaction for 
their already fixed preferences. Both of these ideals, aggregative and 
deliberative, are procedural in the sense that they focus on the idea of 
democratic procedures instead of institutional structures or practices of actual 
decision making. They also share some basic elements of democracy: the 
principle of the rule of law; voting as a means of decision making (albeit 
according to the deliberative ideal that it is to be used only when reaching 
consensus is impossible); and basic rights and liberties such as freedom of 
expression, association, and assembly. They differ, however, in their 
understanding of the role of public reasoning and also in interpretations of 
rationality and even some convictions concerning the possibility of objective 
normativity. Yet deliberative theorists maintain that the elements of the 
deliberative ideal that differ from the aggregative ideal are the most important 
for achieving legitimate decisions in plural societies, as will be discussed 
below. The focus in this thesis is on the differences between types of 
proceduralisms that accord an essential role to deliberation;26 in particular, on 
the kind of role that deliberation plays in different types of procedural views 
and how it is justified. 
 
                                               
23 I do not claim that pluralism as such has increased; rather, that awareness of it has grown. 
24 Some use also label “interest group pluralism” (e.g., Bohman & Rehg 1997), but, as Iris Young has 
emphasized, this is misleading as the ideal does not necessarily involve vindication of pluralism or even 
interests that are thoroughly (2000, fn. 5). 
25 Steven Wall (2000, 225) labels James Buchanan, Anthony Downs, William Riker, and David 
Truman as defenders of this kind of ideal which employs elements of Schumpeter’s elitist view and 
rational choice theories. Robert Dahl’s egalitarian account also favors aggregating even while differing 
from more social choice theory orientations (Bohman & Rehg 1997, x—xiii.) 
26 I will not discuss the aggregative type of proceduralisms further here, but the references in the 
previous footnote offer a good starting point.  
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Although many deliberative theorists do defend voting as a means of 
decision making, especially in situations in which consensual decisions are not 
reached, they argue that the role of voting in their formulation differs from 
that in aggregative approaches. In a deliberative framework voting is seen 
merely as a pragmatic means to decide in cases in which a decision has to be 
made even if agreement has not been reached, whereas the discussion and 
deliberation prior to that comprise the main driving force. The aim of an open 
dialogical deliberation process is to shift individual preferences in a more 
reasoned and justified direction, one taking into account the various 
viewpoints affecting the decision. As deliberative views seek the best reasons 
for decisions, the latter are not merely the result of a majority vote. Instead, 
the ideal decision-making process arrives at consensual decisions made with 
mutual understanding of the diverse multiplicity of all the relevant viewpoints 
(see for example Young 2000, 18–23; Cohen 1989.) 
2.2.1 COHEN’S JUSTIFICATORY VIEW – BOTH PROCEDURAL AND 
SUBSTANTIAL 
[R]adical democracy – understood as an effort to combine values of 
both participation and deliberation – has promise to be a distinctive 
form of democracy, in which the informal public sphere and 
conventional democratic institutions are reshaped by their 
connections with participatory-deliberative arrangements for solving 
problems. (Cohen 2009b, 263) 
 
Joshua Cohen is a key developer of the idea of deliberative democracy (see 
also, for example, Seyla Benhabib 1996b, 2002; Amy Gutmann & Dennis 
Thompson 1996; John Dryzek 1990.) His approach is what I, in this work, take 
as a paradigm case for the mainstream deliberative ideal. He combines 
elements from the liberal democratic ideal and an emphasis on individual 
rights with the republican ideal that focuses on citizenship and public 
dialogue. More specifically, he has taken elements from both Rawlsian and 
Habermasian frameworks and incorporated them into his own conception of 
democracy. In particular, Cohen’s view builds on Rawls’ idea of public 
reasoning and his method of reflective equilibrium, a process of deliberation 
aiming at coherence between particular beliefs and coherentist justification in 
the contexts of liberal society,27 and on Habermas’ ideal of communicative 
                                               
27 Rawls’ reflective equilibrium describes a state of balance. It refers to a theoretical method that can 
be used in order to square particular judgments with broader normative theory in order to find coherence 
between them. The method was originally developed for logic by Nelson Goodman for the purpose of 
coherentist justification of particular judgments and general rules. Rawls later applied this method to 
normative moral philosophy. The core idea of the Rawlsian application is that the reflection process 
changes both specific judgments and broader theory so that reflective equilibrium between them can be 
achieved (see, for example, Rawls 1999[1971], 18–19, 40–45; Daniels 1979. 
Cohen’s Procedural and Substantial Ideal Deliberation 
 
32 
discourse.28 Even if both Rawls and Habermas have later discussed these 
themes in more detail themselves, it was Cohen who first brought the themes 
to these discussions and, more importantly, applied the elements concurrently 
in building his own ideal of democratic deliberation to serve as a source of 
public justification (Cohen 1989).29  
Cohen’s conceptualization is particularly interesting from this perspective 
since it is both a paradigmatic philosophical deliberative account and yet it 
specifically emphasizes both procedural and substantial elements; indeed, he 
maintains that they are joined, observing, “Procedural and substantive values 
come … as parts of a package” (1994, 591). The central part of democracy is not 
just equal treatment of citizens, that is, decision-makers, but the joint process 
of reasoning together as equals and relying on this common reasoning as a 
basis of justification. “A deliberative conception puts public reasoning at the 
center of political justification” (Cohen 1996, 99). This process is not only an 
instrument for achieving more just outcomes, but “a way to realize in actual 
political life an ideal of justification through public reason-giving” (Cohen 
2009a, 8). Thus for Cohen, the legitimacy of democratic decisions emerges 
from the role of reason-giving, that is, mutual justification that is reached via 
the deliberation procedure. Cohen also emphasizes that his deliberative ideal 
is a political ideal in distinction to an all-encompassing moral outlook. 
Cohen maintains that democracy is above all free and self-determining. He 
explains (2009a, 10) that “deliberative democracy has strong roots in a radical 
democratic tradition”. He regards democracy as a fundamental political ideal 
                                               
28 Habermas maintains that substantial ethical standards are no longer available in contemporary 
plural societies. Habermas’ main project has been developing an account of normativity that arises from 
the structure of human capacities. According to his discourse-theoretical view, only those norms or 
normative arrangements that have been accepted by all parties in the ideal discourse situation are 
binding. This is the key idea behind deliberative ideals in political philosophy. Later, in the wake of many 
others, he also applied the idea to democratic theory. There are many similarities between Habermasian 
and Rawlsian views, but Habermas’ view is more democratic in the sense that he denies that 
philosophers have some sort of special knowledge of where ideal discourse might lead. For Habermas 
the key is the ideal discourse of actual people. In other words, the discourses constitute the outcome that 
does not exist prior to them. In Habermasian thought ideal and real discourses might not resemble each 
other. Real discourse should proceed according to norms that would ground the assumption that they 
have been unanimously accepted in ideal discourse, but the norms might be very different from those 
guiding the ideal discourse (see, for example, Habermas 1996[1992], 1996). 
29 Cohen’s view is also more “democratic” than Rawls’ – this is the Habermasian part of his account. 
By this I refer to the point that the ideal requires actual reasoning between citizens, whereas Rawls’ 
account is built on his standard of public reason, something that is not constituted by a democratic 
process of reasoning among citizens. As Benhabib (2002, 108) has argued, “public reason in Rawls's 
theory is best viewed not as a process of reasoning among citizens, but more as a regulative principle, 
imposing certain standards upon how individuals, institutions, and agencies ought to reason about 




that is itself a source of value, not a derivative ideal that could be explained via 
other values. He argues (1996, 102) that “deliberative democracy provides a 
form of autonomy: that all who are governed by collective decisions … must 
find the bases of those decisions acceptable”. However, although Cohen 
accentuates the role of actual deliberation and the mutual justification 
achieved in a form of consensus, the acceptance required is after all 
hypothetical. He maintains (1997[1989], 73) that “outcomes are 
democratically legitimate if and only if they could be the object of a free and 
reasoned agreement among equals”. The key to Cohen’s deliberative ideal lies 
in this hypothetic public procedural justification.30  
To emphasize this core element of Cohen’s view, in comparison to other 
formulations discussed in this thesis, namely epistemic proceduralism and 
intrinsic proceduralism, I label Cohen’s approach for the purposes of this 
work, justificatory proceduralism.31 The ideal reasoning process is the source 
of justification. The core of the view is that democratic decisions gain their 
legitimacy via the ideal public deliberation process.32 The justificatory view 
also provides an interesting point of comparison with epistemic proceduralism 
and intrinsic proceduralism. (This is not to be confused with justificatory 
minimalism, discussed in Chapter Six, which focuses on the scope of 
justification rather than procedures.) 
As noted, justificatory proceduralism combines procedural and substantial 
elements. Cohen maintains that his deliberative democracy reaches beyond 
mere proceduralism, because it accepts what he calls “the ‘fact of reasonable 
pluralism’ – the fact that there are distinct, incompatible understandings of 
value, each one reasonable, to which people are drawn under favorable 
conditions for the exercise of their practical reason” Cohen (1996, 96). 
Reasonable pluralism functions not just as a limit for outcomes of the 
procedure, but also as a way to bring more substantial elements into frame. 
Additionally, it is used to introduce relevant considerations about the 
stringency or weight of demands imposed on agents by their convictions. 
(Cohen 1989, 1994, 1996.)  
                                               
30 Often the ideal process is also determined “by all the affected”. Yet the question of scope of 
democratic decision-making opens up a complicated debate since it is extremely difficult to determine 
who are affected by decisions and to what extent. In this work, however, I pass over that debate (as far 
as possible). Yet the question of the scope of demos is one of the relevant themes to consider when 
democratic decision-making in a globalized world is discussed (see also, for example, Goodin 2003, 
Benhabib 1996a; for a critical view see, for example, Lagerspezt forthcoming). 
31 In a recent review article Christiano and Bajaj (2017, 383) label Cohen’s view the rational 
consensus conception and evaluate it as “perhaps the most prominent moral conception of deliberative 
democracy”. 
32 There are many other prominent theorists whose approaches also build on public justification, 
including Gaus. Yet for Gaus the scope of legitimate decisions is much narrower (see, for example, Gaus 
1996.) 
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The role of equality in the Cohenian deliberative ideal is rather complex, 
even ambiguous, I would say. Cohen emphasizes (2009a, 6) that the equal 
treatment of people in the decision-making process was one of the key themes 
at the beginning of his work on deliberative theories. He is interested in the 
kind of implications that equal treatment would have both on democratic 
procedures and outcomes and, furthermore, how it captures both the 
procedural and substantive dimensions of decision making. However, he also 
explicitly maintains in a later text (2009a, 6), the mere “treating people as 
equals” seems to him “thin” and “too limited to serve the central normative 
role” – which resembles a worry that theorists defending epistemic 
conceptions often highlight (see Estlund’s critique of intrinsic proceduralism 
in Chapters Four and Five). Cohen has even described an earlier version of his 
approach as “an epistemic conception of democracy” (1986), although he also 
sees (2009a, 7) that an epistemic conception is not enough as such, as it is 
“missing something about democracy as a fundamental political value”.  
2.2.2 CONDITIONS OF THE DELIBERATIVE IDEAL 
Cohen states (1989, 17) that deliberative democracy means “roughly, an 
association whose affairs are governed by the public deliberation of its 
members”. The deliberative ideal is an abstract model that combines an 
intuitive idea of democratic co-operation and a more substantial view and is 
thus both procedural and substantial at the same time. It is based on an 
intuitive idea of a society in which the conditions of co-operation are justified 
in a dialogical process of reasoning between equals. Deliberative democracy 
institutionalizes this intuitive ideal of political justification. Cohen describes 
democracy as an association in which citizens commit to mutual decision 
making and, above all, to sharing their reasons with each other. He writes 
(1989) “[d]emocratic deliberation is about reason-giving to others as equals”. 
In a dialogical deliberation process citizens present their ideas or suggestions 
for solving common problems or fulfilling legitimate needs. The arguments 
presented in this process are also intended to convince the other participants 
of their legitimacy.  
This ideal dialogical reasoning process is defined by certain 
institutionalized normative rules. These rules set the deliberative ideal apart 
from democratic vices such as manipulation, propaganda, brainwashing, or 
strategic negotiation, and also function as limits to the autonomy of a 
deliberative society. They set the stage for democratic decision making. The 
deliberative ideal is constituted of equal, public, and open deliberative 
decision making, and also rules and institutionalized procedures that 
condition deliberation, thereby simultaneously enabling deliberation. 
Essential to the ideal is that the outcomes of deliberation are legitimate “if and 
only if they could be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among 
equals”, as already mentioned above (Cohen [1989]1997, 73). Most of all the 
ideal deliberative procedure should enable this.  
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Cohen describes these rules of deliberative democracy as a combination of 
formal and substantial conditions. The formal conception describes an 
account of the ideal and can be characterized via five features (F1–F5) (Cohen 
1989, 21–22): 
F1 A deliberative democracy is an ongoing and independent 
association, whose members expect it to continue into the indefinite 
future. 
 
Deliberation is understood not just as mere face-to-face dialogue in a certain 
place and time, but as an ongoing, never-ending process at various levels of 
society. According to most deliberative theories this dialogue takes place in 
numerous contexts, not just in certain institutions, even though the actual acts 
of law-making might do so. It is also expected that relationships between 
people can be complex, mediated, and multiple (see also Habermas 1996a, 
296–307).33  
F2 The members of the association share (and it is common knowledge 
that they share) the view that the appropriate terms of association 
provide a framework for or are the results of their deliberation. They 
share, that is, a commitment to coordinating their activities within 
institutions that make deliberation possible and according to norm 
they arrive at through their deliberation. For them, free deliberation 
among equals is the basis of legitimacy. 
F3 A deliberative democracy is a pluralistic association. The members 
have diverse preferences, convictions, and ideals concerning their own 
lives. While sharing a commitment to the deliberative resolution of 
problems of collective choice (D2), they also have divergent aims, and 
do not think that some particular set of preferences, convictions, or 
ideals is mandatory. 
F4 Because the members of a democratic association regard 
deliberative procedures as the source of legitimacy, it is important to 
them that the terms of their association not merely be the results of 
their deliberation, but also be manifest to them as such. They prefer 
institutions in which the connections between deliberation and 
outcomes are evident to ones in which the connections are less clear. 
F5 The members recognize one another as having deliberative 
capacities, i.e., the capacities required for entering into a public 
                                               
33 Democratic theories can be split between centered and decentered. In centered models democratic 
decision-making is at least implicitly understood as taking place in a certain institution or institutions, 
such as at a small local meeting (see, for example, Barber 1984); whereas in decentered models 
democratic processes are understood to occur in various contexts of the public sphere and even in more 
private arenas as well (see, for example, Benhabib 2002; Bohman 1996; Andrew Arato & Jean Cohen 
1992; Joshua Cohen 1989; Habermas 1996a; Young 2000). 
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exchange of reasons and for acting on the results of such public 
reasoning. 
 
This formal ideal is given substance by Cohen’s outlining an ideal deliberative 
procedure that states the conditions for deliberative decision making. 
According to Cohen (1989, 21) the substantive account of an ideal procedure 
“captures the notion of justification through public argument and reasoning 
among citizens, and serves in turn as a model for deliberative institutions”. It 
is these substantial requirements (below) that connect the formal ideal (above) 
to democratic institutions. The ideal procedure consists of the following four 
conditions (I1–I4) (Cohen 1989, 22–23):  
I1 Ideal deliberation is free in that it satisfies two conditions. First, the 
participants regard themselves as bound only by the results of their 
deliberation. Their consideration of proposals is not constrained by the 
authority of prior norms or requirements. Second, the participants 
suppose that they can act from the results, taking the fact that a certain 
decision is arrived at through their deliberation as a sufficient reason 
for complying with it. 
I2 Deliberation is reasoned in that the parties to it are required to state 
their reasons for advancing proposals, supporting them, or criticizing 
them. They give reasons with the expectation that those reasons (and 
not, for example, their power) will settle the fate of their proposal. In 
ideal deliberation, as Habermas puts it, “no force except that of the 
better argument is exercised” (1975, p. 108). Reasons are offered with 
the aim of bringing others to accept the proposal, given their disparate 
ends (D3) and their commitment (D2) to settling the conditions of their 
association through free deliberation among equals. Proposals may be 
rejected because they are not defended with acceptable reasons, even 
if they could be so defended. The deliberative conception emphasizes 
that collective choices should be made in a deliberative way, and not 
only that those choices should have a desirable fit with the preferences 
of citizens. 
 
Cohen’s third condition for ideal deliberation is equality, which is provided 
with more detail than formal condition F5’s mutual recognition of deliberative 
capacities: 
I3 In ideal deliberation, parties are both formally and substantively 
equal. They are formally equal in that the rules regulating the 
procedure do not single out individuals. Everyone with the deliberative 
capacities has equal standing at each state of the deliberative process. 
Each can put issues on the agenda, propose solutions, and offer 
reasons in support of or in criticism of proposals. And each has an 
equal voice in the decision. The participants are substantively equal in 
that the existing distribution of power and resources does not shape 
their changes to contribute to deliberation, nor does that distribution 
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play an authoritative role in their deliberation. The participants in the 
deliberative procedure do not regard themselves as bound by the 
existing system of rights, except insofar as that system establishes the 
framework of free deliberation among equals. Instead they regard 
that system as a potential object of their deliberative judgement. 
 
The last, and perhaps also the most controversial of Cohen’s conditions for 
ideal procedure, is consensus: 
I4 Finally, ideal deliberation aims to arrive at a rationally motivated 
consensus―to find reasons that are persuasive to all who are 
committed to acting on the results of a free and reasoned assessment 
of alternatives by equals. Even under ideal conditions there is no 
promise that consensual reasons will be forthcoming. If they are not, 
then deliberation concludes with voting, subject to some form of 
majority rule. The fact that it may so conclude does not, however, 
eliminate the distinction between deliberative forms of collective choice 
and forms that aggregate non-deliberative preferences. The 
institutional consequences are likely to be different in the two cases, 
and the results of voting among those who are committed to finding 
the reasons that are persuasive to all are likely to differ from the results 
of an aggregation that proceeds in the absence of this commitment. 
 
This condition accentuates the infinite nature of the deliberative process. Since 
people often disagree on what is rational, irrational, or fair, and, moreover, 
since they often also disagree on what is a valid basis for judgment, the 
deliberative process takes time. Yet, even with enormous amounts of time, one 
cannot be sure that consensus will be available at the end, and there are 
reasons to assume that it will not. If consensus cannot be reached, Cohen 
suggests majority voting as a compromise. But he wishes to emphasize that the 
vote in question is a vote on alternatives refined by the deliberative process. 
He argues that the institutional consequences of this kind of refined post-
deliberation voting differ from aggregative voting, since the participants have 
been committed to solving the question according to ideal deliberative 
conditions (I will discuss this assumption in greater detail later in this chapter) 
(Cohen 1989, 21–23; see also Pettit 2001, 270). 
The ideal deliberative process is constituted by these conditions and it 
should respect these conditions in order to reach legitimate decisions. 
Defenders of the deliberative ideal maintain that the ideal conditions rest upon 
human interaction’s being guided by universal respect and equal reciprocity: 
the same norms that are the preconditions of moral and political dialogue. 
Indeed, Benhabib (2002, 11) observes that these conditions reflect a virtuous 
circle, by which she refers to the idea that political dialogue requires these 
conditions as a preliminary starting point, and should also result in these 
conditions becoming concrete and legitimate in particular decisions. 
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(Benhabib 2002, 11–12.) This circularity is not seen in such a favorable light 
by everyone (see, for example, Young 2000, 33–36), as I discuss later. 
This free and equal dialogical interaction over common questions creates 
democratic publicity, a publicity in which the participants can hold each other 
responsible,34 forming a political public sphere in which all the citizens can 
participate. Intuitively, however, one could question the possibility of public 
deliberation in large societies, an issue which provides a theme for deliberative 
theory: how to deliberate in a mass society. Yet the deliberative theorists 
typically answer that the deliberation does not require one singular dialogue.35 
Deliberation includes all the various dialogues which members of a society 
have with each other about common questions. As Ackerly and Okin (1999, 
134–139) emphasize, deliberation works simultaneously on many levels: as a 
large process encompassing the whole of society, yet also in small groups 
addressing a particular question. Deliberation is an infinitely ongoing process 
in which the publicity as such is constituted by multiple, unfolding, 
overlapping dialogues on questions relevant to political decision making. As 
smaller public discussions are included in the deliberation process rather than 
located outside it, the deliberative public sphere is constituted by the publicity 
in formal decision making institutions combined with that in all the informal 
venues: social and political movements, parties, religious and artistic groups, 
social media, and so on. This deliberative publicity requires, among other 
elements, freedom of expression and freedom of association; in complex 
contemporary societies it also requires freedom of the press and free media 
(Cohen 1989; see also Benhabib 2002, 21, 115; Arato & Cohen 1992; Habermas 
1996a). 
The public plays an indispensable part in deliberation. It can be seen as 
having three different kinds of roles:  (1) it creates a social space for 
deliberation; (2) it controls the deliberation process and the justifications 
brought out in the course of it; and (3) it offers a standard against which the 
outcomes of the deliberation may be compared. Therefore “the publicity” 
refers to the sphere and procedure of deliberation, but also to the type of 
justification that is used, which, along with mode of expression, should be as 
understandable to others as possible.36 It also increases the weight of 
responsibility for participants. In the public realm one should consider what 
to say and how to say it in order it to be accessible and potentially acceptable 
                                               
34 As public reasoning is one of the major themes of political philosophy, deliberative theorists often 
build on the classic arguments: Kant’s deontological arguments for publicity presented in Perpetual 
Peace (1989[1795]), as well as those delicious examples presented by Mill in his Liberty (1982[1859]), 
especially in the chapter, “Of the liberty of thought and discussion” (1859). The use of these classic 
themes is elaborated by, for example, Gutmann & Thompson (1996, 95–127). 
35 This applies especially to defenders on decentralized conceptions, see footnote 33. 
36 Interpretations of this requirement comprise a relevant point of difference between the 




to others. Accordingly, participants must acknowledge the social pressure of 
the public sphere, how the multitudes of others who comprise it challenge 
them to express their arguments in a more polished and considered manner. 
Furthermore, the various differences between the publics add their own tone. 
Different publics are delimited by the perspectives from which participants are 
able to view their environment, by their social imagination; shared values and 
shared background assumptions impact on each particular public, and what 
must be justified, and what can be taken for granted varies between them 
(Bohman 1996, 25–38; see also Arendt 1961; Habermas 1996). 
2.2.3 ADVANTAGES OF THE DELIBERATIVE IDEAL 
The ideal of democratic deliberation has many advantages. A deliberative view 
combines in the same decision-making procedure both the idea of a common 
good and an autonomous society of free equals. The deliberative ideal is seen 
as a way to improve collective decision making to produce a better fit with 
contemporary plural societies (see Cohen 1989; and also Benhabib 1996b, 
2002; Gutmann & Thompson 1996; Dryzek 1990). According to deliberative 
theorists, deliberative democracy can make decisions more rational and 
legitimate. There are, however, different types of advantages. 
Firstly, decisions made via deliberative procedures differ from bargaining 
and other market types of decision-making procedures in that they explicitly 
focus on the common good. Deliberative theorists maintain that legitimacy 
requires more than a mere arithmetical majority vote. Aggregative decision-
making procedures, on the other hand, are seen to gain legitimacy via 
quantitative merit and the force of numerical majority, and therefore their 
legitimating potential is considered weak (for critique of such a view, see Elster 
1997[1986]; Young 2000, 19–20). In contrast, in deliberative procedures the 
legitimacy of decisions lies in a shared consensus in which everyone accepts 
an outcome on the same grounds. Participants justify different viewpoints to 
each other, and make deliberative decisions that everyone participating in the 
process can accept, taking into account all the variety of viewpoints. The 
legitimacy of decisions made via deliberative procedures rests on the 
assumption that decisions made represent a shared view (Cohen 1989, 17–18; 
see also Benhabib 2002, 105–106, 133.) 
The second advantage of the deliberative approach is that preferences are 
not taken as given, whereas typically, in aggregative ideals, qualities of 
preferences or their motivations are not objects of reflection.37 Some 
aggregative preferences might just be sudden whimsical ideas or based on ill-
founded prejudice, while others are carefully examined products of 
fundamental and pressing needs. Some scholars even claim that aggregative 
views seem to be linked with the methodological fiction of an imaginary 
individual whose preferences are deeply considered and justified (see 
                                               
37 Rousseauian ideals even request preferences to be kept “pure” from deliberation. 
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Benhabib 1996b, 71). Nonetheless, everyone undoubtedly has a range of 
thoughts and preferences, many of which are unreflexive, and not only should 
individuals scrutinize these but they should also evaluate the effects of their 
ideas on society as a whole. This is an asset of the deliberative view since the 
deliberative process enables people to evaluate critically both their own 
thought and that of others, and thus reflect a broad variety of individual views. 
This helps to diminish pure fallacies, or narrowly reflected opinions. Often, at 
the beginning of the process, different views and ideas may be rather 
contradictory and distant, but the public deliberation process helps people to 
reflect on their own points of view and also take other views into better 
account. Initially divergent views become much more compatible with each 
other via the process of deliberation (Cohen 1989; see also Benhabib 1996b, 
71; Young 2000, 19–20). Ultimately, attending to and understanding others’ 
points of view helps to diminish differences and tensions. 
The deliberative process should help decision makers reflect upon and 
consider their views, and eliminate those that are ill-founded. Unelaborated 
individual preferences can be egoistic, dismissing even the most legitimate 
claims of others, but they may be partly or even wholly based on 
misunderstanding or fallacy. Furthermore, a public deliberation process 
forces individuals to think about what is acceptable to others in terms of 
reasons and justification, since they have to defend their views to an audience 
which will not be convinced without explanations of why something should be 
taken into account, why it is relevant. Because justifications should also 
convince those of different minds, taking their legitimate claims into account, 
viewpoints cannot be ill-founded or based on prejudice or bias in the ideal 
deliberative process. In order to justify their perspective to others, deliberators 
should enlarge their mentality to take other perspectives into account, at least 
during the process if not before. Benhabib, who defended a mainstream 
deliberative ideal much like Cohen’s in the 1990s and early 2000s,38 also refers 
to Hannah Arendt (1961) and her Kantian notion of enlarged mentality when 
discussing the ideal reasoning required by democratic deliberation. Arendt 
especially locates the enlarged mentality idea in relation to political judgment, 
where it is crucially applied to the potential acceptance of reasoning, since it is 
agreement with others that has to be reached. The special feature of judgments 
is their potential to affect agreement, not just in the personal, but also the 
public realm. Yet other, different viewpoints are required in order to go beyond 
a singular individual perspective and reach legitimacy in the public realm. 
Further, Arendt stresses that a judgment can never be universally accepted, as 
its validity requires the presence of other perspectives, and is limited to the 
perspectives present in the process (Benhabib 1996b, 68–72; Arendt 1961, 
220–221; see also Cohen 1989; Phillips 1999, 113–116). Since deliberation 
requires participants to present their arguments and justifications in public, 
                                               




the orientation of participants shifts from the self to the public, facilitating 
understanding of other points of view (Young 2000, 24–26). 
According to defenders of the deliberative ideal, the deliberative process 
makes collective decisions more rational. The relevance of inclusiveness can 
be interpreted epistemologically; when all points of view are equally included 
in the deliberation process, understanding may be acquired of multiple 
standpoints, giving rise to the question: what are the reasons behind the 
views? Thus the deliberative decision-making process is based on enlarged 
understanding of all the relevant viewpoints. Benhabib highlights (1996, 71) 
this important role of the deliberative process in the rationality of collective 
decision making when she writes that “no single individual can anticipate and 
foresee all the variety of perspectives through matters of ethics and politics 
would be perceived by different individuals” and also that “no single individual 
can possess all the information deemed relevant to a certain decision affecting 
all”. Deliberation enables a more coherent and considered picture of the whole 
(Cohen 1989; Benhabib 1996; 70–71; see also Lagerspetz 2001, 19–21).  
Deliberation as open-ended reflection offers the potential for novel 
solutions to political problems. For example, Young highlights that, in 
addition to providing a general overview of a situation, understanding of 
inherent tensions and the reasons for them are clarified via deliberation. That 
makes it possible to focus on the actual problems (Young 2000, 30–31). As 
Anne Phillips has suggested (1999, 114–116), decisions reached via public 
deliberative reflection can be such that no one could have foreseen them 
beforehand; even should such ideas have arisen, there would not have been 
sufficient grounds to propose them. After decision-makers hear all the 
different viewpoints pertaining to a topic, however, they have the opportunity 
to create together new ways to solve problems that take the range of 
perspectives into account.  
The deliberative process also impacts on participants and their civic skills 
and virtues. How should a point of view be justified to others? How should one 
listen? This helps participants to develop a broader understanding of society 
and the perspectives it contains. Deliberative decision making broadens and 
deepens the opportunities of citizens to affect their society – not just the 
decisions made, but also the institutions of decision making and the topics of 
discussion, which are not predefined and limited. Participants are free to 
suggest new topics and redefine the scope of deliberation. As Cohen maintains, 
the questions are not limited to their scope, and that also enables deliberation 
about the democratic institutions themselves (1989, 17–18).  
Whereas the aggregative model of democracy faces difficulties with 
objectivity – incorporating a subjectivist view that considers normative 
statements as mere expressions of individual preferences – this does not seem 
to be a problem for the deliberative model (Young 2000, 19–21). The 
normative force of deliberative decisions is based on the fact that all those 
affected by the decision have accepted it in the course of the deliberative 
process. Thus the decisions are not the product of individual preferences, but 
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rather reflect the shared view of the best possible solution, taking into account 
all the various viewpoints (Cohen 1989). Iris Young (1997b, 401–403) adds 
that the deliberative ideal decision-making procedure also advances a more 
reflective and objective view of society as a whole, on a more general level. By 
objective she does not refer to a neutral ideal, but to a reflective view that 
locates individual viewpoints in a broader context of multiple particularistic 
viewpoints (see also Williams 2000, 124–125, 131–134; cf. Putnam 1995).39  
Proceduralism is one of the main strengths of the deliberative ideal. With 
its focus on procedures, it seems to be well-suited to a plural context since it 
does not require commitment to potentially contradictory values or a limit to 
be placed on the viewpoints that can be brought into a deliberation. In fact, 
value pluralism is considered the starting point for deliberation. The 
deliberative model departs from the assumption that people have different 
views concerning social life and the best solutions for social ills. The role of 
democratic procedures is to find ways to solve problems that take into account 
the pluralism of modern societies. According to the justificatory ideal, only 
procedural understandings of democracy that do not require commitment to 
a particular set of values are rational means to solve common problems in 
plural democratic societies. When decision making is conditioned only by 
those values and rules which have been accepted via mutual deliberation, 
decision making can fit flexibly into a plurality of values and changing 
situations. Moreover, individuals are not required to exclude their values from 
deliberation; rather, they can bring their value considerations into the process 
when presenting arguments in a joint deliberative dialogue. Democratic 
procedure can be seen as method to form, analyze, and allocate weight to these 
various viewpoints. The more conflictual the views, the more important it is 
that those disagreeing can present their arguments in public dialogue with 
others. Deliberative procedures offer a unique possibility to articulate the 
conflicts of interest of plural societies in social co-operation conditioned by 
mutually accepted rules (Cohen 1989; see also Benhabib 1996b). 
2.3 IDEALITY OF THE DELIBERATIVE IDEAL?  
Thus the deliberative ideal has many advantages. Yet there are problems as 
well. In the following, I discuss the ideal in a more critical light: the ideal sui 
generis, and also approximations of the ideal. Why are the approximations 
                                               
39 Young herself defends social perspectivism, an idea that social reality can be observed only as a 
combination of different social perspectives. The more viewpoints that are combined and the better the 
different views taken into consideration, the more objective the general broader view becomes. This idea 
of objectivity as a combination of social perspectives references Nietzsche (see, for example, 1968, points 
259, 339, 481, 490, 602, 616, 636, 786). For more on the politics of difference and social perspectivism, 




also relevant? Because in Cohen’s view it is not just the legitimacy of particular 
deliberative decisions that is based on this hypothetical justification – on a 
consensus that everyone could reach on the same grounds – it also applies to 
deliberative institutions themselves. As Cohen states (1997[1989], 72; my 
italics): “The notion of a deliberative democracy is rooted in the intuitive ideal 
of a democratic association in which the justification of the terms and 
conditions of association proceeds through public argument and reasoning 
among equal citizens.” According to Cohen, democratic procedures are 
justified on the basis of hypothetical consent given under certain imaginary 
conditions, namely, ideal deliberative democratic procedure. If it seems, as it 
does, that these ideal conditions remain too distant from the actual, the 
justificatory force of the ideal suffers.  
Here I focus on a few interlocked themes: the ideal of pursuing consensus, 
the isomorphism between the ideal and its practical applications, and 
extending the justification from ideal to deliberation and even to post-
deliberation voting. By the pursuit of isomorphism I refer to the use of the ideal 
of deliberative democracy as a model that democratic decision-making 
procedures should seek to mirror even in non-ideal conditions. In what follows 
I first elaborate on why the consensus condition is complicated as a political 
ideal; that is, as a normative ideal for democratic decision making in plural 
societies. Then I argue that, given the temporality of political decision making 
and the path-independency of deliberation, it seems that the justificatory 
interpretation of deliberative democracy faces difficulties in justifying the role 
of deliberation in political decision making.  
The questions related to ideality and feasibility discussed in the 
methodological section of Chapter One (1.3) are relevant here. Cohen’s aim is 
to provide an explicit statement of the conditions that fit with the formal 
procedural conception and that should be embodied by democratic 
institutions “as far as possible”. He states (1989, 22) that “the ideal deliberative 
procedure is meant to provide a model for institutions to mirror”. Yet it is not 
clear why actual institutions should seek to replicate it. Why does Cohen urge 
isomorphism with an ideal requiring in many respects ideal circumstances 
from the beginning? Two core conditions are especially complex in the absence 
of the latter: reasonability and consensus. In this chapter I principally discuss 
consensus – as an aim and also as a basis for the legitimacy of deliberative 
decisions. Themes related to reasonability are discussed in more detail in the 
next chapter in relation to Estlund’s epistemic proceduralism. Yet these 
themes are intertwined. 
2.3.1 COMPLICATED CONSENSUS 
Reasonability and consensus conditions are typical of mainstream deliberative 
theories, not merely of Cohen’s (see, for example, Benhabib 2002; Gutmann & 
Thompson 1996). More epistemically motivated deliberative theorists tend to 
share these goals as well, although epistemic proceduralists are willing to ease 
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up on the equality condition, which slightly changes the dynamics (see, for 
example, Estlund 2008; for more discussion on this, see the end of the next 
chapter). Those emphasizing the equality condition, on the other hand, seem 
to be willing to reduce either the reasonability or consensus requirements, or 
both, in favor of equality (see, for example, Christiano 2008; Young 2000; 
Bohman 1996; for more on this see Chapters Three to Five.) Questions related 
to the consensus requirement reflect many of the different complications of 
the deliberative ideal. One could also say that consensus foregrounds 
difficulties arising from the other requirements of the ideal, making them 
more visible. Why does Cohen argue that deliberation should aim at 
consensus? How should the consensus condition be applied to decision-
making procedures with time limitations? Could the deliberative decision-
making procedure be supplemented by a vote if consensus cannot be reached, 
as he claims? 
Many of the questions consensus raises also relate to feasibility discussions 
and seem to be a point of fundamental disagreement between theorists. 
Should political processes be understood as reasonable deliberation processes 
aiming at consensus, or should politics be understood as essentially 
conflictual? According to Cohen and most other mainstream deliberative 
theorists, ideal democratic decision-making procedures should aim at 
consensus: consensus on decisions and also consensus on the justifications on 
which decisions are based. Yet some see the consensus requirement as 
excessively demanding; James Bohman (1996), for example, has suggested the 
option of a weaker consensus in which there would be consensus on the 
decision, yet not its justifications.40 Others see idealizing consensus as 
intrinsically problematic; Young maintains, for example, that aiming at 
consensus can actually suppress the deliberation process and prevent people 
from bringing complicated and delicate viewpoints to the fore (Young 2000; 
see also Phillips 1999; Mason 1993); Christiano, whose approach is discussed 
in Chapter Four, does not defend the consensus requirement either (see 
Christiano 2008).  
The strongest opponents of the consensus ideal are agonists (cf. the Greek 
agôn41) (see, for example, Mouffe 2000; Honig 1996; Pulkkinen 1998). For 
agonists political procedures are always more or less conflictual power 
struggles; therefore, aiming at consensus would merely quell the differences. 
A consensual decision would only be an interpretation made from the 
perspective of those with power in a given situation, one that suppresses the 
perspectives of the weaker to some degree. The powerful decide what 
                                               
40 Because of the complications related to the consensus requirement, he has proposed that 
deliberation should aim at something slightly less demanding. Instead of shared mutual understanding 
of both justifications and decisions, he suggests a less demanding form of mutual understanding, i.e., a 
certain kind of compromise in which the requirements for consensus would be weaker (Bohman 1996, 
18–19, 33). 
41 Greek agôn: contest, competition, conflict.  
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justifications are rational and reasonable, what should be taken seriously and 
what should be seen as mere prejudice, and how the different reasons should 
be weighted and combined (Mouffe 2000; Honig 1996; Pulkkinen 1998; see 
also Young 2000, 49; Shapiro 1999, 2003, 3–5.)  
What does consensus ideally mean for Cohen? It is about jointly reaching a 
mutually acceptable decision. Moreover, it must be reached for the right 
reasons; not just any reasons will do. As Cohen emphasizes in condition I4 of 
his ideal: “ideal deliberation aims to arrive at a rationally motivated 
consensus―to find reasons that are persuasive to all.” In Between Facts and 
Norms (1996[1992], 339) Habermas explains the strong demand for the 
unanimity condition of consensus: "Whereas parties can agree to a negotiated 
compromise for different reasons, the consensus brought about through 
argument must rest on identical reasons able to convince the parties in the 
same way." Thus, the normative judgments achieved via democratic 
deliberation should not be bound to subjective preferences but to insights that 
could be commonly accepted and moreover accepted on the same grounds.  
This Habermasian definition of consensus employed by Cohen has raised 
many objections since it is considered too demanding (see, for example, 
Valadez 2001 and Bohman 1996 among others.) However, Benhabib has 
defended the requirement with a hypothetical example about two countries 
trying to reach consensus on human rights. Many of us would agree that the 
people of country X should not claim that they accept the principle of human 
rights on the basis that they see it as the best means to spread their values and 
own way of living. Meanwhile, those of country Y cannot answer that they 
accept human rights because that course provides international credibility and 
access to international markets. “If, however, we believe that human rights 
constitute the moral foundation for democracies everywhere, then we must be 
ready to argue for their validity on the basis of reasons we think can be justified 
from the standpoint of all human beings” (Benhabib 2002, 143–144). It might 
be that concrete decisions are often based on strategic viewpoints, but when 
we discuss justice and the decisions that bind us normatively, the reasoning 
on which they are based should be acceptable to all. Benhabib maintains that, 
seen from this perspective, it is not odd to demand that consensus should be 
reached on the same grounds for the same, shared reasons. Were normative 
judgments to be based on different, merely strategic reasons, they would not 
be morally binding. Judgments based on shared consensus reached via ideal 
deliberation, however, carry normative legimating force (Benhabib 2002, 
143–145). 
The consensus ideal plays multiple roles in Cohen’s view. It is not just a way 
to make decisions; it also justifies democratic procedures. Yet the ideal is 
highly controversial. Often the most complicated democratic decisions are 
related to political disagreements concerning themes that involve moral 
conflict which, in plural societies, is one of the core difficulties for the 
justificatory deliberative ideal. How should solving moral conflict fit with the 
requirement of achieving consensus? Disagreements can be divided into 
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different types depending on the level of difference – on whether the parties 
accept each other’s stances and justifications as understandable or justified. If 
the parties disagree about a decision yet regard the justifications of the other 
parties as acceptable, the situation is typically called a reasonable 
disagreement. A vast amount of mainstream political philosophy has focused 
on reasonable disagreement and how to solve conflicts in situations in which 
parties disagree yet consider the other party reasonable.42 What are more 
complicated are situations in which the position of the other party is 
considered unreasonable or even inconceivable (see, for example, Gaus 1997, 
234–236; Phillips 1999, 114–115; Bohman 1996, 18–19, 33; Young 2000, 
among many others.) Theorists do not converge on how the importance of 
these should be weighted in democratic contexts. 
How should disagreement in a political context be understood? Andrew 
Mason (2008[1993], 2–4) suggests in his Explaining Political Disagreement 
that different types of political disagreement can be understood in accordance 
with imperfection conceptions and contestability conceptions.43 In his 
account the imperfection conception describes the idea that when 
disagreements arise at least one of the parties is mistaken. According to the 
imperfection view, with enough time, patience, will, and so on, disagreements 
can be solved so that all reasonable participants accept the solution. The view 
is connected to the idea that there are correct solutions to political disputes, 
whereas the contestability conception posits that rational use of political terms 
allows a wide variety of application, and thus political disagreements are 
intractable. The most extreme contestability views embrace relativist 
stances.44 The core idea emphasized, however, is that there need be no 
intellectual error involved in political disagreement, because political concepts 
such as “justice” or “freedom” can reasonably be interpreted differently and, 
furthermore, used to express incommensurable ways of thinking.45 It should 
be noted that, even if the distinction between understandings of political 
disagreement is useful for heuristic purposes, there are not many proponents 
of the extreme contestability view. Nonetheless, current epistemological 
                                               
42 For example Rawls, Habermas, Gaus.  
43 Mason names Marsilius Padua, William Godwin, and John Locke as historical defenders of the 
imperfection view. He admits that it is difficult to find defenders of the contestability view, even if it is 
heuristically useful, though he suggests that William Connolly, and to some extent C. L. Stevenson, R. 
M. Hare, and Alisdair MacIntyre could be seen in this light (Mason 2008[1993], 2–4). In contemporary 
scholarship, at least Chantal Mouffe could also be taken as a proponent. 
44 See, for example, Connolly (1983). 
45 Mason (2008[1993]) cites Stevenson (1944) as a classic example of contestability: “People with 
different racial or temperamental characteristics, or from different generations, or from widely separated 
communities, are likely to disagree more sharply on ethical matters than on factual ones. This is easily 
accounted for if ethics involves disagreement in attitude; for different temperaments, social needs, and 
group pressures would more directly and urgently lead these people to have opposed attitudes than it 
would lead them to have opposed factual beliefs.” 
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debates concerning disagreement provide the basis for the possibility of 
contestability (or at least justify remaining agnostic in relation to the 
question).46 It seems that both proponents and critics of contemporary 
deliberative views agree that in plural societies the reach of the imperfection 
conception alone is not broad enough; there remain disagreements that 
cannot be solved to the satisfaction of all reasonable participants.  
The reasonable disagreement thesis does not seem devastating for the 
deliberative view, as it does not challenge the core essence of the setting; but 
incommensurable moral conflicts are more complicated. As Bohman (1996, 
73) asks, “What role does reason play in such deliberations, if standards of 
rationality are themselves subject to deeply conflicting interpretations?” When 
conflicts challenge the basic framework of moral assumptions and political 
procedures they become profound, he maintains.47 He points out, moreover, 
that solving deep political conflicts that challenge whole frameworks is often 
impossible without legal coercion or moral loss. Deep conflicts are especially 
complex when moral and epistemic standards are inextricably intertwined. 
The problem with the deliberative process is that, according to the deliberative 
ideal, only decisions accepted by all, on the basis of the same reasons, carry 
legitimating force. In Habermasian terms, therefore, the process seems too 
“singular” for plural societies. Procedural notions of public reasoning that are 
based on singular understanding of consensus cannot solve deep conflicts48 
(Bohman 1996, 18–19, 72–75). In the case of moral conflict the complication 
for the deliberative ideal is that there seems to be no way to solve the situation 
if the parties disagree not just over the solution, but also over what is to be 
counted as a reasonable justification. It is especially complex if the parties 
involved in deliberative decision making are not politically equal and 
epistemic bias and prejudices cause injustice.49  
                                               
46 Disagreement is currently a topical theme for mainstream epistemology, perhaps one of the most 
debated themes of the field. See, for example, essays in the Feldman and Warfield edited volume, 
Disagreement (2010), and Christensen’s and Lackey’s edited volume, The Epistemology of 
Disagreement: New Essays (2013).  
47 Bohman uses as an example Sioux tribes who challenge the whole concept of settling past 
injustices with monetary compensation. 
48 Bohman himself defends reasonable moral compromises for this kind of situation as a more 
pluralist solution (1996). 
49 Miranda Fricker (2007) has elucidatorily denominated injustices related to this kind of situation 
in which parties are unfairly not treated as epistemic equals as epistemic injustice. She identifies two 
forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial and hermeneutical. Testimonial injustice refers to prejudices 
that "give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker's word" (Fricker 2007, 1, see also Ch. 1). For example, 
in a deliberative setting, testimonial injustice would indicate prejudices that unfairly cause listeners to 
be less likely to believe a person’s arguments and give them credit. Consequently, those points of view 
are not taken into account in the decision-making process as extensively as they should be. 
Hermeneutical injustice refers to a lack of shared resources for social interpretation whereby, because of 
prejudicial flaws in shared interpretive resources, someone is either systematically or incidentally 
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However, Benhabib denies that moral conflicts are a major problem for the 
deliberative ideal; interestingly, she argues this partly on a quantitative basis. 
According to her, most democratic dialogue is not about questions that cannot 
be solved via deliberation, claiming that very few cases are such that parties 
find each others’ stances incommensurable with their own after a free and 
equal deliberation process. She maintains that most democratic decision 
making concerns topics about which decision-makers initially disagree, and 
they can have very divided views, but after deliberation parties can 
nonetheless reach a consensus over the best solution. Benhabib emphasizes 
that it is not possible to know, prior to deliberation, the depth of disagreement, 
and she also notes that situations can occur in which compromises must be 
made when disagreements are irresolvable via deliberation (Benhabib 2002, 
21, 136). I will not take issue with her quantitative claim, but it seems that there 
should be a legitimate way to make decisions even when disagreements cannot 
be solved via deliberation. 
2.3.2 MIRRORING AND UNAVOIDABLE DEVIATIONS FROM THE 
IDEAL  
The relationship between the ideal deliberative process and its application is 
one of the main questions for the deliberative procedural approach. In the 
following part I discuss the suggested isomorphism with the ideal in the light 
of aspirational deliberation, that is, deliberative procedure for less ideal 
circumstances. Some deliberative theorists focus solely on the ideal side, but 
Cohen explicitly considers feasibility considerations a relevant part of 
philosophical reflection. He sees political philosophy as making a reflective 
contribution to public reasoning about political life, although sometimes a 
strikingly small contribution, as he notes (2009a, 4). He maintains (Cohen 
2009a, 5) that “sensible normative political ideas should be workable in the 
political world as it might be”. Therefore, it seems fair to evaluate concerns 
about workability or feasibility as part of the assessment of his deliberative 
ideal. 
What is the role of ideal deliberation in Cohen’s view? Christiano claims 
that Cohen “fails to provide a cogent account of the importance of public 
deliberation” (Christiano 1997, 243), while Cohen argues that actual 
democratic institutions should mirror ideal deliberation: “The ideal 
deliberative procedure provides a model for institutions, a model that they 
should mirror, so far as possible” (Cohen 1997[1989], 79). He maintains (1989, 
20) that what should be mirrored is “a system of ideal deliberation in social 
and political institutions”. This idea of mirroring has Rawlsian echoes, even if 
the application is different. In the Rawlsian picture the ideal situation (i.e., 
Rawls’ original position) serves as an abstract model. Rawls maintains that the 
                                               
prevented from making sense of an experience that it is “strongly in her interest to render intelligible” 
(Fricker, Ch. 7). For more on Fricker, see 4.2.2. 
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fairness of political arrangements should mirror ideal fairness. So does 
Cohen.50 Cohen cites Rawls when he writes, “The idea [of the fair value of 
political liberty] is to incorporate into the basic structure of society an effective 
political procedure which mirrors in that structure the fair representation of 
persons achieved by original position” (Rawls 1982, 45; italics and additions 
between parenthesis by Cohen 1989, 19). But Cohen argues that the Rawlsian 
notion of mirroring an ideal in political arrangements is too indirect and 
instrumental. Cohen prefers a less distant relation whereby the ideal situation 
is the one that we should mirror in actual political institutions. So he seeks to 
mirror a system of ideal democratic deliberation instead (Cohen ([1989]1997, 
70–71; see also Rawls 1982, 45).  
Yet the recommendation of isomorphism between the ideal and the 
application of the ideal procedure seems to arise from the point that no one is 
in a position to predict where such an ideal discourse – between actual people 
– would lead. Consequently, Cohen recommends that actual decision making 
should aspire to mirror ideal deliberation, to aim at isomorphism between the 
two. In order to make decisions taking into account all the viewpoints and 
reasoning, they need to be made understandable. Why are the views defended? 
By what kind of reasoning are they defended?  
Cohen’s suggestion that actual societies should mirror ideal decision-
making situations seems complicated. In this idea, procedures are assumed to 
be able to transfer their properties to outcomes if properly carried out. 
However, actual decision making does not happen in ideal deliberative 
conditions – deviations are unavoidable. Since actual deliberative situations 
always deviate from the ideal, there is the problem of second best (explained 
in 1.4). Even if a specific ideal procedure were to lead to just decisions in an 
ideal situation, that does not give us sufficient reason to expect that once some 
of these conditions are not met, the same procedural structure would still be 
one to choose. This seems rather clear in obvious cases; if, for example, there 
were no freedom of expression, we would not expect an otherwise ideal 
deliberation to lead into ideal justified decisions. This is more complex when 
deviations are only barely recognizable or hidden. In cases where some of the 
deliberating parties have greater resources, for example, this can affect the 
process in many ways (cf. Fricker 2007).51 Yet, if it is not obvious to 
                                               
50 Cohen refers to Rawls’ account of democratic politics and an informal argument for the ordering 
of political institutions: “Justice as fairness begins with the idea that where common principles are 
necessary and to everyone’s advantage, they are to be worked out from the viewpoint of a suitably defined 
initial situation of equality in which each person is fairly represented. The principle of participation 
transfers this notion from the original position to the constitution [… thus] preserv[ing] the equal 
representation of the original position to the degree that this is practicable” (Rawls 1971, 221–222; my 
italics). Cohen cites this paragraph but, interestingly, replaces the “practicable” used by Rawls, with 
“feasible” (Cohen 1989, 19). 
51 Practical applications of deliberative (like any participatory) arrangements should be studied for 
hidden biases with utmost sensitivity. Empirical political scientists are of course doing that. In Finland, 
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disadvantaged participants that the deliberative setting is unequal, the 
decisions made might seem to be legitimate – even if they are, in fact, the result 
of a biased procedure. This can produce a vicious circle wherein biased 
procedures lead to biased results with no one recognizing the bias involved. 
This difficulty – that of recognizing socially biased settings – poses the greatest 
threat when putting ideal deliberation into practice (see Estlund 2008, Ch X, 
184 fn 2; Young 2000, Ch. 1–3.)  
In the case of deliberative democracy, it is an ideal. But the question is, can 
it be applied to non-ideal circumstances? Can it be approximated? In ideal 
conditions that fulfill the conditions of open reasoning, political equality, 
inclusion and free publicity, the deliberative process can potentially enable 
reaching a just decision and legitimating it once made. However, even if the 
deliberative ideal on an abstract level defends equality and inclusivity, and 
takes the pluralism and separateness of viewpoints into account, the 
deliberative ideal suffer from a certain circularity. It presumes the ideal 
conditions in order to produce ideal decisions. According to the deliberative 
ideal, a decision is just when it has been reached via the ideal deliberation 
process in ideal conditions. However, according to the Cohenian version, the 
justification is based on the acceptance by all of the decision (and also the 
whole deliberative process).  
Attaining ideal, imaginary conditions, however, is impossible in practice 
(rather than mere pessimism as Cohen seems to imply [2009b]). Young 
graphically describes the problems involved in applying the ideal deliberative 
procedure, beginning with the premise that societies are more or less unequal. 
In non-ideal circumstances the deliberative procedural context of formally 
open and equal dialogue can reinforce hidden and yet effective actual 
inequalities without anyone noticing. The socially, culturally, and 
economically privileged can use their skills to define topic choices, the kind of 
argumentative styles that are considered reasonable, and so on (as discussed 
previously). Hidden deliberative disadvantages tend to accumulate in the 
formally equal deliberative context, and several types can cause epistemic 
injustices. A lack of cultural and social resources, for example, or opportunities 
to develop skills useful in the deliberative context – in public discussion and 
when presenting and evaluating arguments – make it much more difficult to 
participate effectively in public deliberation procedures; this reduces the 
opportunities to influence decisions. If, at the same time, those with a different 
perspective are skilled and able to make their case understood and acceptable, 
their views will be taken into greater account in decision making – thereby 
even further disadvantaging those whose means are initially circumscribed. 
Thus, what formally appears to be an equal deliberative setting can produce a 
vicious circle (Young 2000, 30–35; Bohman 1996, 108–112, 1997; see also 
                                               
for example, Maija Setälä & al have studied the differences in deliberation with enclaves, i.e. groups of 
similarly minded and mixed groups (Setälä with Grönlund & Herne 2015). Yet the empirical work is 
complex, limited, expensive, and slow. 
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Fraser 1992, 115–128; Williams 2000, 134–141; Mansbridge 1999, 226–227; 
Fricker 2007). 
According to Young, the consensus aim is the main feature that makes the 
deliberative ideal exclusive when it is applied in less than ideal conditions. 
First, if shared consensus is understood as the goal of the deliberative process, 
the scope of viewpoints and topics that are brought into sphere of deliberation 
may be limited. Young observes that if deliberators are committed to reaching 
consensus, it can cause them to elide the most complicated themes if it is 
foreseen that attendant differences will be too deep and conflictual. Yet 
conflicts and disagreement are part of meaningful discussion, and participants 
in democratic dialogue should not be discouraged from continuing discussion 
because there seem to be deep disagreements. As Young claims (2000, 44), 
“too strong commitments to consensus as a common good can incline some or 
all to advocate removing difficult issues from discussion for the sake of 
agreement”. When disagreements are profound and there is no shared 
understanding, it is quite likely that open public dialogue will reveal even more 
differences; certainly, especially when there are structural inequalities, 
processes of democratic communication may be characterized more by 
struggle than agreement. Yet even in this kind of situation it is more important 
to learn about the differences that are the source of conflict than to aim at 
consensus (Young 2000, 44). 
These problems are related to the dynamics of hidden inequalities, power 
asymmetry, incommensurability, and the weight accorded to justifications. 
Young emphasizes that, under conditions of inequality, existing power 
relations and prejudices affect how different views are evaluated. Even if one 
accepts, in line with Young, that it is possible and even necessary to seek to 
understand other perspectives, it is difficult to show testimonial virtues and 
fairly assign weight to competing perspectives. Phillips (1999, 116–121) has 
noted that it is especially difficult if understanding the other perspective could 
lead to decisions costly for oneself. It is not hard to imagine that it would be 
even more difficult if understanding the other perspective were to reveal one’s 
own behavior as unacceptable or shameful. Human beings are biased towards 
their own perspective, and what counts as a valid point or justification may 
depend on one’s own values and prejudices. Therefore, favorably interpreting 
the justifications given by others from a different perspective is challenging, 
even with the best intentions, if they contradict one’s own deeply held 
convictions. As Jorge Valadez maintains, seeking understanding with an open 
mind can only diminish the political power imbalance, not eliminate it wholly 
(Valadez 2001, 101; see also Dryzek 2005). Thus it is quite likely for consensus 
reached via public deliberation to express the interests and convictions of 
those already better off when deliberation begins, while the voices of those 
worse off may not be clearly heard or understood.  
 
Thus, as Young puts it (2000, 43), if participants in seemingly democratic 
dialogue  
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are differentiated by a social position or culture, and where some 
groups have greater symbolic or material privileges than others, or 
where there are socially or economically weak minorities, definitions 
of the common good are likely to express the interests and perspectives 
of the dominant groups.  
  
Meanwhile the claims and points made by the less privileged might seem 
unreasonable or even irrational; proving a point is especially difficult if 
testimonies are not weighted fairly evenly in the beginning. Nonetheless, it is 
difficult for those in the less privileged position to show that what appears to 
be a neutral situation actually favors the perspective of privilege, or even for 
the more privileged to recognize the unbalanced nature of a situation. Even 
the less privileged themselves often suspect their own experiences and 
interpretations (Young 1996, 52; 1997b, 399; 2000, 43; Phillips 1999; see also 
Bohman 1996; Fricker 2007; Fraser 1992; Valadez 2001). 
Melissa Williams (1998) also elaborates problems related to these themes, 
emphasizing that deliberative democracy requires very refined skills of 
participants, not just in presenting their own views in a reasoned manner, but 
also the ability to listen in order to understand the views of others and fairly 
take into account their point of views and justifications. If deliberative 
democracy requires participants to be able to distance themselves from their 
own interest and prejudices for the sake of the common good, it is enormously 
demanding both motivationally and in relation to human psychological 
abilities. As James Johnson (1997) has remarked, deliberative democracy will 
remain utopian “insofar as it makes ‘heroic assumptions about participants’” 
(see also Williams 1998, 143–145). 
Cohen admits that actual deliberative political arenas are not equal, and 
that they suffer from deliberative pathologies, also observing (2009b, 255) 
that deliberation is a “fragile accomplishment”. Yet he seems to maintain that 
objections raised against the principle of ideal deliberation exaggerate feared 
effects and deliberative pathologies (see, for example, Cohen 2009b, 254–
260). In response to the claim that unequal argumentation skills are a problem 
for deliberation he argues that “evidence from deliberative polling suggests 
otherwise: deliberative capacities seem reasonably widely shared”; therefore, 
he claims, that critics are “too quick to conclude that deliberative decision-
making empowers the verbally agile”. His view of the practical difficulties of 
application of the ideal to non-ideal circumstances seems to be that the 
tensions between ideal deliberation and practice should be explored and 
dispelled. He suggests institutional measures to redress the consequences of 
practical situations. Furthermore, he implicitly claims that critics are too 
pessimistic concerning potential ways of redressing pathologies.  
However, it is still not clear why actual decision-making procedures should 
aim to mirror the ideal. Why should actual democratic practices resemble the 
ideal? What would be the basis for aiming at an isomorphism between the 
actual and the ideal? The ideal deliberative situation cannot be realized in 
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actual democratic societies but it is not clear what would be the second-best 
alternative. Cohen seems to think that isomorphism between the ideal and the 
actual would constitute a second-best alternative with some redressing (see, 
for example, Cohen 2009b, 253–260), but there seems to be no guarantee that 
trying to approximate the ideal situation via redressing measures would bring 
better outcomes than some other solution. Deviations from the ideal affect the 
project and trying to keep the deviations as minimal as possible might cause 
other problems. Even Estlund (2008, Ch X, 186) argues against that 
“[p]olitical behavior does not and should not take place in anything resembling 
the ideal deliberative situation, and so the deliberative mode of behavior is not 
privileged in practice”. He sees, therefore, that the deliberative ideal has 
epistemic virtues, but that in actual democratic politics sharp and disruptive 
activity has an important role to play. 
There are also alternative strategies for mirroring. One strategy could, just 
for the sake of an example, be Herbert Marcuse’s “selective intolerance”: 
meeting a deviation with a counter deviation. This structure is employed by 
Estlund, for example (for more on the subject see 3.3, and also Estlund 2008, 
Chapter X). Estlund has discussed the deliberative ideal and also the theme of 
countervailing deviations. His exemplar for the latter continues on the same 
note as presented above: a deliberative situation in which one group has 
disproportionate control over the debate because of their superior social 
power. In these conditions unrestricted freedom of expression could favor the 
interests of the powerful. Thus, it might actually be better in some sense to 
restrict communication, that is, deviate from the ideal in order for the 
deliberation to lead to more ideal outcomes. According to Estlund, mirroring 
the ideal deliberation provides no guidance for this type of case, as the ideal 
seems to suggest that even though unequal power is a deviation from the ideal, 
any compensating infringement of the speech of the powerful would be a 
further deviation, and should thus be avoided (Estlund 2002, 10). A further 
version of this idea is discussed in the next chapter along with Estlund’s 
epistemic proceduralism. 
Most of the critiques of consensus discussed above are related to 
applications of consensus to less ideal circumstances. However, when 
discussing democratic decision making in plural societies, it seems that 
questions concerning complicated situations are unavoidable. Recent 
empirical psychological studies also suggest that despite the fact that group 
decisions often benefit from interaction, and that vaguely consensual decisions 
are likely to be correct in some situations, it seems that in complicated 
situations the effect of aiming at consensus could have the opposite outcome. 
The reason for this lies in the psychological features of humans, in our 
excessive reliance on subjective confidence; according to these studies, actual 
consensual decisions made by groups seem to express confidence levels rather 
than accuracy. Yet if the majority of a group is in error, reliance on confidence 
is misleading. As Koriat (2012, 362) writes, in “situations in which most 
participants tend to make the wrong decisions … social interaction is expected 
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to yield decisions that are even less accurate than those of individual alone”. 
Furthermore, pressing for consensus52 could have undesirable effects as, “[i]n 
such cases, it is the low-confidence individuals who are more likely to be 
correct, and reliance on the more confident members should lead the group 
astray” (Koriat 2012, 362). So it seems that seeking consensus might lead to a 
detrimental outcome both in terms of equality and from an epistemic 
perspective. 
2.3.3 TEMPORALITY, ABSENCE OF CONSENT, VOTING, AND PATH 
(IN)DEPENDENCE  
Questions concerning consensus and persisting disagreement are also 
connected to levels of idealization and the extent to which the ideal abstracts 
from practice. Let us assume for a moment that if we idealize enough, that is, 
until reaching a utopian situation with infinite time – the ideal discourse 
situation between free and equal deliberators – it might be imaginable that the 
separateness between people could be overcome. Yet, with idealizations, it is 
crucial to consider the elements from which one can idealize, and vice versa: 
which core elements of the phenomenon discussed should also be part of the 
ideal version? For example, if the justification of an institution is based on an 
idealization, how far can the justification be extended? Are the features on 
which the justification builds present in the actual situation as well? Are they 
connected to the target of justification (as otherwise the justification will not 
have relevance)?53 
In the case of democratic decision making procedures, one core element 
that should be taken into account is temporality: the inevitable fact of a time 
constraint. In Carlos Santiago Nino’s words (1996, 188): “democracy can be 
defined as a process of moral discussion with a time limit”. In the 
Habermasian ideal (a-political) discursive situation there is no urgency to 
make a decision but Cohen has brought this justification strategy into the 
arena of politics. Nonetheless, it is a specific context. As Eerik Lagerspetz 
emphasizes (2010, 48), “[i]f there is no time limit for deliberations, there is no 
real need to make any binding decisions at all ... This supposition makes the 
models a-political: if there is no need to make binding decisions, there is no 
politics.” This might sound rather strict, but as the discussion is about decision 
making in terms of democratic procedures, it seems that the ideal should take 
into account the need to make decisions in a political context. Therefore, a time 
                                               
52 In these studies, “consensus” is interpreted rather vaguely as something attained via discussing a 
matter until participants reach a joint decision, not in the Habermasian manner. 
53 In a more contextualized way of expressing a similar point, Stuart Hampshire criticizes a narrow 
notion of reasoning that is not connected to its subject (2000, 13–14). According to Hampshire, the 
process of reasoning should be constructed by starting from the practical end, otherwise the explanatory 
value might be zero or one might end up with something “utterly disconnected” from the issues to be 
dealt with. What is the empirical situation for which the process of reasoning is needed? 
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limit seems essential for democratic decision making (Lagerspetz 2010, 47–
49, 53).54  
In addition – and connected – to the time limit, another crucial task for 
democratic theory is to provide an answer to what to do if disagreements 
cannot be solved. Even if justificatory deliberative democrats do not consider 
all disagreements mere errors,55 they seem convinced that at least most 
disagreements can be solved. Political philosophy comprises normative 
theorizing in a specific context – in the political sphere of plural societies. Even 
under conditions in which consensual decisions cannot be reached by public 
deliberation because of irresolvable indeterminacies, democratic decision-
making procedure should proffer a way to make decisions in a normatively 
justified way. Otherwise the scope of justification seems to remain too distant. 
How should political disagreements be best umpired in the absence of 
consensus?  
Cohen accepts that sometimes disagreements cannot be solved and there 
might be cases in which consensus cannot be reached. He suggests that if 
consensus is unreachable then decisions should be made by voting (Cohen 
1989; see also Benhabib 2002; Gutmann & Thompson 1996; Miller 2003). 
However, Cohen (1989) claims that even if deliberation is concluded by voting 
“the results of voting among those who are committed to finding reasons that 
are persuasive to all are likely to differ from the results of an aggregation that 
proceeds in the absence of this commitment”. He highlights that the 
preferences of participants who have sought consensus have undergone a long 
process of deliberation even if the decisions cannot be reached deliberatively; 
thus many of the advantages of deliberation are incorporated into the results 
of voting. When the options have been chosen post-deliberation, they are not 
the same as prior to deliberation.56 
Cohen’s justificatory deliberative ideal is built upon the epistemic force of 
better argument and tracking the better argument in a deliberative setting. If 
consensus is to be replaced by some other mechanism, this other mechanism 
has to be connected to tracking the better argument and more substantive 
reasons (cf. Estlund’s epistemic proceduralism in the next chapter). However, 
it seems that this relation between deliberation and voting in Cohen’s 
deliberative view is less solid than it first appears. The connection is rather 
                                               
54 The awareness of a time limitation would quite likely impact on the process of deliberation if 
occurring in the deliberative setting. Simone Chambers has argued (1995, 248), for example, that “the 
more the parties are constrained by the need to make a concrete decision, the less motivated they will be 
to act discursively and the more motivated to act strategically”. 
55 For different types of political disagreements see, for example, Mason 1993. 
56 David Miller also discusses the change of preferences via deliberation. He follows similar lines of 
thought as Cohen, suggesting that deliberation aids the understanding of the other viewpoints and the 
reasons behind them, and also diminishes misunderstandings (Miller 2003, 188–191; 1.2.2). 
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complex (see, for example, Gaus 2008),57 and yet it is essential for legitimacy. 
Christina Lafont provides an insightful view on this issue, noting that 
deliberative theorists must be able to justify voting on epistemic grounds. The 
absence of consensus (in a deliberative case) also means an absence of consent, 
and the “consent” reached via achieving consensus is the basis of the 
legitimacy of the (justificatory) deliberative ideal. As Lafont argues (2006, 17):  
By declaring the substantive reasons for political decisions irrelevant 
for securing the agreement of the citizens, the deliberative model 
would just concede defeat to the aggregative model of democracy and 
recognize that a deliberative procedure of tracking the force of the 
better argument has no intrinsic contribution to make in determining 
the outcome of decision making process.  
 
Consequently, justificatory deliberative theory must be able to connect the 
voting rule and the epistemic virtues of deliberation. For this reason 
deliberative theorists have to make the connection between the epistemic 
benefits of deliberation and voting. Otherwise as Lafont (2006, 18) argues: “if 
a minority gives its assent to majoritarian outcomes ‘for procedural reasons 
that are unrelated to any epistemic features of the democratic process, the 
deliberative model makes no essential contribution to a theory of democracy’”. 
(Lafont 2006; see also Lagerspetz 2010, 49.) Voting could be defended for 
equality-related reasons, but that option is not open for the defender of 
justificatory deliberative democracy (and nor to defenders of the epistemic 
version58). 
How could ideal deliberation be connected to the epistemic features of the 
procedure? Many mainstream deliberative theorists argue that even if 
consensus cannot be reached, the vote after deliberation would differ from the 
aggregative voting. Benhabib, for example, argues (1994, 33) for “the 
presumption that if a large number of people see certain matters in a certain 
way as a result of following certain kinds of rational procedures of deliberation 
and decision making, then such a conclusion has a presumptive claim to be 
rational until shown to be otherwise”. Why would it differ in relevant sense? 
Is the idea that a majority vote could predict the likely result of consensus? The 
potential connection between deliberation and voting depends on whether the 
role of consensus is seen as indicative or constitutive. If the validity of norms 
which are the subject of deliberation is independent of the process of 
deliberation, the role is indicative. If the validity is constituted by the very 
process of deliberation, then the role is constitutive. Within this framework, if 
                                               
57 In addition, the choice of a particular voting procedure – majority vote, super majority, etc. – to 
be combined with public deliberation is much less straightforward than deliberative theorists assume 
(see, for example, Gaus 2008; Pincione & Teson 2006; van Aaken et al. [eds.] 2004). Gaus (2007, 2) 
states that he is puzzled by the fact that deliberative democrats even “suppose that the majority rule 
procedures are the best way to cope with the demands of practical politics”. 
58 Estlund (2008, Ch. XII), however, rejects Cohen’s the tracking claim on contractualist grounds. 
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the validity of a decision is constituted by unanimous consent, then a mere 
majority decision cannot have validity pre-consent, since no valid result exists 
prior to consensus. But if the consensus is only indicative of a valid decision, 
one should be able to justify why a majority decision or any other vote would 
be the second-best indicator of this validity (Lagerspetz 2010, 50; see also 
Estlund 2008, 286 fn. 6). Cohen seems to defend the constitutive version, as 
he states (1997[1989], 74), “The deliberative conception emphasizes that 
collective choices should be made in a deliberative way, and not only that those 
choices should have a desirable fit with the preferences of citizens.” He also 
notes that “what is good, is fixed by public deliberation, and not prior to it” 
(Cohen 1997[1989], 83).59  
Therefore, it seems that voting cannot settle the problem, since Cohen 
should be able to proffer a satisfactory answer on how to combine deliberation 
with voting in those situations in which the competing views are indeterminate 
and there is a practical need to make a decision. Temporality and the need to 
make a decision complicate the picture. I claim that this combination also has 
one more difficulty related to the path independence of the deliberation 
process.60 Even if we assumed for the sake of argument that consensus were 
reachable within infinite time, in the partial deliberation procedures there is 
no state of consensus that could be used as a reference point. Without the point 
of consensus, one cannot evaluate if the deliberation process is just starting, 
or is already approaching the final stage. Are the options discussed just some 
early sketches? Has some random extreme opinion taken the whole discussion 
in a weird direction for a while? Is convergence already forming? Or is it just a 
false convergence that will prove to be based on a misunderstanding in the 
long run? Cohen seems to assume that voting at some random point during 
the deliberation process somehow carries the benefits of the deliberation 
process. However, there seems to be no guarantee that it would do so, as the 
deliberation process is not path dependent. One should be able to predict the 
path and the length of infinite ideal deliberation to be able to assess the partial 
process of deliberation – in order to evaluate whether the process just 
beginning, at the end of the very first stage, already in the middle, or 
approaching the final outcome. A brief, partial deliberation process 
terminated at a random point might, in the worst-case scenario, lead to worse 
decisions than no deliberation process at all if, for example, a vote is taken at 
a stage at which deliberation has just carried parties further away from each 
other, or brought up the strongest hidden prejudices or most strained 
tensions. Then a vote might lead to worse decision than it would have before 
the deliberation process even started.  
                                               
59 Although somewhat confusing Cohen also states (1997[1989], 73) while defining the conditions 
for ideal deliberative procedure, that outcomes of democratic procedures “are democratically legitimate 
if and only if they could be the object of free and reasoned agreement among equals” (my italics). 
60 This point seems rather obvious, yet I have not come across this problem in the literature. On the 
idea of path dependency in a different context, see Gaus 2003, Ch. 5. 
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Deliberation should be somehow path dependent in order for a vote to 
settle a question. We should be able to predict that if at point of time Tn 
decision-makers hold certain views V1–V55 on the questions deliberated, then 
they might reach decision D28 at Tn+100. Hence it is not necessarily an 
epistemic improvement firstly to engage in “some” deliberation and then vote. 
There are no metrics to evaluate in advance the length of deliberation in 
relation to epistemic benefits gained by it. A defender of partial deliberation 
might try to reply in the tones of an epistemic proceduralist that maybe partial 
deliberation does not always lead to better decision via voting than non-
deliberative procedure, but surely it typically does, and thus the procedure is 
defendable in the long run on an epistemic basis. But Cohen does not seem to 
defend this kind of option, and even if he did, that would not settle the issue. 
In addition to the time element, there is another relevant difference 
between partial deliberation and consensus. As cited in the beginning of the 
chapter, Cohen defends the idea of hypothetical acceptance, maintaining 
(1997[1989], 73) that “outcomes are democratically legitimate if and only if 
they could be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals”. But 
as Bohman and Richardson point out (2009), there is a relevant difference 
between “could accept” and “accept”. They believe that leaning on an idea of 
“RACA”, that is, “reasons all can accept” – that is also a key element in Cohen’s 
view – “is a mistake”. As they write (2009, 254): “The idea of RACAs, built 
around the modality of possibility, seems to offer a way for the liberal to 
characterize political ideals in a way that neither appeals to a current 
consensus that does not exist nor rests its weight on substantive normative 
commitments.” Yet, as they point out, appealing to the possibility holds an 
illusory hope. The idea of possibility seems neutral. What does “could accept” 
actually mean in a contrafactual setting? Apparently it simply refers to an 
imaginary idea of a reasonable person in a hypothetical setting. Empirically 
this hypothetical acceptance is rather indeterminate. As Bohman and 
Richardson maintain (2009, 261) the hypothetical test is “unhelpful, 
unworkable, and effectively otiose”. It would be simpler to say, for example in 
Cohen’s case, that outcomes are democratically legitimate if they “cohere with 
the constitutive requirements of reasonableness”.61 As Bohman and 
Richardson emphasize, the question of what could be reasonably accepted is a 
normative issue, whereas what is accepted is practical. Yet justifying an ideal 
procedure on the basis of actual acceptance in a hypothetical contrafactual 
setting is complex. When one takes into account deliberative pathologies, 
epistemic considerations, the political setting, and problems related to 
                                               
61 Bohman & Richardson themselves rather defend legitimacy that is based on certain deliberative 
virtues, but in a more open-ended manner, observing that “political process is legitimate only if each of 
its participants engage forthrightly with others’ arguments and respond openmindedly to them” (2009, 
273.) This actually comes very close to the view on deliberation defended in Chapter Six on the basis of 
discussion in Chapters Four and Five. 
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consensus I would be less optimistic than Cohen concerning the possibilities 
of prediction. 
2.4 PROCEDURALISM AND OUTCOMES IN THE 
JUSTIFICATORY VIEW 
One key motivation for theorizing on democratic procedures and substance 
seems to arise from the aim of coping with the pluralism of contemporary 
societies. Theoretical strategies range from the epistemic purposes of 
acquiring knowledge of the different viewpoints to the aims of overcoming 
differences by procedural means and treating people as equals in the decision-
making process. In addition to being one of the paradigmatic deliberative 
theorists, Cohen is also one of the few who have explicitly argued (1994) 
against the division between procedures and substance. He maintains that 
procedures and outcomes actually face similar questions and problems in 
relation to pluralism. He claims (1994, 593) that “the distinction between 
procedure and substance is not a fundamental distinction in political 
justification”. He also states that “[p]rocedural and substantive concerns stand 
on a common footing in democratic thought” (1994, 594). He discusses (1994) 
how outcome justice and procedural justice are not as distinguishable as it is 
often thought, claiming that moral disagreement is no more of a problem to 
agreement on the procedures than it is to agreement on the substance. 
Therefore, he claims, if we accept that we can reach consensus on the 
procedures, we should accept the possibility of reaching consensus over the 
outcomes as well.  
Cohen has a point here. While there is no doubt that disagreement affects 
not just epistemic prospects but also the possibility of reaching agreement on 
the procedures, it is not clear why justification of procedures and justification 
of outcomes should be joined, as Cohen seems to think. As Ceva (2016, Ch. 3) 
emphasizes, procedures and substance do not face the same problems, even if 
both undoubtedly do face problems. As Ceva maintains (2016, 73) one should 
distinguish between two claims: 
(1) the decision about the desirability of certain procedures ultimately 
depends upon the qualities of the procedures’ expected outcomes, so the 
disagreement on outcomes naturally extends to procedures; or  
(2) the decisions about the desirability of certain procedures and 
outcomes, although separate, both depend on substantive normative 
presuppositions which are exposed to disagreement, so procedural 
principles of justice may in themselves be no less controversial than 
those concerning outcomes. 
 
Cohen’s view represents the first claim, the more problematic of the two, in 
which the desirability of the procedures depends on the desirability of the 
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outcomes. In the second version, on the other hand, it is equally understood 
that the disagreement as such is not a reason to turn towards proceduralism, 
as procedures are no less prone to disagreement than outcomes. Yet the 
second version sustains the difference between procedures and outcomes. As 
Ceva points out (2016, 74): “Procedures and outcomes are distinct social 
objects, and recognizing the justice of one tells us nothing about the justice of 
the other.” That seems to be the crucial difference, one that is relevant for the 
latter half of this work. Evaluating the justice of the procedures should be 
conducted with different standards than those used to evaluate the justice of 
the outcomes. For example, the outcome of certain procedure might be 
perfectly just although the procedure that led to it was unjust, and vice versa 
(Ceva 2016, Ch. 3).  
Public deliberation procedures can be considered valuable for different 
reasons: as the source of political justification for the outcomes, or for their 
intrinsic procedural values. I do not wish to deny that both play roles in 
defending deliberation; on the contrary, I think they do. Nevertheless, it seems 
that there are difficulties in justifying the combination of procedural and 
epistemic elements in the way Cohen seeks to do. His starting point is that 
both substantive and procedural perspectives are relevant,62 and this seems 
correct. Yet conjoining them as he does in the justificatory approach suffers 
from certain shortcomings, as discussed above, while the epistemic part of the 
formulation does not seem to carry the justification over these difficulties. 
Furthermore, Cohen’s interpretation of the egalitarian character of democratic 
procedures does not seem adequately developed to serve a justificatory 
purpose. Cohen himself argues that the way he understands equality in 
democratic procedures, is that it is too thin a value for a central normative 
role (2009a, 6), arguing, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, that 
“treating people as equals” is not enough for his purposes. At the same time he 
is concerned that the mere epistemic conception is “missing something about 
democracy a as fundamental political value” (Cohen 2009a, 7). Yet, despite the 
doubts expressed here, his approach is very influential, and presents many 
themes that are relevant for procedural considerations. Even if Cohen’s 
version of a solution does not seem fully satisfying from my perspective, I am 
sympathetic to his aims. I also see that the core question that seems to 
motivate his project – namely, how to employ both epistemic and procedural 
elements in the justification of democratic deliberation – is a crucial one, even 
though I do not agree that these elements should be considered conjoined. On 
the other hand, I do agree with him when he argues (1989, 17) that democracy 
should be treated as “a fundamental political ideal, and not simply as a 
derivative ideal” that can be explained in other terms, something with which 
epistemic proceduralists, discussed in next chapter, might disagree. 
                                               
62 Gutmann and Thompson (1996, 27), however, defend “deliberation as an outcome-oriented 




3 THE EPISTEMIC APPROACH AND 
DELIBERATION AS A TEMPLATE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Where does the value of democratic procedures arise? From the just outcomes 
of decision-making procedures? Or from the just decision-making 
procedures? One of the appreciated elements of the deliberative ideal is its 
seeming independence from prior substantial commitments; another is the 
feature that even procedural commitments themselves belong in the sphere of 
deliberative decision making. Yet the reality is that even deliberative 
procedures cannot avoid all substantial commitments. Thus, in this and the 
following chapters, I discuss the kinds of substantial commitments democratic 
procedure should involve. The previous chapter addressed Cohen’s 
justificatory deliberative proceduralism wherein he defends the 
interconnection between procedures and substance. As we have seen, 
however, justifying democratic deliberation on that basis is a complex task; 
therefore I proceed in a more singular mode in the following discussion.63 As 
mentioned above, there are two strands in current democratic theory – 
epistemic and intrinsic proceduralism – emphasizing procedure and 
substance respectively, as distinct elements. Bohman and Rehg exhibited 
prescience in 1997 (xxvii–xxviii) when predicting that the internal tension 
between procedural justification and the need for independent standards of 
judgment and reason would be one of the key future issues for deliberative 
theorizing: in recent debates the combination of procedural and substantial 
standards has been one of the vital themes in normative democratic theory.  
By epistemic proceduralism I refer to a view according to which 
democracy’s justification is built on a procedure’s tendency to produce just 
decisions. Fabienne Peter (2017b, 76) describes the growing interest in 
epistemic questions in strongly worded terms, claiming that “recently, there 
has been an epistemic turn in the literature on deliberative democracy”. In this 
chapter I examine what seems to be the most prominent and sophisticated 
recent hybrid of procedural and substantial elements: epistemic 
proceduralism as defended by David Estlund in his book, Democratic 
Authority (2008). Estlund himself locates the view he defends on a continuum 
between pure proceduralism and epistocracy, employing some Cohenian 
elements in his approach. As he explains (2008, 286 fn. 6), he draws loosely 
on Cohen’s deliberative ideal, even though the theoretical role he accords this 
imaginary situation is explicitly epistemic, whereas for Cohen the deliberative 
ideal is more constitutive. In this chapter I retreat somewhat from a 
                                               
63 Thomas Christiano (2004) has distinguished between monistic and non-monistic conceptions of 
political legitimacy on the basis of whether the source of legitimacy is singular or non-singular. 
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deliberative frame to focus on the dynamics between procedure and substance 
on a more general level, as one of Estlund’s strengths lies in showing some 
typical weaknesses of procedural accounts in relation to substance. 
Nonetheless, in the last parts of the chapter I return to questions concerning 
the role of ideal deliberation and equality. 
 
Figure 1. 64 
 
3.2 EPISTEMIC PROCEDURALISM BETWEEN 
CORRECTNESS AND PURE PROCEDURALISM  
Estlund likes to situate his epistemic proceduralism on a continuum between 
correctness defenses of democracy and pure proceduralism. He maintains 
(2008, 8) that in his account “the bindingness and legitimacy of the decisions 
                                               
64 My visualization in a stair format illustrates Estlund’s core idea. While he has visualized the 
elements in a linear format (1997, 182 Fig 6.1), I prefer the stairs since Estlund’s procedural steps are 
always steps downwards from the epistemic end. 
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are not owed to the correctness of the decisions, but to the kind of procedure 
that produced them”, adding that “a central feature of the procedure in virtue 
of which it has this significance is its epistemic value”. He defines (2011, 367 
fn. 25) the epistemic standard as concerning “what a society, as such, ought 
morally to do”. However, whereas some other defenders of epistemic views use 
ambitious scientific analogies to describe the epistemic potential of 
democracy65, Estlund is rather modest about democracy’s epistemic prospects, 
simply aiming for better than randomness. Nonetheless, the core of his 
account of democratic legitimacy is built on the epistemic prospects of 
democracy: the publicly recognizable epistemic value of democratic 
procedures. 
In the following, I begin by briefly presenting Estlund’s view, describing 
how he combines procedural and epistemic modes of justification and yet 
seeks to avoid the typical problems of each. Then I concentrate on the balance 
of the epistemic and procedural elements. What is relevant for the purposes of 
this thesis is that Estlund’s strategy accords a major justificatory role to 
epistemic elements at the expense of procedural equality. Yet the epistemic 
part that he prioritizes over procedural equality seems controversial. I argue 
that, without leaning more on procedural equality between citizens, either 
epistemic proceduralism moves too far in the epistocratic direction or it is 
much more modest than it first appears. Additionally, I discuss themes related 
to disagreement. For the latter part of the chapter I focus on the role that 
deliberation is granted in the epistemic view, since one of Estlund’s arguments 
against the justificatory view on the one hand and intrinsic proceduralism on 
the other relates to the role of deliberation. 
Estlund understands current democratic theorizing as characterized by the 
tension between the goal of substantially just decisions (rising towards the 
epistemic end) and the fact of political disagreement over the substance 
(descending towards the procedural end). He maintains that if substance is 
available, it should have primacy over procedures, although the challenge of 
political disagreement needs to be taken seriously. However, he argues that 
the latter does not provide sufficient reason to reject all procedure-
independent standards. Abiding by mere procedural fairness is always a 
retreat from substance. If there is a possibility to hold to certain epistemic 
standards at the expense of the procedural, we should take the more epistemic 
route. As he sees it, the essential question is “when to retreat and when to hold” 
(2008, 83). Each of the following retreats toward deeper proceduralism is 
taken because of the unavailability of required substance, as Estlund often 
points out. His core claim is that one should not give up any substantial 
standards merely out of fear of disagreement; rather, one should carefully 
consider what standards can be retained and what must be given up. 
Estlund’s epistemic proceduralism is a hybrid of epistemic and procedural 
modes of justification – a couple of steps from the pure epistemic end and a 
                                               
65 See for example Episteme Vol. 5/1 2008. 
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step up from the pure proceduralism (see Figure 1 above). In his view, political 
authority is not built on the actual correctness of decisions, but on a 
procedure’s tendency to produce just decisions. The normative essence of the 
view lies in the idea of public reason: legitimate political authority must be 
based on justifications that are acceptable to all reasonable or – as Estlund 
prefers – “qualified” points of view. With the choice of word, Estlund wants to 
underline the point that the scope of “qualified” should not depend on a 
Rawlsian idea of “reasonableness”. Yet his term is not free of hidden burdens. 
His so-called qualified acceptability requirement is, according to him, a 
necessary condition of the legitimate exercise of political power and the main 
motivating force of epistemic proceduralism.66 (I return to the requirement in 
more detail later.)  
According to Estlund, it would be ideal if consensus on the substantially 
correct solution could be reached. Hence the only justified reason for any 
deviation from the epistemic end is the unavailability of consensus. According 
to so-called correctness theories67, in which the legitimacy of democratic 
procedure depends entirely on substantially just outcomes, decisions are 
legitimate if, and only if, they are correct. However, in diverse communities in 
which people disagree over what counts as correct, the view runs into 
difficulties in terms of political discord. Thus, the correctness view suffers 
from a problem of deference. Were the correctness theory valid, those in the 
minority in a particular decision would have to accept that they are most likely 
wrong and therefore defer to the view of the majority. That, however, is an 
unreasonable demand. Reasonable people should be able disagree over the 
substantial merits of a particular decision even when they fail to convince the 
majority (Estlund 2008, 99–107).68  
The next step is epistocracy. If people disagree over the substantial merits 
of a decision, the focus shifts to decision-makers. Estlund argues that it is 
obvious that some people have more political expertise than others. He also 
maintains that it is natural to associate the ideas of expertise and authority. 
Nonetheless, inferring political expertise from legitimate authority would 
consist of an expert/boss fallacy. Mere expertise does not legitimize authority 
as such. As Estlund puts it (2008, 40), one could always ask: “You might be 
right, but who made you a boss?” Why should experts be entitled to lead? How 
should one choose between experts? In Estlund’s terminology, the problem 
                                               
66 As Copp (2011, 241) puts it, Estlund’s QAR is a cousin of John Rawls’s liberal principle of 
legitimacy (see Rawls 1996, 137). Estlund shares with Rawls the core ambition of justifying democracy 
in a way that is beyond controversy, so that people can endorse it despite their disagreement on moral 
matters. Enoch (2009) claims (and refers to a conversation in which Estlund himself also admits it) that 
because the Rawlsian view is so generally accepted in the field, and Estlund’s case rests on a similar 
foundation, Estlund actually does not even bother to justify his own case in so detailed a manner. 
67 Estlund discusses Rousseau as a paradigm exemplar. 




with epistocracy culminates in the qualified acceptability requirement, 
according to which “no one is so obviously better … that there isn’t some 
qualified point of view that denies it” (Estlund 2008, 22, 30–36, 40). (There 
are some puzzling parts in retreating from this step that relate to Estlund’s 
own view, to which I return.)  
While Estlund’s own approach is procedural, he warns against retreating 
to the purely procedural step or even to the fair proceduralist one.69 His 
reasons are the same on both counts. The core of pure proceduralism can be 
understood in the deliberative context as Christiano explains it: “democratic 
discussion, deliberation, and decision making under certain conditions are 
what make the outcomes legitimate for each person. ... [W]hatever the results 
of discussions, deliberation, and decisionmaking … they are legitimate. The 
results are made legitimate by being the results of the procedure” (Christiano 
1996, 35, my italics). In other words, pure proceduralism (as a non-hybrid 
version) would mean that only the procedural features of the decision-making 
process can be counted as a source of legitimacy. On the other hand, “fair 
proceduralism” (the label Estlund offers for Christiano’s view) would involve 
some substantial, although not procedure-independent, elements as well (a 
hybrid).70 
While recognizing the lure of proceduralism, Estlund both eloquently and 
comprehensively argues that procedural justifications are actually thinner 
than many seem to realize. After the entire epistemic residue is peeled away 
from democratic procedures, what is left is too weak for justificatory purposes. 
He argues that mere procedural fairness is not sufficient to explain the 
authority of democratic institutions. He then defines (2008, 65) fair 
proceduralism as “the view that democratic arrangements are justified by 
being procedurally fair to participants, and not by any tendency of democratic 
procedures to produce good decisions”. The fairness of the outcome follows 
purely from the fact that the outcome was produced by a procedure that is 
considered just. However, to be procedural enough, in the sense required by 
Estlund’s argument, fair proceduralism must avoid “appealing to any 
supposed ability of democratic procedures to make substantively good 
decisions” (2008, 66). In Estlund’s eyes the main advantage of fair 
proceduralism is the same as that of pure proceduralism: avoiding the 
complexity of defining substantial standards.  
Estlund seeks to peel the epistemic residue away from fair proceduralism 
to get a grasp of the essence of non-substantial fairness. He argues that the 
procedural view must include substantial – that is, procedure-independent – 
elements, if it is not to be too thin to have enough justificatory power for 
democratic decision-making procedures. Many alternatives that one might 
                                               
69 He criticizes certain deliberative democrats for failing to realize the hollowness of pure procedure 
(e.g., Estlund 2008, 30). 
70 In Christiano’s (2004) terminology, pure proceduralism is a monistic conception, as its legitimacy 
is based on one singular dimension, and the “fair proceduralism” non-monist one. 
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assume to be purely procedural are nevertheless not completely pure in the 
end. As Estlund points out, so-called social choice theories test the outcomes 
of temporal decision-making procedures by comparing them with the 
responsiveness of individual preferences. Even “deep deliberative democrats” 
(as Estlund calls Habermas and Waldron, for example) cannot do without 
procedure-independent criteria. For Habermas it is the independent standard 
that “would have agreed in an ideal speech situation”. Even “fair 
proceduralists” such as Waldron, as well as Christiano (whose work is 
discussed in more detail in the following chapters), need procedure-
independent criteria to be able to say why equal treatment of decision-makers 
requires a certain specific type of equality, not just any equality whatsoever 
(Estlund 2009, 89).  
Estlund presents a dilemma that he considers fatal for non-substantial fair 
proceduralism. He asks (2008, 6): “[I]f fairness is the main basis of 
democracy’s importance, then why not flip a coin instead?” According to him, 
procedural fairness must be entirely independent of not just the value of 
outcomes but also other non-procedural matters such as advancing interests, 
preferences, judgments, and so on. He sees no difference in pure fairness 
between democracy and a coin flip, but he assumes that those who are 
committed to defend the value of fair procedures would refuse a coin flip as a 
method of decision making.71 The reasons for resistance would be procedure-
independent in Estlund’s view. However, he passes over one key question, 
namely the definition of procedure-independence: what is procedure-
independent and what is actually procedure-dependent? (This is Estlund’s 
modified version of the leveling-down critique, which I discuss in more detail 
later.) 
A mere concern for controversy is not a good reason to adopt the most 
minimal standards and principles; on that, there would be considerable 
agreement with Estlund. Estlund sees that many procedural theorists take 
nihilist doubts too seriously, which seems to be reflected in “an obligation to 
ground a normative account of politics on purely procedural values, since 
supposedly no nonprocedural or substantive standards for outcomes exist” 
(Estlund 2008, 34). He also takes the nihilist objection seriously himself, but 
points out that if it is taken to mean that there is no truth or no acceptable 
standards, that would be the end of all normative theorizing, as there would 
be no legitimate basis to prefer any particular political arrangement over 
                                               
71 As a non-philosophical curiosity, making decisions by a coin flip can be called “Flipism”. A fictional 
TV-show character, Frank Underwood, describes it as: “a pseudo-philosophy of life in which the most 
important decisions are made by the flipping a coin. It was first introduced in the Disney comic book 
Flip Decision … in which Donald Duck is persuaded by Professor Batty to make all the most important 
decisions based on the flipping of a coin. Life is but a gamble. Let flips guide your ramble!” (Walt Disney’s 




another.72 Thus, the relevant question framing the debate, according to him, 
is not about whether or not to import procedure-independent standards, but 
about which standards are too controversial (Estlund 2008, 34, 83). 
So, Estlund’s own epistemic proceduralism is situated between these ends, 
being procedural and yet gaining its legitimacy via epistemic merits. Before 
concentrating on it in more detail, however, a word on Estlund’s theoretical 
strategy is appropriate. He describes his own way of theorizing as an approach 
(2011, 354–356); he offers arguments, analogies, and examples to increase the 
plausibility of his view but no systematic defense of all the steps. 
Argumentatively, Estlund relies more on the burden of proof than offering 
proof himself (see also Edmundson 2011). The ability to justify democracy on 
substantial grounds is a seductive promise for a democratic theorist; however, 
it seems that the epistemic steps on which Estlund seeks to position himself 
might be too controversial to provide a solid footing.  
3.2.1 THE QUALIFIED ACCEPTABILITY REQUIREMENT 
The core of epistemic proceduralism is the qualified acceptability 
requirement (QAR): political justifications must be acceptable to all qualified 
points of view. This idea reflects similar tones as Cohen’s consensus ideal, 
discussed in the previous chapter, although, whereas Cohen seeks ideal 
consensus via actual deliberators, Estlund prefers a more hypothetical setting. 
The qualified acceptability requirement forms the normative core of 
democratic legitimacy, in the form of normative consent. Yet, as strategically 
essential as the qualified acceptability requirement is for his epistemic 
proceduralism, it is worthy of note that Estlund offers no detailed description 
of it. He refers to it as “schematic” and seeks to build a convincing case for its 
plausibility instead of proposing a detailed account. Later he emphasizes 
(2011, 367) that it is a principle that he argues “more from than for”, though it 
would be a fundamental thing for epistemic proceduralism to establish. He 
maintains, “if it can be established, then legitimacy and authority could be 
accounted for in democratic terms” (Estlund 2011, 367).73 Prospects of 
                                               
72 Estlund suspects that the avoidance of truth might be one motive behind egalitarian proceduralist 
attempts. There is a hint of truth there. An egalitarian proceduralist does not, however, need to avoid 
truth, as such, to the relativist end, and might just be more slightly moderate when it comes to truth than 
an epistemic proceduralist. Whereas an epistemic proceduralist has to lean on truth, an egalitarian 
proceduralist is more hesitant about putting too much weight there, as many of them emphasize that the 
potential fallibility and incommensurability of actual decision-making situations make this ground too 
weak to hold all the weight that an epistemic proceduralist wishes to lay on it. 
73 My own italics in both quotations. 
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defining the requirement remain one of the most controversial parts of the 
theory.74  
Indeed, Estlund himself examines a couple of objections to the requirement 
(2008, 44–47): 
Overexclusion objection: any qualified acceptability requirement 
wrongly excludes some points of view (– actual acceptance view) 
 
Overinclusion objection: too many objections are being honored 
(– true objection/exclusive view) 
 
He maintains that defeating these objections would offer strong support for 
the qualified acceptability requirement. Yet even if these objections were 
defeated, one could argue over whether the line has been drawn in the right 
place in any particular version of the qualified acceptability requirement, as 
Estlund emphasizes (2008, 49). The overexclusion objection holds that any 
qualified acceptability requirement is too exclusive. Some points of view are 
arbitrarily excluded from the circle of acceptability, and then justification 
needs to be acceptable only to those points of view that are inside the circle. 
According to Estlund (2008, 45), this objection would advocate an 
acceptability view that insists that all points of view should be counted as 
qualified and, therefore, the overexclusion view must be committed to the 
actual acceptance view. The latter maintains that all objections are 
justification-defeaters and that any objection Y against a view X must be 
accepted, whether or not the objection Y seems valid/informed/fair/just. 
While there are certain cases in which the actual acceptance view seems 
definitely valid, when acceptance matters independently of the justification for 
the objection, such as in cases of sexual consent, but these are not numerous. 
There are more or less always some objections to every view; therefore, 
requiring actual acceptance would imply that no law can ever be legitimate. 
Yet this practical hurdle is not, according to Estlund, such a serious problem 
(2008, 43–47). He offers no precise case against the actual acceptance view, 
merely insisting that it is “radical and skeptical”; nevertheless, he points out 
that he is defending the qualified acceptability view as a necessary condition 
for legitimacy. According to him, as necessary conditions, actual and qualified 
objections are compatible because the qualified acceptance view claims that 
legitimacy requires there to be no qualified objections, while the actual 
acceptance view just sets the condition more broadly as no actual objection. 
Yet neither of them denies that something else can be a justification-defeater. 
He could take a stronger stance and defend qualified requirement as a 
necessary and sufficient condition for legitimacy. However, he notes (2008, 
48) that he “wishes to avoid contradicting (or endorsing) the actual acceptance 
                                               
74 In Ethic’s debate issue (2011) on Democratic Authority, both Copp 2011 and Gaus 2011 




view”. The reason for this is the role played by the requirement in the whole 
approach in general, as it is “meant not to establish legitimacy of laws 
produced in a certain democratic ways, but to show that they can meet a 
requirement of legitimacy that certain other important views cannot”. Here he 
has epistocracy in particular in mind (Estlund 2008, 43–48; see also Gaus 
2011). 
The overinclusion objection view would hold that too many objections are 
being honored by the qualified acceptability requirement. According to 
Estlund (2008, 47) the crucial question is: “Why should objections based on 
false doctrines be thought to defeat justifications that employ true premises 
and sound reasoning?” Estlund calls the fictive defendants of the objection 
“Truth Lovers” to indicate that they care for the truth, not just mere 
qualifiedness, with the goal that objections based on false views should not be 
allowed to defeat justifications. According to “the true objection view: the only 
qualified objections should be true ones” (Estlund 2008, 51). Estlund argues 
that “[t]his line of reasoning, however, is fallacious” (Estlund 2008, 50–52; 
see also Gaus 2011, 280–285). Nevertheless, as Gaus points out that, it is not 
exactly clear what this fallacy consists of. Apparently it is related to the 
inconsistency of the two following premises (Gaus 2011, 281):  
(1) asserting that one who loves the truth will reject the Qualified 
Acceptability Requirement because it gets to the way of truth combined 
with 
(2) the possibility that Qualified Acceptability Requirement is itself the 
truth. 
 
Gaus (2011, 281) presses his argument by asking: “Is Estlund claiming that one 
can consistently love the truth and accept his Qualified Acceptability 
Requirement (as true) and that the ‘fallacy’ involved in the true objection view 
is a sort of (false) repressed premise that these are necessarily 
incompatible?”75 Mere disagreement over the truth of the latter would not 
count as a fallacy, however, but simply a false conclusion (Estlund 2008, 50–
52; Gaus 280–285).  
Ultimately, Estlund’s aims are rather modest here. He admits that nothing 
he has said shows that the qualified acceptability requirement is true, rather 
                                               
75 Gaus stipulates another form of the potential argument, in which the fallacy might be found (in 
which a premise deemed false is used in an argument which is supposed to prove it is false). However, 
in Gaus’ view this would lead to problems with the scope of truth. According to Gaus, the scope of the 
truth might cause trouble in any case. As Estlund’s theory is epistemic, he needs to take a stance on truth. 
Estlund’s view is based on the assumption that there can be a correct answer to the question of what 
ought to be done politically (2008, 25). He seeks to define substantive standards as minimally as possible 
in order to accommodate various conceptions of moral truth. And yet it seems that attaining robustness 
in relation to truth is more complicated. Gaus argues that even the minimal conception might exclude, 
for example, certain indexical notions of truth (see Gaus 2011, 275–277). Yet these themes are beyond 
the scope of this thesis. 
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than the true objection view. His goal is (2008, 52) “only to point out that it, 
too, would be a truth” and thus the exclusive view should not gain any 
advantage “derived from the idea of loving the truth”. In addition, he holds 
(2008, 52) that, without that advantage, the question turns to the basis of 
legitimate coercion. He claims that Truth Lovers fail to elucidate “what basis 
there is for thinking that people are permitted to treat each other in that way: 
to coercively enforce laws even when one’s only basis for doing so concerns 
matters about which people can reasonably disagree”.  
The previous worry is related to the question of the insularity of the 
qualified. Who has the right to define what counts as qualified/disqualified 
according to epistemic proceduralism? How is the group of qualified citizens, 
C, defined? Estlund notes that it would be a fatal flaw in the view if the 
approach had the consequence that only qualified points of view could say 
what counts as qualified. He additionally presents (2008, 53) an additional 
principle: AN (acceptance of which is necessary). This he frames as follows: 
“No doctrine is admissible as a premise in any stage of political justification 
unless it is acceptable to a certain range of (real or hypothetical) citizens, C, 
and no one else’s acceptance is required.” AN has to be acceptable to C not to 
be self-defeating. Nonetheless, Estlund maintains that there might be other 
conditions concerning admissibility in addition to AN (Estlund 2008, 53–54). 
3.2.2 LATENT EPISTOCRATIC TENDENCIES OF EPISTEMIC 
PROCEDURALISM 
In a later work (2011) Estlund supplied some hints regarding what could 
characterize the set of qualified citizens. He suggests that a person’s point of 
view might count as disqualified in two ways: either because of the point of 
view or because of the person representing it. The point of view is disqualified 
“if, for example, the person does not conceive people as equals in certain ways” 
(2011, 364). Estlund points out that merely holding a false comprehensive 
doctrine is not a reason to count someone as disqualified; rather, people count 
as disqualified “for failing to hold certain views, such as, … that all people are 
morally free and equal” (Estlund 2011, 363). Furthermore, a point of view is 
disqualified “if the person does not accept that even views that are mistaken 
about some things can be qualified” (2011, 364). That is actually a sort of 
second-order consideration, since besides concerning an aspect of a person’s 
qualification, the point also relates to a person’s view of the standards of 
qualification. As Estlund (2011, 364) puts it, “being qualified requires having 
certain views about who is qualified”. 
Although Estlund does not provide a description of the qualified 
acceptability requirement, these further qualifications seem to narrow the 
scope of the qualified considerably, even to the extent that differences between 
epistocracy and epistemic proceduralism could diminish noticeably 
depending on interpretation. To illustrate this, I have developed a typology of 
“qualified” in a similar vein as Estlund’s own “Truth lovers”. It seems to me 
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that of five (or six, but one seems self-contradictory) hypothetical types of 
persons, only one type would count as qualified in his view:76  
 
Reasonable Reason lover77 defends qualified views herself and 
understands which views count as qualified  
Reasonable Tolerant defends qualified views herself but does not 
understand which views counts as qualified, too inclusive 
Reasonable Elitist defends qualified views herself but does not 
understand which views count as qualified, too exclusive 
(Unreasonable Reason lover) (defends unqualified views himself 
but understands which views count as qualified – a self-contradictory 
type) 
Unreasonable Tolerant defends unqualified views himself and does 
not understand which views count as qualified, too inclusive 
Unreasonable Elitist defends unqualified views himself and does 
not understand which views count as qualified, too exclusive 
 
It is worth pondering that the group of qualified persons appears to be rather 
limited; indeed, only the Reasonable Reason lover would count as such. 
Considering the requirements for being qualified provokes the question of how 
the view ultimately differs from epistocracy if understood as the epistocracy of 
the qualified, as it seems that epistocracy could be interpreted similarly. 
Estlund’s defense of epistemic proceduralism is built on the assumption that 
it is the epistemically best procedure among those that are acceptable to the 
group of qualified citizens C. Meanwhile, according to Estlund, epistocracy 
includes three tenets (2008, 30):  
1. The Truth Tenet: there are true (at least in a minimal sense) 
procedure-independent normative standards by which political 
decisions ought to be judged. 
2. The Knowledge Tenet: some (relatively few) people know those 
normative standards better than others.78 
                                               
76 It remains open whether Estlund is talking about viewpoints or persons. But as he writes (2008, 
57) about “hypothetical qualified citizens”, I assume that my way of counting them as persons here is in 
line with his view. 
77 Even though Estlund does not define C as a set of reasonable citizens as he wants to emphasize 
that the view does not entails dependence on Rawlsian idea of reasonableness, but, rather, defines it 
more abstractly as the set of qualified citizens, it seems after all that here “reasonable” might be suitable. 
78 Estlund says (2008, 278 fn. 21.) that he slides “between the ideas of actual wisdom, capacity to 
wisdom, and so on” as long as he believes that the point holds equally well across the variants. 
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3. The Authority Tenet: The normative political knowledge of those 
who know better is a warrant for their having political authority over 
others. 
 
At least to a certain extent these tenets of epistocracy seem to fit with epistemic 
proceduralism as well. Epistemic proceduralism has to assume the first, the 
Truth Tenet, at least in some form79, since, according to Estlund (2008, 35), 
refuting the tenet would leave only procedural values on the table and no basis 
for substantive standards. Estlund himself objects to epistocracy by 
questioning the third, the Authority Tenet, based on the qualified acceptability 
requirement, claiming that any chosen group or person would be subject to 
controversy and would not for that reason pass the general acceptability 
criterion; that would not be a problem for epistemic proceduralism if the group 
consisted of the qualified. Finally, as disconcerting as it sounds, it seems that 
at least empirically, the second, the Knowledge Tenet, also appears to fit 
together with epistemic proceduralism. The group of Reasonable 
Reasonlovers appears to be rather small potentially, since most people would 
hold at least some unqualified beliefs.80  
In this light it might be that the group of Reasonable Reason lovers is a 
small one. This would be a problem, especially for those defending actual 
pluralism who reject the idea that controversies could be restrained by 
reasonability or other qualified condition, but claim that normative 
justifications should include all the parties (see, for example, Newey 1997; see 
also Ceva 2016, Ch. 1). Even if one were to remain agnostic with regards actual 
pluralism this still seems worrisome when combined with the previous 
problems with answering the over-inclusion objection. Many commentators 
have criticized the arguments Estlund offers against epistocracy as ad hoc (see, 
for example, Copp 2011; Anderson 2009). David Copp has argued (2011, fn. 6) 
that, “Estlund allows mere speculative objections to epistocracy to count as 
qualified”. Might the reason for the difficulty that Estlund’s epistemic 
proceduralism faces in developing an argument against epistocracy be the fact 
that the views are rather close to each other? From this perspective, it seems 
that drawing the line between epistemic proceduralism and epistocracy is not 
such a simple task. How could one manage to do so? The size of the group of 
                                               
79 Estlund does deny some interpretations of the tenet (2008, Ch. 2) but needs to allow some 
versions, which seems to be relevant here. 
80 According to political psychology studies, only 10% of the population seems to hold even a 
minimally logically coherent set of political views. The number varies slightly between countries, but is 
nevertheless surprisingly low everywhere (see, for example, Uschanov 2010). Peoples’ sets of beliefs also 
vary. Or as Gaus (2011, 278 fn. 13) puts it, even people who hold generally reasonable viewpoints might 
yet advance some pretty crazy specific ideas on some specific sphere of life. (In a sphere of more popular 
literature, Michael Shermer (2002, 297) even claims that, “Smart people believe weird things because 
they are skilled at defending beliefs they arrived at for non-smart reasons.”) Thus, that would disqualify 
them in Estlund’s books. 
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qualified depends, of course, on the criteria for qualifiedness. According to 
Estlund (2011, 364), a person qualifies as qualified even if he holds 
unreasonable views on, for example, whether there is a god/gods, or 
physicality of mind, and so on. However, he offers no clarification of which 
views count and which do not; there are “no general boundaries between 
qualified and disqualified views” as he states (2011, 366). He points out (2008, 
60) that he aims to “include a wide variety of points of view, including many 
false ones, because a wide variety of views seem not to disqualify their owners 
from being owed acceptable reasons to justify state coercion”. Thus the group 
might ultimately not be so small.81  
A stronger commitment to procedural equality and inclusivity could solve 
the problem. Currently equality plays only an instrumental and thin role in 
Estlund’s account. It seems to be a mere consequence of the qualified 
acceptability requirement. He argues (2008, 190), for example, that “[i]t 
would be epistemically costly to let power … determine the course of political 
decision making”; adding that “the advantage of universal suffrage derives 
from the deeper principle of the qualified acceptability requirement” (2008, 
37). I discuss democratic equality in relation to Estlund’s view at the end of 
this chapter. 
Yet if (and only if) the qualified acceptability criteria (or reasonability) 
plays the main role in democratic theory, then it seems to me that there should 
be equal opportunity to be qualified (or to reasonable)82 in order to avoid the 
view’s turning from democracy into meritocracy, because “reasonability” 
tends to correlate with privilege. Often what is understood as reasonability is 
linked (at least statistically) with levels of education and social status, and 
empirical studies show that social status is strongly inherited nowadays (see, 
for example, Bowles, Gintis and Osborne Groves 2005.) 
3.2.3 DECISION FETISHISM, INSTRUMENTALISM, AND THE 
BALANCE BETWEEN PROCEDURAL AND EPISTEMIC 
ELEMENTS 
As I have said, epistemic proceduralism is a hybrid of epistemic and 
procedural elements; furthermore, the balance between the two elements 
raises questions. What is the role and importance of each element? How strict 
is the line between fair proceduralism and epistemic proceduralism? 
Proceeding from the procedural end, one can question whether Estlund’s 
                                               
81 A similar worry has been expressed in relation to Rawls. Bohman (1996, 74–75) has observed that 
“[i]f we accept the social facts of pluralism and deep conflict, then we must also wonder whether the 
scope of what is ‘reasonable for all to accept’ turns out to be so small as to be irrelevant for most political 
disagreements”. 
82 For example if democratic procedures are considered deliberative, this would require equal 
distribution of cognitive conditions for deliberation (on equal political opportunities see, for example, 
Mason 2006; Phillips 2004). 
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notion of pure procedural fairness, which he claims to be too weak to justify 
democracy, is too thin to be meaningful. How much weight would it need? 
Enough to bring it up to epistemic proceduralism? Or would the actually fair 
procedural step be enough after all? Thomas Christiano, defender of a more 
egalitarian proceduralism (see Christiano 2008), calls Estlund’s description of 
the conception of pure procedural fairness a detached conception of fairness. 
Christiano points out that one implication of this conception would be that 
democracy actually turns out to be a less procedurally fair method for decision 
making in a group of equals on controversial matters than a coin flip, since 
democracy responds to the choices made by voters and a coin flip does not. 
Christiano (2009) pushes the idea of anonymity of this sort even further, 
asking whether the coin flip lottery should be arranged to cover all possible 
alternatives, not just those favored by some member of the group, to make it 
more obvious how strange the idea would be. Nonetheless, one might think 
that this hardly defeats Estlund’s critique, as Estlund uses the coin flip 
example as a way to bring to the fore the emptiness of mere fairness. In 
addition, Estlund does not deny the worth of fair proceduralism, he just aims 
to show that it is not a sufficient basis for democracy’s justification.  
Another way to challenge epistemic proceduralism is to question the 
divisional force of the epistemic element. Estlund holds that “democratic 
authority rests on democracy’s tendency to make better than random 
decisions, and better than alterative arrangements, so far as can be determined 
within public reason” (2008, 160). According to his view there are three 
necessary conditions for legitimate rule: first, it has to be acceptable to all 
qualified points of view; second, it demonstrably needs to have a better than 
random probability of choosing just policies; and third, it has to be 
demonstrably better in doing so than the other forms of rule (2008, 8, 98). 
However, demonstrating the second condition is obviously complicated, as 
there will always be a certain indeterminacy in saying that epistemic 
proceduralism is better than random, since it depends on how the alternatives 
are individuated and evaluated (see, for example, Anderson 2008, 134–135; 
Christiano 2009, 237).  
Estlund seeks to demonstrate the fittingness of epistemic proceduralism to 
these conditions by analogies, a key one of which is a Jury analogy, which he 
uses to model the structure of his own view (Estlund 2008, 7–8, 11–12, 136–
137). He also uses it to defend his view, arguing that the parallels between the 
jury case and the democratic case are “very strong”. The (US) jury system, 
(when working properly) gives legal force to a verdict and also some moral 
force. It is a decision-making procedure that aims at both procedurally and 
substantively just decisions, despite the risk of occasionally failing in the latter 
respect. The jury system illustrates both the substantial and the procedural 
strengths of epistemic proceduralism. On the one hand, a jury would enjoy no 
authority if its decisions failed to be generally substantively just; on the other, 
the validity of a jury’s decision is not based on whether they are right in a 
particular case or not. What matters is the general tendency to get things right 
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through this sort of procedure, which is the basic justification structure of 
epistemic proceduralism as well. 
As illustrative as the analogy is, it also frames the setting in a specific, 
favorable way and blurs the picture a bit (Anderson 2008), glossing over at 
least one important difference between juries and democracies: juries have a 
tightly predefined dual set of options: “guilty” or “not guilty” according to 
certain preset standards. Democratic decision making, on the other hand, is a 
complex process with no fixed set of options. A jury also has retroactive 
temporal setting, evaluating specific past events against rules made even 
earlier; whereas democracy is an ongoing process extending into the future. A 
democratic deliberation process is, above all, a creative construction of policy 
options. In a jury case the options are limited and there is an answer to the 
question of whether a jury offers a better than random outcome. In the case of 
democracy, however, the proper means to define what is random or better 
than random are absent. Democratic procedures are partly path-dependent; 
they depend on what problems, agendas, and means are raised, by whom, and 
at which point, and what answers, solutions, or follow up strategies are 
created. It is not just the final vote that matters and there are not even the 
means to tell whether a vote is indeed final on a subject or not. Consequently, 
there seems to be no set of logically possible policy strategies whereby one 
could assess what might have been possible in a given historical situation, and 
where that might have led, compared with what epistemic proceduralism and 
the alternatives would have done (see also Anderson 2008).  
Anderson (2008) has emphasized that the better than random condition is 
not actually necessary for epistemic proceduralism; however, dropping the 
condition would diminish the epistemic content of the argument and make it 
much weaker. He suggests that Estlund could have used empirical evidence 
based on the studies of existing democracies in his comparison, but as Gaus 
(2011, 295) points out, this strategy could show that democracy is better than 
average, but yet not prove better than randomness, if the average is very low. 
Furthermore, Estlund also uses the non-existence of what he calls primary 
bads in actual democracies as an additional proof of better than randomness. 
These primary bads include war, famine, economic collapse, political collapse, 
epidemic, and genocide (Estlund 2011, 163). But this line of argument does not 
appear as convincing as the other strands as the list seems more controversial 
than it appears at first sight. The relation of the bads and justice (there are 
cases in which a war could be just etc.) remains unclear, for example (Gaus 
2011, 293–294.) Further, even if in a certain current situation – ‘n’ – these 
might be non-existent, the situation can be different in ‘n+1’: the world can 
change in unpredictable directions. What would be the final point of 
consideration for the better-than-randomness argument? This seems 
important for Estlund, when the justification of epistemic proceduralism is 
built on decisions and their substantial merits. More procedural accounts, on 
the other hand, could put more weight on the importance of equal self-
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government of citizens and democratic processes such as the practice of 
mutual recognition or public manifestations of relational equality. 
Outcomes actually provide quite a substantial weight in epistemic 
proceduralism – not the process of producing them, but the decisions and the 
procedure-independent standards of valuing the decisions. It is a heavier 
weight than in other procedural accounts of democratic decision making 
wherein the process itself is accorded the major importance. How we should 
explain our intuitions concerning procedural fairness is an open question in 
the epistemic framework. Christiano (2009), for example, has drawn attention 
to the intuition that procedural equality sometimes seems to overrun even 
good decisions. Let us consider, therefore, the decision-making process of 
choosing the most suitable individual for a certain position. Even if the 
outcome of the process is an excellent choice of a candidate, it would 
nonetheless intuitively seem to have failed if some other candidate were 
mistreated during the process in a way that appears to be unfair: this, despite 
the fact the chosen candidate might have been the same if the procedure had 
been fair. Estlund refers to the jury system as an example in which even 
erroneous outcomes gain their authority via the system. Yet it seems to me it 
also shows why unequal procedures make us seriously question the authority 
of a whole institution, at least normative authority, even where a case is 
actually “correct”. For example, a few years ago in Ferguson, Missouri, a white 
police officer shot an eighteen-year-old unarmed boy. The circumstances were 
unclear, and it was obvious that stereotypes and prejudices played a large role 
in the case. But the US Department of Justice reached the verdict that the 
police officer shot the boy in self-defense. Yet even after the verdict – which 
might have been correct – many people had difficulties accepting it since the 
process had been so unfair in the beginning.83 
David Enoch (2009) even accuses Estlund of decision fetishism. Enoch 
analyses two imaginary cases, fictional countries Get-It-Right and All-for-the-
Best. Get-It-Right makes (at least generally) better decisions, but the 
consequences of political decision making in All-for-the-Best are nonetheless 
better on the whole (reasons for this could be based on the citizens’ sense of 
participation, dignity, belonging, and autonomy). For many it is not obvious 
which of these is superior, especially if the consequences of decision making 
in All-for-the-Best are much better. Therefore it seems that choosing the 
procedure on the basis of better decisions would in this case count as decision 
fetishism. The option to choose All-for-the-Best is of course also open to an 
epistemic proceduralist, but then epistemic proceduralism would turn into 
merely a type of instrumentalism in which it is the consequences that matter, 
not the procedure-independent epistemic benefits (Enoch 2009, 38–41).84  
                                               
83 The actual Brown case might not match my description, but the main point here is to exemplify 
intuitions of how procedural justice could matter. 
84 Estlund might argue that a consequentialist would need to commit to a correctness theory of 
legitimacy, losing the space between correctness and legitimacy which is precious to the epistemic 
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Nevertheless, Estlund’s qualified acceptability requirement – and 
epistemic proceduralism that is based on the requirement – represent a type 
of approach that could be described as a doctrine of restraint (Raz 1986, 110; 
see also Enoch 2009, 44–46), as it refers to disqualifying certain kind of 
reasons as politically unacceptable: in this case, reasons that are not 
acceptable to all qualified persons.85, 86 One should note, however, that this 
does not preclude those reasons actually being good reasons; rather, they are 
reasons that are illegitimate because they cannot be accepted by all qualified 
persons. In the case of the “Unreasonable Tolerant”, who defends unqualified 
views and does not understand which views count as qualified, the wrong he 
commits is that of being too inclusive. It seems that one should have quite a 
strong case for supporting a view. As Enoch has argued (2009), we should 
reject the qualified acceptability requirement unless there is a solid case for it. 
Nonetheless, when it comes to argumentative strategy, Estlund relies more on 
the appeal of his own approach and laying the burden of proof on others, than 
offering solid proof himself (see also Edmundson 2011). Let us next focus on 
another dimension of epistemic proceduralism in order to analyse how 
appealing it seems. 
3.3 IDEAL DELIBERATION AS A TEMPLATE 
Estlund has criticized a number of procedural theories on the grounds that 
they face difficulties in justifying the role of deliberation in decision-making 
procedures. He has also pointed out that isomorphism between ideal 
deliberation and actual deliberation is problematic, as discussed in previous 
chapter. However, it is not entirely clear how democratic deliberation is 
justified in Estlund’s own composition, either. He considers the deliberative 
situation as “an ideal epistemic situation” (2008, 18). Yet he warns against 
considering it as constituting the truth, since mistakes can be made even in 
ideal epistemic deliberation. In order to avoid the problem of second best, he 
claims that ideal deliberation should be understood as a template. This 
template is to be used for marking and measuring the deviations from the 
ideal and devising an epistemically remedial response. However, to my mind 
the role of deliberation is unclear in this picture. Why deliberate in a non-ideal 
                                               
proceduralist. However, Enoch (2009) points out that this would not be the case, at least for indirect 
consequentialism.  
85 As noted in footnote 76 of this chapter, it remains open whether Estlund is talking about 
viewpoints or persons. But he also writes (2008, 57) about “hypothetical qualified citizens” not just 
points of view. 
86 This is reflected in the following quote: “According to epistemic proceduralism, the law is 
legitimate and binding on me even though it is unjust, and this is owed to partly to the fact that the 
procedure has epistemic value that is publicly recognizable” (Estlund 2008, 8). 
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way in the first place? I do not wish to argue here, however, that ideal 
deliberation could not have a role as a description of an ideal state of affairs. 
Estlund is right in his warnings about what he calls utopophobia – suggesting 
that a normative theorist should not have a “fear of normative standards for 
politics that are unlikely ever to be met” merely on the grounds that they are 
unlikely to be met (2008, 14); but if he wishes to present his theory as an 
aspirational one, this theme appears complicated.  
3.3.1 ESTLUND’S IDEAL DELIBERATIVE MODEL 
Estlund seeks to answer the question of “how democracy might have epistemic 
value” (2008, 174). To respond to it he starts from the ideal end, from 
considerations of how democratic practices might have value if they recalled 
ideal deliberation. From the value of ideal deliberative practices he moves to 
the fact of countervailing deviations. He is, meanwhile, aware that aspirational 
deliberation should not seek to resemble ideal deliberation. Thus, the 
epistemic version is not prone to similar problems as the Cohenian version 
discussed in the previous chapter. Ideal deliberation is not a sensible practical 
aim, as Estlund maintains.  
Ideal deliberation nonetheless plays an essential role in the epistemic 
framework “as a kind of template by which to mark and measure deviations 
and devise epistemically remedial responses” (Estlund 2008, 175). Estlund 
names his ideal epistemic deliberation the model deliberation, to mark the 
differences between it and other deliberative ideals, describing its conditions 
as follows (2008, 173–176): 
1) Everyone has full and equal access to the forum 
2) Everyone has the same chance to speak as everyone else 
3) People only say things that they believe will help others to 
appreciate the reasons to hold one view or another among those that 
are in question 
4) Anyone whose interests are at stake in the decision is either present 
or represented by an effective spokes person 
5) Everyone has as much time to speak as they wish 
6) Everyone has equal bargaining power 
7) Everyone equally credits and attends to the contributions of all 
others 
8) Everyone recognizes (or tends to recognize) a good reason when 
they see one 
9) Participants strive to address the “devil’s advocate” 
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His “own interest in the model deliberation is as a plausible epistemic device” 
(2008, 185). The epistemic virtues of deliberation include bringing together 
diverse perspectives, propelling a variety of reasons and arguments into public 
discussion, and preventing inequalities in wealth and status affecting results, 
thereby promoting the likelihood of producing good decisions. Yet, 
interestingly, Estlund does not argue that democratic practices should 
resemble the ideal deliberation. He prefers actual democratic practices to 
model wide civility, “that gives a principled place for sharp, disruptive, and 
even suppressive participation under right circumstances, without jettisoning 
the whole idea of an ideal deliberative situation” (2008, 184–185). 
3.3.2 EPISTEMIC TEMPLATE VIEW 
A wide civility in the actual deliberative setting sounds interesting (especially 
in comparison with the wide understanding of deliberation discussed in the 
next chapter) but the crucial question seems to be its relation to the ideal. 
What is the relation of Estlund’s ideal model to democratic practices? Estlund 
argues (2008, 174) that “realistic (nonutopian) democratic practice can have 
epistemic value despite profound and unavoidable deviations from the ideal 
epistemic deliberation”. He seeks to avoid “countervailing deviations” as they 
are problematic, as seen in the previous chapter. In order to avoid them he 
defends a view in which the relationship between ideal epistemic deliberation 
and aspirational deliberation is not isomorphic; rather, ideal deliberation 
should be used as a template. However, he sees that the informal and even 
more formal official parts of political communication have greater value if they 
are not restricted by the “egalitarian and public-spirited norms of the model 
deliberation” (Estlund 2008, 189). The proper theoretical role for the 
deliberative ideal is, according to Estlund, “a tool of thought and analysis ... a 
template to lay over actual deliberations in order to identify … deviations” 
(Estlund 2008, 204). 
What would it mean to use the deliberative ideal as a template? Estlund 
represents Herbert Marcuse’s recommendation of “selective intolerance” as an 
example of this sort of strategy in which repetition of the views of those with 
disproportionate power over deliberation are met with a countervailing 
deviation of interference. Marcuse originally discusses this idea of 
counterbalancing in his essay “Repressive Tolerance” (1969[1965]) as a way to 
cope with dystopic totalitarian regimes. “The function and value of tolerance 
… depend on the equality prevalent in the society in which tolerance is 
practiced” (ibid., 84). Marcuse developed the idea of counterbalancing existing 
repressing circumstances as a means of pursuing liberty in existing non-ideal 
circumstances. If the circumstances are non-equal and biased, he recommends 
selective intolerance against repression. Interestingly, Marcuse also 
considered the question of who should count as qualified (ibid, 101): “who is 
to decide on the distinction between liberating and repressive, human and 
inhuman teachings and practices” (ibid., 101), observing that the distinction 
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“can be made rationally on empirical grounds [by] everyone who has learned 
to think rationally and autonomously” (ibid., 105–106). 
It is not clear, however, how this idea of counterbalancing would fit with 
deliberative practices. Estlund suggests (2002, 10–11) “meet[ing] one 
deviation with another” in a non-ideal situation87, because deviations from the 
ideal affect the process of deliberation and trying to minimize them might 
cause other problems. Estlund’s own exemplar of countervailing deviations is 
related to a deliberative situation in which one group has disproportionate 
control over the debate because of its superior social power. As he maintains, 
in these kinds of conditions unrestricted freedom of expression could favor the 
interests of the powerful. Therefore, he suggests that it might actually be better 
to restrict communication, that is, deviate from the ideal in order that 
deliberation might lead to more ideal outcomes (Estlund 2002, 10).  
3.3.3 DETACHABILITY AND THE TEMPLATE 
Although Estlund’s understanding of an unruly informal political public 
sphere is a wide one, he simultaneously defends a narrow notion of 
deliberation for the sake of epistemic benefits. He suggests comparison of an 
actual situation to an ideal in order to identify deviations. One might wonder 
about the justification for actual deliberation, if ideal deliberation is used as a 
template and actual deliberation does not aspire to ideal circumstances. 
Indeed, Estlund asks of more procedural theorists, why deliberate? Yet it 
seems that the same question is also complicated for his template view. What 
would be the relationship between ideal deliberation that functions as a 
template and actual deliberation that seeks no ideals? Potentially, one might 
think that actual yet non-ideal deliberation would give some hints for the 
template user in forecasting, but this seems an underestimation of the 
deviations that Estlund has himself emphasized when evaluating mirroring. 
The deviations are not easy to evaluate – the inequalities, marginalizations, 
and structures of oppression are complex, and they impact on behavior in 
unexpected ways.88 Furthermore different deviations might jointly produce 
effects even more complex.  
If one were to go along with Estlund’s solution, what role would be left for 
the democratic public? What justifies actual democratic deliberation? What is 
the purpose of it? Would the template model make the actual deliberation 
process trifling? It seems to suggest as much, as the template can be used as a 
remedy in whatever manner the actual public functions. If power imbalances 
                                               
87 Estlund also assesses that his countervailing deviations strategy would be compatible with the 
wider deliberation view (at least the Habermasian version of it), but not the mirroring view. (Estlund 
2002, 11.) But I wonder would defenders of the wide view be particularly interested in taking that path. 
88 As I understand it, affirmative action could be interpreted as a mechanism of countervailing 
deviations. But as the literature on affirmative action shows, it is not an easy solution. See for example 
Young 1990 & 2000; Moller-Okin 1999; Cohen & Sterba 2003; Anderson 2010, etc.  
 
81 
interfere with the use of reason in democratic discourse, then Estlund’s 
solution is to “find some remedial feature that would support our ability to 
infer from the imperfect real discourse to conclusions about what would have 
been accepted if it had been ideal” (Estlund 2008, 194). In this way the 
considerations of ideal discourse as a benchmark are brought in, and the 
template used in order to achieve epistemic benefits.89 
My main worry here is that both the template model and the way in which 
ideal deliberation is considered as isolated from the unruly political sphere 
seem to suggest that the democratic sphere and the ideal are somehow 
detachable from each other.90 Estlund’s idea is that epistemic benefits are 
procedure-independent. The value of democratic procedures depends on the 
epistemic benefits that, in turn, gain their value according to procedure-
independent standards. Estlund notes that there is political truth out there, 
and the democratic ideal indicates that. But what then would be the use of 
democratic process?  
This also resonates with problems of modality when used in political 
theorizing as discussed by Bohman and Richardson (2009) who argue that 
modality is often involved in statements that aim at neutrality, such as in 
formulations of the “reasons all can accept” (what they refer to as RACA).  As 
discussed already earlier in more detail (see Chapter 2.3.3), they emphasize 
that there is something false about the idea of neutrality that is brought along 
with this modality. They claim that there is a fundamental difference in a 
democratic sense, for example, between hypothetical “could accept” and actual 
acceptance. According to them, the seeming neutrality of this kind of modality 
offers an illusory hope and, in the end, the democratic theorist will have to 
work with the difficult elements directly, “with what is actually accepted and 
with substantive moral and evaluative commitments” (Bohman & Richardson 
2009, 254–255). 
If there is no need for an actual democratic deliberation process in the 
epistemic template view, it becomes more understandable that Estlund has 
changed his view in relation to the importance of political equality in epistemic 
proceduralism (discussed at the end of this chapter). When considering these 
difficulties one should note that Estlund argues for the importance of just 
results. He defends “fairness as a tendency of a procedure to produce results 
that are just” (Estlund 2002, 6). Yet, if the idea is that the lack of equality could 
be fixed by a template, this solution starts to sound potentially undemocratic. 
Estlund is a theorist who highly values ideal normative theorizing, lucidly 
emphasizing (see especially 2008, Ch. XIV) how human beings’ actual limits 
and their tendency to engage in undesirable behavior might have no relevance 
for it. He writes (2008, 264):  
                                               
89 Who is to make such a template? As Arneson (2011) points out: “None of us is perfectly rational 
and none of us knows what a fully reasonable and rational agent would think.” 
90 This worry resonates with what Daniel Weinstock (2008) has called the detachedness of epistemic 
proceduralism. 
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Consider a theory that held individuals and institutions to standards 
that it is within their ability to meet, but which there is no reason to 
believe they will ever meet. … It would be morally utopian if the 
standards were impossible to meet, but, again, by hypothesis, they are 
not. Many possible things will never happen. The imagined theory 
simply constructs a vision of how things should and could be, even 
while acknowledging that they won’t be. … So far, there is no 
discernable defect in the theory, I believe. For all we have said, the 
standards to which it holds people and institutions may be sound and 
true. The fact that people will not live up to them even though they 
could is a defect of people, not of the theory. For lack of a better term, 
let us call this kind of theory a version of hopeless realism. 
 
He also admits that the theory might not be useful. His point here is a 
conceptual one. He emphasizes that what is relevant is that even if hopeless 
and useless, a theory can be a true theory. Of course, this is one of the reasons 
he suggests his template view, as he acknowledges that approximating a 
deliberative ideal is not useful guidance for practice (Estlund 2008, Ch. XIV; 
see also Gaus 2016, Ch. 1).91  
In conditions of political disagreement people diverge with regard to what 
is just, what is true, what is equal, what is reasonable – yet the need to make 
decisions remains. And normative democratic theory is often used to find ways 
to do this in a “wiser” mode – whether or not intended for action-guiding 
purposes. The interest of this thesis lies in normative procedural theories that 
may be applied in a political context – idealized perhaps, but political anyway 
– a context characterized by disagreement.92 As Lagerspetz (2010, 55) writes: 
                                               
91 Weinstock (2008) considers one obvious counterargument Estlund could propose: “Now Estlund 
could of course respond that he is offering a philosophical framework for democracy, rather than an 
account of its institutional embodiment. But I think that this line of response can only be taken so far: a 
philosophical account, no matter how abstract, must bear some relation to that real-world thing that it 
is an abstraction of, lest it become an idealization rather than an abstraction.” 
92 As already discussed, disagreement is one of the major considerations affecting contemporary 
political theorizing. Democratic theories involve a commitment to some conception of political 
disagreement, implicitly or explicitly. Meanwhile, the sort of disagreement that is at stake impacts on 
the way democratic procedures should be theorized: whether it is assumed that disagreement could be 
overcome ideally and its relevance for the justification of a particular theory. Disagreement is also a 
topical theme for contemporary epistemology, while epistemological considerations provide useful tools 
for clarifying disagreement. Nonetheless, some disagreements appear to be "faultless", which means, 
roughly, that no party in a dispute needs to be mistaken. Other types of disagreements are "merely 
verbal". If disagreements about a certain subject are faultless, then there are no objective truths about 
that subject matter; if disagreements about a certain subject matter are merely verbal, then they concern 
a pseudo-problem. Yet many epistemologists are nowadays ready to accept that there can be faultless 
disagreement (see, for example, essays in Feldman & Warfield 2010). Yet the frameworks differ, as 
political philosophy operates not just with individuals, groups, evidence, beliefs, and justification, but 
also with questions concerning power and morality. These dimensions make disagreement complex for 
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“The problem is not that there is no truth in political issues. The problem is 
that the role of politics is precisely to handle situations in which the agreement 
on the content of this truth breaks down, but some decision still has to be 
made.”  
3.4 COMPLICATED EQUALITY AND THE QUESTION OF 
EPISTEMIC APPEAL 
The success of Estlund’s proposed epistemic proceduralism requires that the 
approach appears to be the most plausible. Yet it is one which makes the task 
of evaluation complex. Additionally, its plausibility depends on the success of 
alternatives. A few versions of an alternative, intrinsic form of proceduralism 
will be discussed in the next chapters. Yet, on basis of this chapter it seems 
that the burden of proof remains with the epistemic proceduralist. The 
considerations in this chapter provide a basis for defending intrinsic 
proceduralism. Yet, before considering a plausible alternative, there is one 
significant theme to discuss concerning Estlund’s approach: the role of 
procedural justice. This theme is also relevant to intrinsic proceduralism 
(discussed in Chapters Four–Six). 
For an epistemic proceduralist the role of procedural justice is complicated. 
It is thought-provoking that Estlund has changed his view in relation to 
procedural justice between his earlier work (1997) and his major statement 
(2008), as Ben Saunders points out (2010). (Estlund also seems to discuss 
justice and fairness interchangeably.93) In 1997 (174) he wrote: “Democratic 
legitimacy requires that the procedure is procedurally fair and can be held, in 
terms acceptable to all reasonable citizens, to be epistemically best among 
those that are better than random.” He also argued (2002, 6) that “the moral 
value of democracy apparently depends on a background that is, at least, not 
too unequal”. Yet in his major statement (2008, 98) he formulated his view as 
follows: “Democratic legitimacy requires that the procedure can be held, in 
terms acceptable to all qualified points of view, to be epistemically the best (or 
close to it) among those that are better than random.” Thus, in 1997 he 
required democratic procedures to be fair and have epistemic value, but he has 
since given up on procedural fairness. As he states (2008, 66), epistemic 
proceduralism “gives little or no role to procedural fairness”. Later he 
explained (2009): “I develop an account of the nature and point of procedural 
fairness. I argue that the value of fairness derives from what I call a dynamic 
                                               
normative political philosophy, as they bring another type of questions into consideration. It is also 
unclear to what extent contingent, practical disagreement, or the basis for such, should be considered at 
a normative level. 
93 See also Estlund 2008, 69 where he explains this mutatis mutandis in relation to substantive 
justice by saying: “I will use the terms substantive justice and substantive fairness interchangeably.” 
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of retreat from substantive values which are either unknown or unavailable for 
other reasons.” (Estlund 1997, 2002, 2008, 2009; see also Saunders 2010.) 
Estlund requests certain procedural elements that relate to procedural 
fairness for epistemic reasons. He defends “non-cheating fairness”, meaning 
that once there are defined rules people should obey them, as one would 
adhere to “the idea of fair play of the game”, as he explains it (2008, 70). He 
also defends “prospective fairness”, referring to the prospective tendency of 
procedures to produce just outcomes. “A dictatorship could be a fair procedure 
in this sense if the dictator produces substantively fair or just laws and 
policies”, he observes (2008, 70). As mentioned, Estlund argues that the 
request for procedural equality is always a step back from epistemic, and 
substance always has priority. He goes so far as to claim that “the idea of fair 
procedure would not even arise if it were common knowledge that everyone 
agreed what the correct decision is” (2008, 71; see also Saunders 2010). 
Estlund argues that procedural justice (understood in an intrinsic manner) 
is neither necessary nor sufficient to justify democratic procedures. It seems 
that he assumes that his qualified acceptability requirement could replace 
procedural justice, and yet do it in epistemic terms. He argues (2008, 36), for 
example, that “no invidious comparisons” among citizens concerning their 
political wisdom would be acceptable according to qualified acceptability 
criteria. Democratic procedures need to be acceptable for all qualified points 
of view, and there are qualified reasons to reject invidious comparisons and 
procedures that give some groups or individuals significantly more say than 
others. Therefore, inequality is ruled out; for example, unequal voting power 
would contradict the qualified acceptability criteria and thus be precluded 
(Estlund 2008, 36–37, 219; see also Saunders 2010).  
Estlund has emphasized (2010) that he does not wish to deny that 
procedural fairness can have value. He just thinks it is very thin. He even 
admits that there might sometimes be cases when such a thin value is the only 
option, in the face of disagreement or indeterminacy, but his own approach 
“makes no use of this particular value” (Estlund 2010, 54). He furthermore 
states (2010, 54) that “if the majority of important political decisions were 
ones where procedural fairness ought to be invoked, then epistemic 
proceduralism would not be explaining enough of the structure of government 
to count as a general theory of political legitimacy and authority”. Yet he does 
not think that it would be the case.  
If a justification of democratic procedures does not refer to the intrinsic 
value of democratic procedures, but to mere consequences, it is instrumental 
in a broad sense (see Arneson 2003, 2009; instrumentalism will be discussed 
in more detail in Chapter Five). The basic problem with instrumental 
justifications is that they are dependent on contingent empirical factors. In 
other words, instrumental arguments are not robust, and democracy can be 
justified only contingently – only if it produces valuable consequences. Were 
there other means to produce as many valuable consequences, we would not 
have reason to prefer democracy. Furthermore, from the instrumental 
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perspective, inegalitarian institutions are not a problem if they bring better 
consequences (which would require evaluability of the consequences). This 
same worry seems relevant in relation to epistemic proceduralism: that 
epistemic proceduralism can defend democracy only on contingent basis. In 
Estlund’s case it seems that epistemic proceduralism will be contingently 
democratic if democratic procedures can be held “in terms acceptable to all 
qualified points of view, to be epistemically the best (or close to it) among those 
that are better than random” (Estlund 2008, 98). Nonetheless, there is a 
problem with instrumentalism, according to Rostbøll (forthcoming): “the fact 
that democratic instrumentalists reject political equality, which is a defining 
characteristic of democracy on most accounts, raises the question whether it 
is a justification of democracy as such”. 
It seems odd for outcome values to dominate procedural equality lexically 
in the context of democratic procedures. I have caricaturized a science fiction 
example, “Super Episteme”, in order to bring this oddity to the fore, 
simultaneously aiming to highlight some undemocratic tendencies of 
epistemic proceduralism. Super Episteme is a decision machine, a future 
system using intelligent, self-learning, big data methods to analyze human 
beings, cognitive systems, psychology, neurology, physiology, values, cultures, 
data already known, and the history of all existing societies (the machine 
example seems justified on the basis of Enoch’s point that epistemic 
proceduralism is ultimately a form of instrumentalism). This Super Episteme 
decision machine can indicate what would be the best possible solution Y in 
circumstances X, taking into account all the relevant details with an accuracy 
of at least better than random. Let us assume it has an accuracy of 51% and 
there is a way to evaluate whether this is so. Super Episteme will provide the 
required decisions but will make mistakes on 49% of cases. So it seems that 
Estlund should hold that there would be no need for democracy, as substance 
would have primacy over procedural equality.  
It seems to me that it would be so even if we had a reason to believe that 
Super Episteme would suggest faintly biased decisions, as far as the biases are 
random and not based on any invidious comparisons. Let us call this version 
“Super Episteme 2.0”. Say it is publicly known that there is a bug that 
sometimes randomly fosters the relevance of random viewpoints in the 
decision-making process, although there is no sign when random fostering 
takes place, and it is intractable about the particular viewpoints it fosters. 
Nonetheless it is publicly known that the fostering is random: neither 
privileging any specific point, making invidious comparisons, nor 
discriminating demographically, for example. It seems that potentially 
Estlund might even need to defend this second version, if there were no 
qualified point of view against the epistemic prospects and if we knew that 
Super Episteme 2.0 gets it right in 55% of cases, and thus does better than 
random, as Estlund requested. It seems that all qualified points of view should 
still be able to accept procedure’s epistemic value.  
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Ultimately, it seems that Estlund’s epistemic proceduralism is an 
interesting approach. He emphasizes many relevant themes for evaluating 
democratic procedures. One of his strengths also lies in his pointing out 
certain potential weaknesses in competing views. Estlund describes his 
method as a provisional leap (2011, 357–358), in which the core idea is to offer 
a plausible and appealing theory, and if it is appealing and meritorious, then 
later seek to fill in the provisional element.94 He admits (2011, 256) that he 
“give[s] very little positive argument for [his] acceptability requirement” and 
continues that he concentrates “mainly [on] refuting several objections”. He 
hopes that “many will find it appealing”, and there is no doubt that it is. 
Nonetheless it seems that the epistemic justification might not offer such a 
stable grounding as Estlund wishes. It would be outstanding for democratic 
theory if democracy could be legitimatized via the epistemic route. But in the 
face of disagreement, I am so far not convinced that epistemic proceduralism 
appears more plausible than intrinsic proceduralism. In a similar vein I wish 
to proffer some weight to the more procedural hybrid view and answer core 
criticisms against it (in Chapters Four–Six). 
 
                                               
94 He uses classic Arrows theorem as an example of a similar kind of theoretical strategy. 
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4 CHRISTIANO’S INTRINSIC 
PROCEDURALISM AND WIDE VIEW 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The third version of deliberative proceduralism which I discuss is Christiano’s: 
proceduralism that builds on equality. This chapter is simultaneously the last 
chapter of the first part of the thesis, which discusses different deliberative 
proceduralisms, and the first chapter of the latter part, which studies the 
intrinsic (or non-instrumental)95 worth of democratic deliberative procedures. 
In this chapter I concentrate on intrinsic deliberative proceduralism. Where 
epistemic proceduralists seek justification for their approach in the outcomes 
of democratic procedures, intrinsic proceduralism focuses on the values that 
are intrinsic to procedures: procedures and procedural interaction, as such, 
are at the center of emphasis, not merely outcomes. For intrinsic 
proceduralists, justice is not just an outcome-related question, but is also a 
property of procedures: one of the inherent qualities of human interaction. 
This is especially interesting in plural and complex societies. Yet one should 
not confuse the idea of intrinsic procedures with those of so-called pure 
proceduralists, who accord no role at all to substantial value commitments.96 
One of the main strengths of intrinsic proceduralism is that it enables a 
focus on the dynamics of interaction. How do parties behave towards each 
other during the processes of democratic interaction that are an ongoing part 
of everyday life in democratic societies? Procedural aspects have not been very 
popular in democratic theorizing97, although Christiano, whose approach is 
the main focus of this chapter, is one of the exceptions.98 Ceva has also recently 
                                               
95 Some theorists prefer the term non-instrumental in place of intrinsic. See, for example, Rostbøll 
(forthcoming). See also fn 137 in this thesis. 
96 See, for example, Hampshire 2000. 
97 Potential reasons for that are many, and proper analysis of the causes is, of course, an empirical 
question. Political philosophers have, however, traditionally focused on more ideal theories. What would 
reasonable and otherwise ideal decision-makers decide? The absence of consensus accompanied by 
disagreement, and value conflicts have been seen more as non-ideal circumstances, and consequently 
not very interesting for normative theorizing focusing on ideals. Thus conflict management has been 
discussed in the sphere of peace-studies, not by philosophers, and these two areas have been rather 
distant (see also Ceva 2016, esp. Introduction.) 
98 Other promising recent procedural approaches in the area include that of Corey Brettschneider 
(2007), with a focus on the legal realm and rights. Brettschneider (2007) has defended a view according 
to which the values of democracy are not independent, but an explication of what democracy actually 
means. Ceva (2016), whose focus is on interactive justice, is discussed in greater detail later in this work 
along with Jeremy Waldron, who focuses more on juridical themes, and less on questions related to the 
weighting of intrinsic vs. instrumental values. Waldron also emphasizes that the need to look at the 
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published a remarkable work in this area entitled Interactive Justice (2016). 
Some of her ideas will also be discussed in more detail in the context of the 
intrinsic worth of democratic decision-making procedures in the following 
chapters. 
Intrinsic procedural approaches have been challenged by epistemic 
proceduralists and instrumentalists. By epistemic proceduralism, I refer to the 
view that political authority is built on a procedure’s tendency to produce just 
decisions. In this chapter I refer to Estlund as the main proponent of epistemic 
proceduralism (see Estlund 2008). Instrumentalism, on the other hand, refers 
to the view that the value of democratic procedures is, in the end, instrumental 
– that the operation of democratic procedures produces better consequences 
over time (Arneson 2003, 122). (The difference between the two is discussed 
below.) Epistemic proceduralists, Estlund to the fore, warn against retreating 
to non-substantial proceduralism, maintaining that procedural justifications 
are thinner than many seem to realize. The core of the allegation is that after 
the entire epistemic residue is peeled away from democratic procedures, what 
is left, based on detailed examination, is too weak for justificatory purposes. 
Mere procedural justice is not sufficient to explain the authority of democratic 
institutions if it does not appeal to the ability of democratic procedures to 
make substantively good decisions. Either the procedural view must include at 
least some substantial, procedure-independent elements, or it will be too thin 
to have enough justificatory power for democratic decision-making 
procedures. In addition, as already mentioned, epistemic proceduralists have 
argued that even hybrids of epistemic and procedural considerations are too 
unstable if they rely more on procedural elements. 
Epistemic proceduralists seem to be on the right track when criticizing 
entirely unsubstantial stances. However, from that point it does not 
necessarily follow that one should bring procedure-independent substantial 
standards into the picture. At least logically there is another possibility: 
substantial standards that are not procedure-independent. In this chapter I 
describe a hybrid view that rests on values that are at the same time substantial 
yet not independent of procedure in a broad sense – an alternative that does 
not lean merely on the outcomes of processes but emphasizes the value of 
procedures as such. In the following chapter I further develop a proceduralist 
view that can be described in a similar vein in relation to substantial standards. 
That is to say, in this chapter I analyze influential version of intrinsic 
proceduralism as presented by Christiano. He defends democratic procedures 
because he considers them intrinsically just. Here “intrinsic proceduralism” is 
shorthand for “intrinsic democratic proceduralism”, as even an intrinsic 
democratic proceduralist would maintain that most procedures are only 
                                               
procedural values rises from disagreement (2013, 8): “Exactly because we disagree in our ideals and 
policy aims, we need to inquire into the structures that are to house and refine our disputes and the 
processes that are to regulate the way we resolve them, how we (in our millions) resolve disagreements 
over disparate aims that we severally regard as fundamentally important”. 
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instrumentally valuable. Yet, as I will argue (with other non-instrumentalists), 
democratic procedures are different from other procedures in this respect. 
One should note that Christiano does not himself label his own view “intrinsic 
proceduralism”. He uses the term “moderate proceduralism”, since “moderate 
proceduralism implies that democratic process has intrinsic value but it 
recognizes limits beyond which some restraints must be placed on the process” 
(Christiano 2008, 298). Yet, as considering procedures intrinsically valuable 
is characteristic of his view, and as it is also the feature that interests me here, 
in this thesis I discuss his view under this label for heuristic purposes.99 
As I mentioned above, this is also the first chapter of the latter part, which 
focuses on intrinsic proceduralism. Here in this chapter the themes concern 
understandings of proceduralism, the role of deliberation in intrinsic 
deliberative proceduralism, and epistemic challenges. Another set of questions 
relates to the possibility of intrinsic value as such, which is discussed in more 
detail in the next chapter, Chapter Five. In the following, I first outline 
Christiano’s approach, and then discuss problems raised by epistemic 
proceduralists. One challenge for the type of hybrid view that rests on the 
procedural footing lies in explaining the nature of deliberation. The 
explanation of the intrinsic value of democratic procedures seems even more 
complicated (more about that, especially in Chapter Five). Topical questions 
related to that are how an intrinsic proceduralist would face the 
instrumentalist challenge by Richard Arneson, and whether democratic 
procedures can be intrinsically fair. In Chapters Four–Six I argue that 
democratic procedures can have intrinsic value and that this value could be 
understood as constitutive.  
4.2 CHRISTIANO’S INTRINSIC PROCEDURALISM 
Having discussed justificatory and epistemic proceduralism in the previous 
chapters, I now concentrate on one more approach that combines both 
procedural and substantive commitments: an alternative for considering the 
value of democratic procedures that does not lean on the outcomes of 
processes or their justificatory power but emphasizes the value of procedures 
as such. As in previous chapters, to keep discussion rooted, I have selected 
what I consider the most distinguished contemporary approach as the focus of 
my analysis. Thus, my starting point is the account presented by Christiano in 
Rule of Many (1996), and more comprehensively in The Constitution of 
Equality (2008). For Christiano, democracy basically means “a process of 
collective decision making for a political community in which the principal 
stakeholders participate as equals in an essential stage of the decision making 
                                               
99 Ceva uses intrinsic proceduralism as a broad label for approaches that focus on inherent qualities 
of procedures (see, for example, 2016). 
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and in which that participation plays a central role in the creation of law and 
policy for that community” (Christiano 2015). 
Christiano’s approach is a combination of both intrinsically procedural and 
substantive commitments, yet with a more procedural twist than those of 
justificatory or epistemic proceduralism. His perspective onto democracy 
differs significantly from the more epistemic proceduralists by virtue of its 
procedural take. Christiano does not defend certain procedures on epistemic 
grounds because they promote substantially just outcomes; rather, democratic 
procedures are defended because he sees them as intrinsically just, stating 
(2008, 11) that “democratic decision-making has intrinsic value”.100 He 
maintains that while public deliberation has instrumental value, “the equality 
of the process of public deliberation has an intrinsic worth grounded in the 
requirements of justice” (1997, 243). 
Christiano combines democratic proceduralism with substantive values 
that are not independent of, but fundamental to, democratic process.101 In his 
view the intrinsic worth of democracy is connected to equality and diversity. 
Equality, furthermore, is grounded in the dignity of persons and their being 
authorities in the realm of value. His argument proceeds from humanity to the 
requirement of equality. Humanity gives humans a special status, that of 
dignity.  
[T]he humanity of a person is that person’s capacity to recognize, 
appreciate, engage with, harmonize with and produce intrinsic goods. 
… Persons have dignity because they are capable of appreciating and 
enhancing the value in the world and this capacity involves the 
autonomous and self-conscious exercise of their capacities. (2008b, 
20)102  
                                               
100 He even states (2011, 4) that referring to his 2008 book: “It is one of the main aims of my book 
to show in what way democratic decision-making is an intrinsically just way of making collective 
decisions in certain contexts.” 
101 He describes these outcome standards in following way (2015): 
In my conception of the intrinsic value of democracy, there are a number of outcome standards that 
play a role in justifying democracy. First, we have a collective procedure in order to decide a question. 
Second, the function of political decision making is to advance the common good and justice among 
persons, and the thought is that we do better on this score when we make collectively binding decisions. 
Third, persons have interests in being able to shape the social world in which they live (even if they are 
not always trying to advance their interests), and these interests are advanced in a democratic decision-
making process. The idea behind the intrinsic value of democracy is that a certain way the justification 
of democracy of pursuing these aims is intrinsically valuable in light of the importance of the aims and 
in the light of the facts of disagreement and the interests of these equal participants. Democracy’s 
intrinsic value consists in its affording equality in the means by which people pursue their aims. 
102 Dignity is a heavily laden concept, and I will not go deeper into it here than seems necessary for 
the purposes of the discussion, but I should mention that even if dignity typically has Kantian echoes, 
the Kantian version of the concept has its challenges. Christiano (2008b), for example, argues that the 
problem with the Kantian interpretation is that “it is not at all clear how persons can have dignity by 
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He adds that “the only way to acknowledge this special status of humans as 
authorities on realm of value is being responsive to this special worth, that 
each is given her or his due as a human” (ibid.). Therefore, because of this 
special status, humans should be given the chance to exercise their capacity. 
“[W]hat is due to this kind of being is that it be enabled to exercise its 
enormously valuable authority” (Christiano 2008b, 20).103 Democracy is then 
the realization of this demand in the political realm, the realization of public 
equality. He argues, “democracy is one of the necessary conditions of the 
public realization of equality in any moderately complex society” (2008, 9). 
However, the intrinsic value of democracy is conditional. Democratic 
procedures can have intrinsic value only if they realize public equality 
(Christiano 2008, Ch. 1, 2008b, 2011, 2–3). (This point – an interesting one, 
especially concerning the possibility for democracy’s intrinsic worth – is 
discussed in the next chapter.) 
The requirement of the public realization of equality is connected to social 
justice. Christiano states (2008, 9) that “social justice requires that there be a 
collective decision-making process for the whole society and that each person 
has by right an equal say in the collective decisions of their society”. It 
furthermore entails (2008, 46) that this is done publicly: “social justice 
requires that justice must not only be done, it must be seen to be done”. So, 
democratic procedures are those that realize both public equality and also the 
latter requirement (2008, 46): “In democracy people can see that they are 
treated as equals.” The authority of democratic procedures is grounded in their 
realization of public equality. If the procedures fail in this (as is sometimes 
case when there are, for example, persistent minorities: a sign, according to 
Christiano, of procedural difficulties and tyranny by the majority), 
                                               
virtue of their rational nature when there are no values independent of rational nature in terms of which 
it can rationally justify its choices of ends”. Furthermore, Waldron (2012) points out that the Kantian 
concept of dignity might have complications for contemporary purposes, as it refers not just to dignity 
as something beyond price, but also to dignity as a rank, available only to some. Yet Anderson (2008b) 
has analyzed the Kantian notion of “commanding value” that combines these elements, and enables the 
transformation of the Kantian understanding of dignity into a universal ethic of honor for all humans. 
Moreover, the concept can also be historically understood as linked with freedom. James Griffin has 
defended dignity as the human capacity to “be that which he wills”, with lines of thought originating 
from Renaissance thinker Pico della Mirandola. Griffin refers (2008, 31) to Mirandola as the origin of 
the link between freedom and dignity: “God fixed the nature of all other things, but left man alone free 
to determine his own nature. In this he is God — like. Man too is a creator — a creator of himself. It is 
given to man ‘to have that which he chooses and be that which he wills.’ This freedom constitutes, as it 
is put in the title of Pico's best-known work, ‘the dignity of man’” (Waldron 2012). Waldron himself 
defines it (2012b) in the following terms: “Dignity, in my view, is a sort of status-concept: it has to do 
with the standing (perhaps the formal legal standing or perhaps, more informally, the moral presence) 
that a person has in a society and in her dealings with others.” 
103 Carol Gould has also defended democracy on the basis of human right to self-determination (see, 
for example, Gould 2006). 
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democracy’s authority is defeated. Moreover, the absence of persistent 
minorities can be used as a criterion for a minimum outcome standard 
(Christiano 2008, 288–299). (This is discussed in more detail below.) 
4.2.1 FROM DISAGREEMENT TO INTRINSIC PROCEDURALISM 
To understand the argument for intrinsic proceduralism, diversity and 
disagreement also become relevant, as they are the premises from which 
Christiano proceeds towards his intrinsic proceduralism in the political realm. 
(The intrinsic proceduralism part is interesting in itself. It seems that it could 
also be defended independently of some of the other elements with which 
Christiano combines it. I return to this point both at the end of this chapter 
and in the later chapters.) Christiano sees certain practical limitations as 
conditions that have to be taken into account in social structures, even in the 
idealized versions, stating (2008, 9), “the basic facts about social life … are the 
facts of diversity, disagreement, fallibility, and cognitive bias. These facts 
about persons in societies color everything we must think about how to 
structure society.” Political disagreement is a crucial element affecting his 
approach. His argument proceeds from pervasive disagreement to the request 
for democratic equality. Because we face pervasive disagreements about 
justice, the common good, and the value of substantive laws and policies, 
democratic decision making should publicly treat each citizen as an equal. As 
Christiano (2009, 233) argues: “The principle of equality is an appropriate 
principle for regulating collective decision-making in the context of significant 
disagreement.” 
What he calls the common world portrays an important condition. He 
argues that if we recognize the challenges of plural societies, namely, the 
prevalence of diversity, human fallibility, and cognitive bias, then the only way 
to ensure that people are treated equally is to give each an equal say in shaping 
the common world, “a world in which the fulfillment of all or nearly all of the 
fundamental interests of each person are connected with the fulfillment of all 
or nearly all of the fundamental interests of every other person”. As he 
describes it, the common world presents a set of circumstances that is “marked 
by a deep interdependence of interests among its members” (Christiano 2008, 
80). Thus, the human status of dignity in combination with fallibility, biases, 
disagreement, and the common world are the facts and conditions that build 
the case for the request for public equality. From these conditions he moves 
towards proceduralism.  
Why should Christiano’s proceduralism be considered intrinsic? Why not 
simply consider democratic procedures a means for public equality? 
Christiano does not merely argue against outcome-oriented and instrumental 
views, he also defends democracy as intrinsically just. He writes (2008, 71) 
that “the public realization of equality is intrinsically just”, and that democracy 
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is necessary104 and an “essential component of the public realization of 
equality”. He argues that democracy is grounded in the principle of public 
equality and that understanding this also enables us to understand how 
democracy is intrinsically valuable (2008, 75–76):  
Democratic decision-making is the unique way to publicly embody 
equality in collective decision-making under the circumstances of 
pervasive conscientious disagreement […]. Democratic decision 
making enables us all to see that we are being treated as equals despite 
disagreements as long as we take into account the facts of judgments 
and the interests that accompany them. Because democratic decision-
making realizes public equality in this way, and there is pervasive 
disagreement on its outcomes, it is intrinsically just. 
4.2.2 POLITICAL EXPERTISE AND (IN)EQUALITY 
Democratic theorists typically defend equal political rights for all adult 
citizens, yet political questions are often complicated and many lack the 
expertise to deal with this.105 Christiano maintains (2008, 116–130) that the 
moral idea of political equality implies that all adults have the right to 
participate in democratic decision making as equals. This is one of the 
controversial questions of political philosophy. Some argue that it is apparent 
that some people have more understanding of political issues than others, that 
there are so-called political experts. This is particularly so for epistocrats or 
epistemic proceduralists such as Estlund, who argues for the existence of 
political experts, adding that the only reason that they are not given the power 
to rule is that we are unable to identify beyond doubt who they are. In relation 
to the question of political expertise, Christiano’s view concerning knowledge 
and power is interesting. It would seem to imply either that differences in 
political expertise are not relevant or that there are no relevant differences in 
political expertise. Christiano is not defending these propositions; rather, he 
argues that there is too much controversy in these matters. This is something 
with which an epistemic proceduralist would also agree, while arguing for it 
on the basis that political expertise does not fulfill the qualified acceptability 
criteria. The egalitarian proceduralist can make the same argument on the 
basis of equality of decision-makers because of equal advancement of 
interests, whereas this strategy is not open to the epistemic proceduralist. 
Nonetheless, it is a challenging one.  
                                               
104 He uses “necessary” in this context himself (2008, 88). 
105 Political knowledge is an interesting area of empirical political studies. The general political 
knowledge of ordinary citizens is typically quite low, although slightly above average in Finland. 
Empirical studies have shown, for example, that only approximately one person in ten holds a coherent 
set of political beliefs. (For a Finnish analysis, see, for example, Rapeli 2010, and for a more general take 
see Uschanov 2010.)  
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Estlund questions the isomorphism between substantive and procedural 
distribution in Christiano’s approach. He acknowledges that both face the 
question, but he thinks that since Christiano wishes to go the egalitarian route, 
Christiano should have a stronger claim. He asserts that it is not obviously 
correct that unequal political power indicates unequal regard for people’s 
interests, as Christiano claims. “If some are given more votes than others on 
the ground that they know better how to promote the common interest, how 
does this fail to publicly indicate an equal regard for everyone’s interests?” 
(Estlund 2009, 244). According to him, Christiano should be able to argue why 
educated elites could not make decisions that would treat people’s interests 
with equal respect. If the substantial equality in Christiano’s approach cannot 
offer any additional basis for resisting the allocation of extra votes to experts, 
Estlund sees that as a larger problem for Christiano’s attempts to link 
substantive values and democratic procedures. “It turns out, then, that the 
theory of democracy owes very little to the theory of justice, whereas 
Christiano proposes to link them closely” (Estlund 2009, 244–245). 
Yet it seems that Estlund fails to take into account the fact that Christiano’s 
argument presupposes certain conditions: that is, the pervasiveness of 
disagreement, the diversity of interests among people, the cognitive bias 
towards one’s own perspective, and human fallibility in understanding the 
interests of others. As Christiano maintains (2009, 238), given these 
preconditions, educated elites cannot hold an informed belief that they have 
superior judgement in promoting equality. He asserts that people have 
fundamental interests “in correcting for the cognitive biases of others, in 
making the world a home for themselves and of being recognized and affirmed 
as equals”. These interests are not instrumental, not something that could be 
externalized. Thus, no educated elite experts can conscientiously believe that 
they could take care of the interests of others better than those persons 
themselves. He notes, moreover, that the driving force behind these claims is 
actually social-psychological, not conceptual, since he sees that “[i]t is deeply 
relevant to a theory of what can be publicly clear to people in political societies” 
(Christiano 2009, 238). This is also related to the themes discussed at the end 
of the previous chapter. Recognition and affirmation as equals is something 
that cannot be outsourced to experts. 
When it comes to instrumental reasons, the case for epistemic superiority 
is a complex one. Why should educated elites not believe they have superior 
judgement under given conditions? There is plenty of recent research on 
cognitive biases, limited cognitive abilities, and fallibility. Interesting studies 
in different fields from the ethics of knowing to empirical behavioral 
economics have strengthened the case that Christiano employs in his 
approach. For instance, one of the practical problems is that some experience 
is not easy to explain in a reasoned way or even verbally. Moreover, we are 
biased towards our own perspectives. We humans tend to see our own choices 
as more rational than the choices of others. It is difficult to understand the 
situation from another person’s perspective; it requires effort, especially in 
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cases in which someone with experience lacks the words for, or even the 
conceptual understanding of, the situation, and yet does not realize it. We also 
tend to have a higher opinion of our abilities to understand the other’s 
perspective than we should have.  
The practical limitations that condition democratic deliberation are also 
discussed nowadays by theorists conducting conceptual research in the field. 
For example, the social conditions characterized by disagreement, diversity, 
bias, and fallibility discussed by Christiano, can be described in terms of 
epistemic injustice. Miranda Fricker (2007) has described the difficulties 
related to understanding the perspectives of others in normative terms, 
pointing out that epistemic practices have an ethical dimension as well. This 
ethical dimension can be made visible with less effort via a negative, that is, 
via epistemic injustice, since epistemic injustice is often a “silent form of 
injustice”. By epistemic injustice she refers to wronging someone in their 
capacity as a knower, which, as Fricker highlights, is a capacity essential to 
human value. It is also one of the crucial elements in the deliberative process. 
She identifies two distinct forms of epistemic injustice – testimonial injustice 
and hermeneutical injustice – that are related to fundamental epistemic 
practices that are also foundational for public deliberation processes: gaining 
knowledge by being told and making sense of social experiences. According to 
Fricker (2007, 1, 20), testimonial injustice refers to situations in which 
“prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s 
word” and in which “someone is wronged specifically in her capacity as a 
knower”. Therefore, it occurs in situations in which someone’s testimony is 
not given enough epistemic credit. This credibility deficit can result either 
from innocent error or it can be systematic. Innocent error can be caused by 
human fallibility, but systematic structural epistemic injustice is a serious 
form of epistemic injustice often connected to other forms related to economic, 
educational, professional, sexual, legal, political, or religious issues. These 
identity prejudices can be negative or positive, causing credibility deficits or 
excess credibility. If testimonial injustice is persistent it is even more 
disastrous for an individual. Hermeneutical injustice occurs earlier, when 
collective interpretive resources – or even more typically, the lack of them – 
put “someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their 
social experiences”.106 These injustices are intertwined with social power, 
stereotypes, and prejudices. Moreover, epistemic injustices are also vicious 
because they are latent. As Fricker puts it, epistemic injustice is a silent 
dimension of discrimination (2007, 21–29). 
Giving due credit for everyone’s testimony is crucial in the deliberative 
setting in plural societies. Individuals, even if educated, cannot have 
                                               
106 Fricker’s basic example of testimonial injustice is a case in which a police officer considers a 
person’s testimony unreliable because the person is black, while for hermeneutical injustice it is a person 
suffering from sexual harassment in a culture that still lacks the concepts that are needed in order to 
make sense of the experience for those who have not been victims of the same or similar experience.  
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knowledge of all the relevant social settings, circumstances, and experiences; 
sometimes they lack the experience that could help them understand the 
other’s perspective vividly. Some experiences are also what Laurie Paul (2015) 
has called transformative: experiences that are radically new for us and change 
us in a fundamental way.107 The latter can be transformative in the epistemic 
or personal sense. Epistemically transformative experiences teach us 
something we could not have learned without them. These kinds of 
experiences can provide new abilities to imagine, recognize, and even 
potentially cognitively model similar future experiences. Paul’s examples of 
transformative cases of a personal kind include becoming a parent, 
discovering a faith, moving to another country, and fighting in a war. One good 
outcome of these cases is that one might realize that one’s understanding is 
limited, but more often the results are less obvious (Paul 2015a, 2015b). 
There are also other reasons, related to instrumental diversity, to favor 
political equality and public deliberation between citizens. One line of 
argument employs the cognitive benefits of group diversity. For example, 
Christiano refers to the empirical studies by Scott Page and his collaborators 
of how cognitive diversity affects the collective intelligence of groups. 
“Cognitive diversity refers to differences between individuals’ perspectives. A 
perspective is a way of representing or encoding objects or situations. 
Perspectives constitute understandings of the world, including ways of 
structuring a given problem and generating solutions” (Hong and Page 2004). 
According to Page, sometimes groups with high cognitive diversity can 
outperform experts in problem solving. The logic behind this so-called 
diversity trumps ability theorem is that experts often think alike and thus they 
are able to find no better solution for a problem as a group than they would as 
                                               
107 In an interview (2014) Paul uses modern day vampires as an imaginative example: “We're going 
to pretend that modern-day vampires don't drink the blood of humans; they're vegetarian vampires, 
which means they only drink the blood of humanely farmed animals. You have a one-time-only chance 
to become a modern-day vampire. You think, ‘This is a pretty amazing opportunity, do I want to gain 
immortality, amazing speed, strength, and power? But do I want to become undead, become an immortal 
monster and have to drink blood? It's a tough call.’ Then you go around asking people for their advice 
and you discover that all of your friends and family members have already become vampires. They tell 
you, ‘It is amazing. It is the best thing ever. It's absolutely fabulous. It's incredible. You get these new 
sensory capacities. You should definitely become a vampire.’ Then you say, ‘Can you tell me a little more 
about it?’ And they say, ‘You have to become a vampire to know what it’s like. You can't, as a mere human, 
understand what it's like to become a vampire just by hearing me talk about it. Until you're a vampire, 
you're just not going to know what it's going to be like.’  
The question you need to ask yourself is how could you possibly make a rational decision about 
whether or not to become a vampire? You don't know, and you can't know what it's like. You can't know 
what you'd be choosing to do if you became a vampire, and you can't know what you're missing if you 
pass it up. This would be a problem if we faced these choices on a regular basis because what it suggests 
is that there is a principled, philosophical reason why, when faced with this big choice, we would be 
unable to reach our epistemic gold standard." 
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an individual.108 Yet, when a cognitively diverse group is stuck with a problem, 
they can employ diverse ways of looking at it, use alternatives in creative way, 
and therefore find better solutions.109 The theorem makes the diversity of 
perspectives a virtue – the very virtue on which equal inclusive public 
deliberation builds. This is an instrumental reason to favor inclusive public 
deliberation and cognitively diverse citizenry over political expertise in 
democratic decision making (Christiano and Bajaj 2017, 386; See also 
Landemore 2013). 
Sometimes the psychological effects of a certain situation make it non-
transparent. It is difficult to understand the micro dynamics of decision 
making from the outside. Why do people in certain situations prioritize things 
the way they do? As shown by Mullainathan and Shafir (2013), who have been 
studying people experiencing scarcity, a scarcity of resources affects a person’s 
cognitive processes. By scarcity they mean having less than one feels that one 
needs in different areas of life, not just extreme cases such as malnutrition or 
poverty, but also less severe financial scarcity or a scarcity of social relations. 
How does this cause different social problems and change ways of thinking, 
making it impossible for those experiencing scarcity to behave in a way that 
outsiders would consider rational? Why does solving these problems require 
understanding of the dynamics of the specific type of scarcity? For someone 
not experiencing the psychological changes caused by scarcity the 
compulsiveness of the situation is not obvious.  
However, one thing to remember is that even if the studies demonstrate 
practical, existing complications, humans are not stable in their abilities. An 
understanding of different levels of expertise in the political sphere should not 
be interpreted as involving a static consideration of human capabilities, as 
people change in these respects. They can learn to be better decision makers, 
and therefore it seems that political procedures should enable this learning. 
Humans are also malleable in less favorable respects. Elizabeth Anderson 
(2010, 85) describes this as a problem of adaptive preferences: “People adapt 
to their deprivations, making do with what they have by giving up on larger 
ambitions.” This can also be seen as a problem for subjectivist theories, and a 
good reason to defend more objectivistic approaches. 
4.3 EPISTEMIC CHALLENGE: A MODIFIED LEVELING-
DOWN OBJECTION 
Another, perhaps more serious, challenge for intrinsic proceduralism lies in 
problems related to the possibility of leveling down. As already explained (in 
the first part of Chapter 3.2), Estlund presents a dilemma that he considers 
fatal for non-substantial proceduralism (in the following, I will call this the 
                                               
108 Often referred as a local optimum. 
109 The global optimum. 
Christiano’s Intrinsic Proceduralism and Wide View 
 
98 
modified levelling-down objection110, 111). He suggests that (2008, 6), “if 
fairness is the main basis of democracy’s importance, then why not flip a coin 
instead?”112 (Estlund 2008, esp. Ch. IV.) Before considering a potential reply 
to this argument, I wish to elaborate on the typology of proceduralisms in more 
general Rawlsian terms, and explain why his procedural taxonomy 
complicates discussion on proceduralism. General taxonomies can be 
heuristically useful as enablers of broader understanding of a whole variety of 
alternative points of views. Yet they can also serve us poorly if they are 
somehow misleading. Ceva points out that when it comes to the merits of 
proceduralism, political philosophers can both thank Rawls for providing food 
for thought, and blame him for certain pervasive effects on conceptual and 
terminological misunderstandings concerning procedures. Rawls has 
famously distinguished types of proceduralism in his Theory of Justice (1971) 
into “perfect proceduralism”, “imperfect proceduralism”, and “pure 
proceduralism”. Perfect proceduralism would lead to a desired outcome with 
certainty.  
The essential thing is that there is an independent standard for 
deciding which outcome is just and a procedure guaranteed to lead to 
it. … First there is an independent criterion for what is a fair division, 
a criterion defined separately from and prior to the procedure which 
is to be followed. And second, it is possible to devise a procedure that is 
sure to give desired outcome. (Rawls 1999[1971], 85)  
 
For imperfect proceduralism there is no procedure that could guarantee the 
just outcome. As Rawls describes it (ibid., 86): “The characteristic mark of 
imperfect procedural justice is that while there is an independent criterion for 
the correct outcome, there is no feasible procedure which is sure to lead to it.” 
Thus, in both of these cases there is an independent criterion for outcome 
justice, but the difference is that for the perfect case there is a procedure that 
guarantees achieving it, whereas imperfect procedures do not always yield the 
right outcomes, even if they could reasonably be expected to do so. Finally, in 
the Rawlsian taxonomy pure proceduralism is the only alternative in which 
there is no independent criterion for the correct outcome. The outcome cannot 
be judged independently since, according to Rawls (ibid., 86), “in this kind of 
procedural justice the correctness of the distribution is founded on the justice 
                                               
110 The original non-modified levelling down objection has been presented, for example, by Parfit 
(1997, 210–211; also by Raz and Temkin among others).  
111 An earlier version of this has been presented by Charlez Beitz (1989, 76). 
112 Parfit (1997, 207–208) also discusses the purely procedural and substantial: “In some cases, 
justice is purely procedural. It requires only that we act in a certain way. For example, when some good 
cannot be divided, we may be required to conduct a lottery, which gives everyone an equal chance to 
receive this good. In other cases, justice is in part substantive. Here too, justice may require a certain 
kind of procedure; but there is a separate criterion of what the outcome ought to be.” 
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of the scheme of cooperation from which it arises and on answering the claims 
of individuals engaged in it” (ibid., 85–86; see also Ceva 2016, 63–67). 
However, as Michael Rosenfeld has pointed out (1998), Rawlsian perfect 
and imperfect proceduralisms are both outcome theories in “procedural garb” 
(see also Ceva 2016). The procedures are simply instruments for attaining 
certain outcomes. (Estlund’s epistemic proceduralism would count as an 
example of imperfect proceduralism in this vocabulary.) Pure proceduralism 
is thus the only form of proceduralism proper in the Rawlsian taxonomy. 
“Procedures thus acquire a central role in the realization of justice as they are 
thought to be capable, if correctly operated, of transferring their properties to 
their outcomes” (Ceva 2016, 67). However, as Ceva notes, the Rawlsian tri-fold 
taxonomy of proceduralisms has blurred the picture, blinding us to other 
alternatives. From that perspective it is more complicated to understand 
intrinsic proceduralism, as there is not suitable space for the view in this 
setting. While Rawlsian pure proceduralism can be interpreted in many 
ways113, all potential interpretations seem to be motivated by resorting from 
substance that is a feature that characterizes only the outcomes (Ceva 2016, 
Ch. 3).  
Let us return to the leveling-down theme. It seems that Estlund does have 
a point in criticizing purely procedural views. Mere fairness as anonymity 
seems rather thin for justifying democratic procedures.114 However, as 
discussed, proceduralism is often misinterpreted as Rawlsian pure 
proceduralism. For pure proceduralism, Estlund’s point might be valid, 
although, from the perspective of the intrinsic proceduralist, it seems that 
Estlund is too eager to peel (cf. Chapter 3 and epistemic layers). Christiano is 
not aiming at pure proceduralism. An intrinsic proceduralist would maintain 
that democratic procedures involve something that is substantial, yet not 
procedure-independent. As Saunders (2010) points out, this substantial yet 
procedural fairness is sensitive to context and the matter being distributed. 
(For example, we would not consider it fair to resolve sporting contests by 
means of a lottery either.) It is not sensible to compare it to a coin flip. As 
                                               
113 As Ceva stipulates (2016, 67—69), the potential interpretations of Rawlsian pure proceduralism 
include (1) constructivist description of metaethical reasoning that leads to the formulation of principles 
of justice; (2) the characterization of the properties of those norms on which social cooperation is based 
and that legitimize the outcomes of those procedures; (3) an account of what holds societies together; 
and finally (4) a source of political authority in democratic decision-making. 
114 At least in most cases. Yet I am not fully convinced that leveling down to a lottery would always 
be as bad a choice as many seem to assume. It seems that the use of lotteries in certain situations does 
involve interesting dimensions that should be more thoroughly considered. Saunders (2009) has noted 
that proponents of egalitarian proceduralism, such as Christiano, might not have reason to reject 
lotteries in all potential cases. Christiano criticizes lotteries for producing only a “thin form” of equality. 
But Saunders points out that, depending on the background assumptions, it might be the case that 
sometimes one might prefer a lottery as a means of distribution. Saunders considers, for example, 
whether that might fit with Christiano’s view of how one should cope with persistent minorities. 
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Christiano describes (2011, 3), there are two points to notice: “One, public 
equality is a minimal requirement of justice, and, two, it involves a kind of 
consensus on equality.” He emphasizes, furthermore, that what he aims at is a 
sort of minimal level – the level that is required for democracy. He notices that 
there are limits for this (2011, 3), writing, “the idea cannot be stretched very 
far. If it is stretched too far, it loses its character as a reasonably 
uncontroversial realization of equality.” Thus, the equality that is a core value 
of democracy also sets limits on democratic legitimacy.115 Some might argue 
that this kind of view is circular, but if it is understood that equality is a core 
democratic value, and without it, democracy cannot exist, I can see no 
circularity here (for more about this see Chapter Five). 
Christiano also notes in his reply to Estlund (2009), that Estlund seems to 
misunderstand his point. He argues in a sufficientarian way, referring to Harry 
Frankfurt, that he does not support the claim that more equality would always 
be better in any circumstances. Equality should be maximized only in 
circumstances where more would be better. Therefore, he maintains that if 
there is a genuine level of sufficiency, then equality matters only beneath the 
sufficiency level. When everyone is above the sufficiency level, equality ceases 
to matter. Yet he points out that this “does not undermine the thought that 
equality matters when all or most are beneath the level of sufficiency (which I 
take to be the normal situation)”. He moreover asserts that Estlund’s leveling-
down argument works only in cases in which a sufficient level of equality is 
easy to meet.  
Nonetheless, to be precise, Estlund does not explicitly deny the possibility 
of the intrinsic fairness of democratic procedures. His argument against 
hybrid stances – that is, those that are not purely procedural but do not rest 
on an epistemic footing either – is based on their supposed instability. He 
argues that putting too much weight on procedural justification would lead to 
difficulties, as it would make the view instable. This is an objection an intrinsic 
proceduralist should take seriously. The tricky part of any hybrid procedural 
view is the connection between procedural and substantial elements – how the 
elements are knit together and how the knitting it is justified. Epistemic 
proceduralists stitch the division between substantial and procedural by 
epistemic criteria, as all the choices are made on an epistemic basis.116 But if 
no epistemic criterion is used, there seems to be no stable justifiable criteria, 
Estlund maintains (Estlund 2008, esp. Ch. V). He also argues against the view 
he calls “fair deliberative proceduralism”, which he attributes to Christiano.117 
The fact that fair deliberative proceduralism is neither epistemic nor purely 
procedural will cause inconvenience. He asserts (2008, 96): “Insofar as 
                                               
115 In a somewhat similar vein Brettschneider defends what he calls as a “value theory of democracy” 
(2007, 19): “a truly democratic theory must be grounded in the fundamental, or “core”, values of 
democracy itself”.  
116 Christiano (2009) has also criticized Estlund’s view, arguing that it is instable as well.  
117 He counts Waldron and Christiano as proponents of this type of view (see Estlund 2002).  
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procedural fairness is really the point, the deliberation is superfluous. Insofar 
as the deliberation is important to the theory, the view shifts away from 
procedural values and toward epistemic ones.”  
The reply to this instability charge depends both on the nature of intrinsic 
value and understandings of the role of deliberation. When it comes to 
deliberation it seems that Christiano could answer that the element that joins 
the justice of procedures and deliberation together is equality. He asserts 
(1997, 243) that “while public deliberation per se has an exclusively 
instrumental value in enhancing the quality of decisions in democracy, 
equality in the process of public deliberation has an intrinsic worth grounded 
in the requirements of justice.”118 Nonetheless, this procedural equality is not 
procedure-independent.  
Christiano does not deny that democratic procedures, especially public 
deliberation, also have epistemic value (more about that later). On the 
contrary, he maintains that public democratic deliberation can help to 
minimize epistemic difficulties, such as the existence of widespread 
disagreement, fallibility, and cognitive bias. He refers (2008, 192–193) to 
three types of instrumental results that are hoped for from democratic 
deliberation. First, public deliberation generally improves the quality of 
legislation. When the process of deliberation enhances citizens’ 
understanding of their society and moral principles, the justice of laws and 
social institutions may be increased. Second, laws tend to be more rationally 
justified in societies that undergo intensive process of deliberation. If 
deliberation leads to a reasoned agreement among citizens, the legitimacy of 
society is increased via this process. Third, many think that citizens 
participating in a process of free and equal deliberation are more likely to 
develop desirable qualities, such as traits of autonomy, rationality, and 
morality. Yet, as Christiano highlights, the values of justice, legitimacy, and 
virtue are independent of the process of deliberation that is thought to be 
causally responsible for their realization. He does not wish to argue that public 
discussion only diminishes agreement, but, rather, put emphasis on the fact 
that reaching these results via deliberation is contingent. There is no doubt 
that these results appeal to our common sense. It seems likely that if people 
deliberate sedately in a political context free of fear with comparatively equal 
status, they will often reach better decisions in many respects. They are likely 
to become more informed, and make fewer decisions based on 
unsubstantiated prejudices, for example. However, Christiano wishes to stress 
that empirical evidence supporting the benefits of public deliberation is thin, 
and not all of it is positive.119 In addition, deliberation is also likely to have 
                                               
118 Christiano also sees that the instrumental and procedural values of deliberation are compatible 
with each other (1997, 245). 
119 Furthermore, most of the empirical studies are done only on small groups. Generalizing the 
findings of small group situations into a democratic society might lose their validity (Christiano 2008, 
Ch. 5). 
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other sorts of effects, not just desirable ones. It is, for example, likely to bring 
out more elaborated differences and disagreement, not just eliminate them. A 
society-wide democratic deliberation might also lead to indecisiveness. Or if 
non-ideal deliberative circumstances are considered, deliberation can actually 
have quite devastating consequences. For example, as discussed in Chapter 
Two and argued by Young and others, deliberation in unequal circumstances 
might foster a hidden power bias (see, for example, Young 2000, Ch. 1).  
Despite the contingency of instrumental benefits, Christiano defends 
deliberation as a crucial part of democratic decision making. He also 
maintains (2008, 198): “Public deliberation is one of the main cognitive 
conditions for effective citizenship.” He regards deliberation as elementary for 
democratic equality in the long run in diverse societies. Equality is one of the 
main elements in his defense of a wide conception of deliberative democracy. 
In the following I explain in more detail what he means by it, and why this 
makes Christiano’s view different in important ways from the two other types 
of view discussed in Chapters Two and Three. I discuss intrinsic worth in the 
following parts. 
4.4 A WIDE VIEW ON DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION 
The wide conception of deliberative democracy is maybe the most noticeable 
difference between Christiano’s view and both justificatory and epistemic 
proceduralism. As Saunders observes in his analysis (2009), the wide 
conception is the clearest departure in Christiano’s approach from a typical 
deliberative framework, especially from those favoring the Rawlsian legacy 
and the reasonability requirement. Christiano (& Bajaj 2017, 385) explains 
that the wide conception endorses many of the core elements typical of the 
other deliberative views. Public deliberation as a reasoned discussion 
procedure grounded in competing conceptions of the common good is given a 
central role. It requires that the equality of all the citizens in a public 
deliberation is institutionally supported by other necessary background 
conditions in society. It also requires that, in a well functioning democracy, 
citizens are committed to the process, open to the arguments of others, and 
ready to shape or even change their preferences in the course of deliberation. 
Thus, in most senses, the wide view is quite similar to the justificatory view, 
for example. Nevertheless, the main difference between a mainstream 
deliberative view, such as Cohen’s justificatory view, and the wide view is 
related to reasonability. Christiano maintains that citizens should be free to 
advance proposals based on their own comprehensive doctrines, not just what 
is narrowly taken as reasonable view (2008, 190–230).  
To follow his line of thought, let us look at Cohen’s view, one that Christiano 
has labeled “Cohen’s narrow conception of public deliberation” (2008) and 
later, the “rational consensus conception” (2017 with Bajaj). For Cohen’s 
deliberative view consensus is after all about shared reasons. How should 
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different reasons be understood and what kind of decisions should be made on 
the basis of various reasons? Reasonable pluralism is an important idea for 
Cohen (2009a, 6–9), who maintains that the elementary aspect of democratic 
decision making is that “the kinds of reasons that could be used to justify 
collective decisions needed to be attentive to the pluralism that lies at the heart 
of democratic societies”. In his approach, reasonability is connected to 
equality, as he considers relying on common reason a basis for justification, 
along with treating people as equals. He sees that the request for reasonability 
arises from pluralism, especially in heterogeneous societies. Because there are 
many reasonable views, which have different fundamental elements, both 
religious and secular, the political argument should “take a place on a terrain 
that could be endorsed by people with different reasonable views”. Cohen 
states that his approach is about the political sphere (contra Rawls, for 
example), as he maintains that reasonable disagreement would not be a 
problem for it. Thus, a principle of reasonableness is a fundamental part of 
Cohen’s deliberative ideal. It is supposed to provide a principle for evaluating 
all the basic institutions of society and guide democratic deliberation when 
citizens design those institutions. As Cohen (1999, 396) expresses it: “People 
are reasonable, politically speaking, only if they are concerned to live with 
others on terms that those others, understood as free and equal, can also 
reasonably accept.” Cohen’s justificatory view requires that public deliberators 
exercise a deliberative restraint. It requires that decisions can be based only 
on reasons that all the participants of deliberation can accept as reasons 
(Cohen 1999; see also Christiano 2008, 203–205; Christiano & Bajaj 2017, 
384–385). 
However, Christiano worries that deliberative restraint seems to say that to 
live in a society that implements certain principles that are not accepted by all 
is worse for the person who rejects those principles than it is to live in a society 
that does not implement certain principles for the person who accepts them. 
“[T]he requirement of deliberative restraint rests on the idea that it is more 
oppressive to persons when we make them live on some terms they do not 
accept than when we make them live in societies that do not conform to their 
controversial ideas of justice.” But Christiano (& Bajaj) argue that it is not clear 
why this asymmetry might be justified. Why would the first case be more 
oppressive than the second? If the asymmetry cannot be justified, as they 
maintain, then deliberative restraint should be relinquished. They also claim 
that the ideal of reasonability carries a serious risk of intellectual stagnation 
(Christiano & Bajaj 2017, 384–386). Furthermore, Christiano emphasizes that 
his argument against the idea of reasonability starts from a deliberative 
impasse. It applies to situations in which there are disagreements over the 
norms. Only ideal full consensus would do for a situation in which deliberative 
restraint would not have extra costs (Christiano 2009). 
Therefore, the wide conception differs from Cohen’s view, particularly with 
respect to deliberative restraint and the ideal of reasonability. The wide 
conception rejects the proposition that deliberators should only appeal to 
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reasons that can be accepted by all other reasonable deliberators. This is 
because, according to the wide conception, the moral idea of public equality is 
fully realized when citizens: “(a) respect the democratic process and basic 
liberal rights, (b) take other citizens’ interests and capacities into account in 
the best way they know how, and (c) listen to and sincerely engage with others’ 
arguments in a democratic forum” (Christiano & Bajaj 2017, 385). However, 
the crucial point of difference between Cohen’s view and the wide view lies in 
the type of reasons. According to Christiano, public equality “can be achieved 
when citizens appeal to what they take to be the most compelling reasons 
when justifying political proposals, even if such reasons are not acceptable 
to all other reasonable citizens”120 (Christiano & Bajaj 2017, 385; see also 
Christiano 2008, Ch. 5). 
4.5 THE WIDE VIEW AND INCLUSIVITY 
What are the advantages of the wide view? The wide conception of deliberative 
democracy is more inclusive than Cohen’s justificatory or Estlund’s epistemic 
approaches. Since it does not require deliberators to limit their appeals only to 
those reasons that all can accept (or the qualified acceptability requirement, in 
Estlund’s case) it allows a wider variety of views of common good and justice 
to be considered in the political justification process. The wide view seems to 
be able to incorporate both instrumental and intrinsic values in the same 
frame. The broader understanding of deliberation accentuates the virtues of 
deliberation generally. On the one hand, there are general instrumental 
benefits: increasing the diversity in the process of deliberation can improve 
decision making because of the positive effects of cognitive diversity on 
problem solving, as discussed earlier. The wider the variety of points of view, 
the more effective and just the decisions. More interestingly, the wider view 
also supports the intrinsic values of deliberation. 
While the wide conception distinguishes Christiano’s view from many 
other deliberative theorists, this kind of request for a broader interpretation of 
deliberation is not unique. The consensus ideal in particular has been 
criticized by theorists emphasizing the politics of difference (see, for example, 
Young 2000; Phillips 1999; Lara 1998; Williams 1998) or radical equality (see, 
for example, Bohman 1996). For instance, as discussed already, Young 
requests a wider and more inclusive understanding of deliberative styles, 
stressing that aiming towards consensus can actually work in an exclusive 
manner. She asserts that democracy is less exclusive when we recognize 
deliberation in various forms of communication that, at first sight, do not 
appear to be an argument, such as in rhetoric or narratives (Young 2000, esp. 
Ch. 2; see also Phillips 1999; Lara 1998; Williams 1998; etc.). Christiano’s wide 
view seems to take into account many of the concerns about deliberative 
                                               
120 My italics. 
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approaches brought to the fore by Young (see, for example, 2000, 25, 40–42) 
and other theorists of politics of difference. 
In a recent article, Christiano (& Bajaj 2017, 386) pays respect to Young 
and her concern that appealing to shared public reasons in a democratic 
deliberation process threatens to marginalize some groups and their social 
perspective: “One worry with the rational consensus conception of deliberative 
democracy is that some groups’ participation in discussion and deliberation is 
impeded by the requirement to justify political proposals in terms all can 
accept”. These worries could be described in Fricker’s terms (see 4.2.2). Some 
marginalized groups face hermeneutical injustice, meaning that their 
difficulties are not taken seriously by the larger society because their problems 
are not familiar to others, and are difficult to articulate in a way that would 
make them understandable. Meanwhile, their mere testimony recounting the 
problem suffers a testimonial credibility deficit. This credibility deficit means 
that the perspectives of persons suffering from it are not given due emphasis 
during deliberation and if this is repeated it can lead to political 
marginalization. As Christiano notes, political marginalization can in turn 
arrest or prevent the development of concepts or schemes for describing the 
harms in publicly understandable and acceptable terms. Thus, these persons 
or groups are excluded from full participation in public democratic process. 
That is a serious threat to the ideal of public equality (Christiano & Bajaj 2017, 
385–386). 
4.5.1 THE WIDE VIEW AND TWOFOLD CONDITIONS OF 
DELIBERATION 
At a more general level, one recognizable difference between the epistemic 
approach and the wide view is the dissimilar motivation and justification for 
the conditions of deliberation. It has not been brought to the fore clearly 
before, but I think this is a crucial feature which deserves elaboration. As Nomi 
Arpaly writes (2011, 82–83) there is a difference between moral and epistemic 
motivations:  
The truth seeker seeks the truth, but the morally concerned person qua 
morally concerned person only need care about the truth when the 
truth is morally salient, when there are moral stakes. Some will hold 
that the truth is always morally salient, as any false belief is capable 
of causing a harmful action. If that is true, the morally concerned 
person and the truth concerned person would be well advised to act in 
the same way, and will be similarly nonvoluntarily moved in their 
beliefs, but even then, there will always be the question of whether it is 
concern for what is moral or concern for the truth (or some 
combination of the two) that moves the agent to act in some way or to 
be influenced in some way. 
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For epistemic proceduralism the conditions of deliberation seek to define ideal 
deliberation for epistemic purposes, whereas for intrinsic proceduralism, the 
conditions of deliberation are not to be defined merely for epistemic purposes 
but also in the interests of intrinsic egalitarianism. According to the wide view, 
deliberation has both instrumental and intrinsic value. On the instrumental 
side it aims to facilitate “the development of informed, rational, and morally 
sensitive citizenship” (Christiano 2008, 191). Yet the deliberation has not just 
instrumental but, more importantly in the given conditions, intrinsic 
egalitarian value. (These themes are also discussed in the final, Coda chapter.) 
On the intrinsic side Christiano presents a broad understanding of the 
deliberative process as embodying three fundamental values: the ideal of equal 
respect, the commitment to advance justice and the common good in society, 
and the process of public deliberation as a public realization of equality in itself 
(insofar as the process is “reasonably egalitarian” as Christiano puts it [2008, 
190]). He emphasizes (2008, 197) that in the process of democratic 
deliberation there are three dimensions of distribution that ought to be 
constrained by egalitarian principles:  
(1) the distribution of cognitive conditions for effective exercise of 
citizenship; 
(2) the distribution of opportunities for influencing the agenda for 
collective decision-making;  
(3) equality of respect that citizens hold for each other.  
 
What makes these distributive dimensions special for Christiano’s approach is 
that he maintains that these are also the dimensions whereby we should assess 
a process of public deliberation. This process should be understood as a 
society-wide operation taking place over the years (Christiano 2008, 192). 
These egalitarian conditions of deliberation furthermore constitute the 
practices of the shared community. “Despite the persistence of disagreement, 
the process of public deliberation can be highly useful activity for the society”, 
Christiano emphasizes (2008, 192). 
The interface of the moral and the epistemic has recently been discussed in 
relation to moral and epistemic virtues. In those debates, Julia Driver has 
argued that distinguishing moral and epistemic virtues on an actual trait level 
is more complicated than it seems. In order to make the distinction 
successfully, what is distinctively valuable should be selected, and many 
elements have both epistemic and moral value (Driver 2003). Yet others have 
argued that the distinctions can be made (see, for example, Arpaly 2011). 
However, what is relevant here for the purposes of this thesis is recognizing 
that to satisfy the criteria of intrinsic deliberative proceduralism, the 
conditions that constrain deliberation are to be chosen to suit not just 
instrumental purposes but, more importantly, on egalitarian grounds.  
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4.5.2 THE UNBEARABLE WIDENESS OF THE WIDE VIEW? 
Estlund proposes a question for fair proceduralists such as Christiano:  
Can political justification appeal to any controversial premises, 
doctrines, or principles? If this is not always impermissible, then 
exactly how do all substantive accounts of justice or common good get 
pushed aside in favor of a procedural treatment of justice for purposes 
of democratic theory? Or, if controversial doctrines always are 
impermissible in political justification, then are … their appeals to 
procedural fairness … uncontroversial. … If only some controversy – 
say, “reasonable” or “good faith” controversy – is what must be 
avoided, then what is their argument that all substantive accounts of 
justice are subject to reasonable controversy and not just the same kind 
of unavoidable controversy that would plague even their procedural 
accounts? (Estlund 2002, 8)  
 
As mentioned earlier, however, for Christiano, the full realization of public 
equality requires citizens to respect both democratic process and basic liberal 
rights, take the interests and capacities of other citizens into account, and 
listen and engage sincerely with the arguments of others in democratic 
deliberation. Citizens should also appeal to those reasons that they consider 
most compelling (Christiano 2008, Ch. 5; Christiano & Bajaj 2017, 385). 
(Limits to inclusion are one of the themes discussed in the final, Coda chapter.) 
4.6 ISOMORPHISM BETWEEN THE IDEAL AND 
ASPIRATIONAL DELIBERATION  
Christiano’s approach also differs from the two previous views discussed when 
it comes to the role of the deliberative ideal. Ideals can be problematic if 
applied to non-ideal conditions; sometimes they may be useless and provide 
no means of improving non-ideal conditions and, in the worst cases, they can 
engender worse circumstances.121 Estlund, who defends a template model 
himself (discussed in the previous chapter), has expressed his doubts about 
the role of ideal discourse in deliberative approaches. Why aim at 
isomorphism between ideal discourse and aspirational discourse? Yet it seems 
that whether isomorphism carries extra costs also depends on the specific 
ideals. 
                                               
121 Whether distant utopian ideals, as such, are useful has provoked considerable debate (see Chapter 
One). Even beautiful, dream-like utopias can have negative effects, as Gaus (2016, 13) has recently 
pointed out: “mere dreams of ideal justice may inspire or give hope, though they may also lead to 
hopelessness, despair, and cynicism. To wake from a dream of a world of perfect justice and confront the 
realities of our social world, without any way to connect the dream to the problems and questions arising 
in our social world, is all too likely to disorient thinking about justice.”  
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Against this background, it is interesting that Brennan and Pettit (2007) 
have criticized Christiano’s democratic ideal as too idealistic. Their general 
concern is that “normative thinking in social and political philosophy has 
concentrated on questions of desirability and not given sufficient attention to 
issues of feasibility” (2007, 263); they pick Christiano as an example. Their 
worry seems to be that Christiano uses what they call ideal-theory abstraction, 
whereby differences between the outcomes of an ideal and the second-best 
option are measured by some “intuitive criteria of approximation” and not in 
sufficient detail (ibid.). They also mention Christiano’s procedural equality as 
an example of an ideal that it is too utopian. Were it to be used as an 
aspirational ideal, it would lead to undesirable outcomes. As they explain: 
The danger of the ideal-theory abstraction is that it will lead 
philosophers to go for a soft, visionary focus in their normative 
thinking and to argue for an idealized system—an idealized democracy 
or an ideally just society—that is nowhere to be found and that might 
be counter-productive to try to establish. (Brennan & Pettit 2007, 261)  
 
They seem to worry that theorists such as Christiano are not taking into 
account the fact that trying to approximate the ideal as such is not the best 
strategy, something which could be quite different from the most intuitive 
version. They further suggest that, in order to select appropriate principles 
according to which an alternative strategy might be developed, the distance 
between the ideal and the one that could be implemented should be measured 
by comparing outcomes (Brennan & Pettit 2007; see also Räikkä 2014, Ch. 3).  
I do sympathize with their worry. Sometimes applying the ideal to non-
ideal circumstances can have counterproductive effects, and taking that into 
consideration should be integral to philosophical normative considerations. 
Making educated predictions is complicated, even for empirical specialists122, 
and political philosophers are in no way professional “deliberation predictors” 
who can say in advance where actual discourses will lead. While consideration 
of the various potential effects of procedures, of what could happen, is part of 
normative theorizing, the actual discourses are full of surprises, and that is 
part of their attraction: their creative unpredictable potential. Yet it seems that 
in this case Brennan’s and Pettit’s target is not an optimal one. First, as Räikkä 
points out at a general level (2014, 41–42), even if it seems from the outside 
that someone has sufficiently considered what might be the second-best 
strategy, it can be that this is not the case in actuality. For example, Christiano 
does not differentiate strategies for ideal and non-ideal deliberation, unlike 
the two deliberative theorists discussed previously (i.e., Cohen and Estlund). 
In fact, this seems one of the core strengths of his approach. Christiano (2015) 
maintains that “this ideal is one that can be approximated to a greater or lesser 
extent”. Secondly, Christiano seems to take these difficulties into account 
better than many alternative approaches. Yes, it still might have counter-
                                               
122 See, for example, Tetlock 2015. 
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productive effects; I am not denying that. What is relevant here, however, is 
that the main defenses of Christiano’s approach are procedural equality and 
wide deliberation. Wide deliberation is, from the start, a less demanding ideal, 
which seems to be one of its main advantages. The inclusivity of the wide view 
makes it in some respects more realistic, even if, in others, idealistic as well. 
Abandoning the reasonability condition is an especially crucial element here. 
As Christiano (& Bajaj 2017, 385) asserts: “the wide conception of deliberative 
democracy may be more realistic than the rational consensus conception”. One 
advantage of the view is that it is not dependent on an assumed purity of 
procedures; therefore it has broader scope. It is not an ideal theory of interest 
only in considerations concerning ideal decision making in ideal 
circumstances. It takes diversity, human fallibility, and cognitive bias into 
account more seriously than epistemic alternatives. These less ideal features 
of complex societies and human beings are regarded as additional reasons to 
emphasize the fundamental interest of equal treatment. Yet the view does not 
give up on normative ideals.123 It is not a mere non-ideal theory, a second-best 
alternative. The principle of equality is crucial here. Indeed, Christiano (2009, 
233) writes: “The principle of equality is an appropriate principle for 
regulating collective decision-making in the context of significant 
disagreement.” The principle can also be used as guidance as to what feasible 
states are better approximations of justice when the ideal cannot be reached 
(2008, 39–42). Nonetheless, the principle of equality fits ideal circumstances 
as well. 
One reason why Christiano’s approach might seem to some to exemplify an 
overly idealistic approach also lies in its proceduralism and in how the effects 
of that aspect might be somewhat untypical. Hints of this appear in the detail 
of Brennan and Pettit’s asking for a comparison of outcomes. Yet, in the case 
of the intrinsic approach, measurement should not focus on outcomes, but on 
procedural elements. Outcomes might be useful as signals of certain problems 
in the process, but they should be considered carefully. Christiano’s minimum 
outcome standard is a useful tool for the purposes of public equality and 
inclusivity. It is an instrument for tracking the limitations of the applications 
of the wide view, while the concept of a persistent minority is a sort of 
idealization in itself. If there are persistent minorities, this should be treated 
as a sign that requires attention. Are there certain groups in the deliberation 
process that are not given enough credit for understanding their own 
interests? Or are their claims systematically overruled? Christiano discusses 
different interpretations for the outcome standard, suggesting one of minimal 
preference satisfaction, which states that “a group of people is being treated 
unjustly when its interests are not being satisfied above some threshold”. This 
kind of minimum outcome standard would impose a constraint on the 
democratic process, yet it would not provide a fully outcome-oriented view of 
                                               
123 “Justice does not obey the ‘ought implies can’ principle entirely. In part it serves as an ideal to be 
approximated.” (Christiano 2008, 36) 
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evaluation, as Christiano notes.124 He calls this kind of view “moderate 
proceduralism”. As long as justice is conditional, fair procedures legitimize 
decisions even when they are unjust. Yet one should note that the minimum 
outcome standard is by no means sufficient for the realization of equality 
(Christiano 2008, 288–299).  
One of the assets of Christiano’s view that is also related to questions of the 
ideal and the aspirational is his stance on the desirability of agreement, 
discussed earlier. He maintains that deliberation should not seek to increase 
the tendency towards agreement. The two sets of reasons for this claim 
include, firstly, the unfavorable consequences of agreement and, secondly, the 
advantages of disagreement. On the unfavorable consequences of agreement, 
he writes that the “problem is that in a world in which the facts of diversity, 
fallibility and cognitive bias are ubiquitous, prolonged periods of agreement 
suggest the presence of intellectual stagnation and oppressive domination of 
one group over others”. Disagreement, meanwhile, is actually a fruitful 
condition: “While agreement may contribute to the stability of society, 
disagreement and diversity of view are amongst the most fertile conditions for 
the realization of the justice and virtue effects” (Christiano 2008, 196). 
Christiano sees the process of deliberation as a process of trial and error; it 
serves a useful purpose in excluding errors and forms of ignorance and 
increases disagreement in society. This also supports the claim that intrinsic 
proceduralism suits the stronger emphasis on interactive justice (see Chapter 
Six).  
4.7 ON THE CURRENCY OF EQUALITY 
One element that seems controversial in Christiano’s approach is that he 
argues for equality of wellbeing. While he discusses the merits of wellbeing, it 
remains unclear why he chooses it as the currency of equality, instead of 
equality of capabilities or some other currency (2008, Ch. 1).125 Corey 
Brettschneider (2011) also emphasizes this, claiming that Christiano’s 
conception of equality is sectarian, and he seems to have a point. As I see it, 
one potential alternative for equality of wellbeing that could potentially be less 
sectarian could be equality of political capabilities.126 Yet the equality of 
                                               
124 For example, Phillips has defended the use of outcome equality as a check point for equality of 
opportunity (Phillips 2004). 
125 Christiano also writes (2009, 231) that “fairness is a feature of collective activities, processes and 
procedures that varies in part of depending on the nature of the enterprise”. Thus, it seems that he 
would be in principle open to varying the elements depending on the context. 
126 Bohman emphasizes that Aristotle believed that deliberation requires equality: the same general 
capacities, education, and even cultural values, although for Aristotle this meant excluding part of the 
people from deliberation. Bohman (1996, 109) maintains: "Only equality of political capacities makes 
deliberation fully democratic." 
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capabilities would be a better precondition for the deliberative process than 
the core substantial value. I will return to this question in the following 
chapters, but the main thing of note here is the perception that intrinsic 
deliberative proceduralism could potentially be defended on the basis of 
different interpretations of equality. Furthermore, equality is not the only 
alternative for a core value of intrinsic proceduralism, which has been recently 
defended on the basis of a freedom argument (Rostbøll 2015). Rostbøll prefers 
to call his approach non-instrumental rather than intrinsic, although 
discussing basically the same idea apart from a different core value (see 
Rostbøll 2015 and forthcoming; and also Chapter Five of this thesis). But for 
the purposes of this chapter, I suppose the intrinsic proceduralist could take a 
more minimalist and pluralist stance towards an interpretation of equality. In 
plural societies, minimalism in theoretical commitments is an alternative less 
prone to charges of sectarianism, and it seems that intrinsic proceduralism, as 
such, does not require a commitment to any specific form of equality. 
My aim in this chapter has been to provide grounds for defending 
egalitarian proceduralism against the epistemic critique. One promising line 
of argument is provided by Estlund who argues that procedural justice is 
unnecessary if there is substantial consensus available. That might be so, but 
in the current situation that seems like an odd place to start.127 I would say that 
Christiano’s approach seems to provide a much more interesting starting 
point. One main challenge for the type of hybrid view that rests on a procedural 
footing lies in explaining the justification of deliberation. Yet it seems that 
Christiano could face that challenge. Public deliberation can be justified on the 
basis of democratic equality.128 However, while deliberation can be justified 
via equality, it seems to me that Christiano should be able to show that the 
value of democratic procedures is intrinsic, that it is not instrumental. To make 
sense of the intrinsic worth of procedures, it seems that one should focus on 
the democratic procedures themselves, as they have certain special features 
that are relevant to this goal. That is the theme of the next, fifth chapter. 
                                               
127 Simone Chambers has expressed the idea that consensus forming should not be considered a 
decision-making procedure (1995, 250): “discourse is a long-term consensus forming process and not a 
decision procedure.”  
128 Waldron writes (2013, 14): “We certainly do need a sophisticated philosophical understanding of 
the layers of value that are implicated in the assessment of political institutions. Somebody has to make 
sure that we do not lose sight of the dignitarian and ontological elements. Someone has to consider how 
these questions of honor and dignity, political justice and respect, stand alongside the criteria we use 
(like Rawlsian justice) for evaluating the output of our politics. They don’t fit easily together—that much, 
we can accept from the value-pluralism of Berlin. But they are not to be neglected.” 
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5 THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF DEMOCRATIC 
PROCEDURES 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I analyze and defend the intrinsic value of democratic 
procedures. Estlund (2008, 86–87), who argues against intrinsic 
proceduralism, defines it as a view in which the value of democratic 
arrangements  
does not depend on any qualities of democratic decisions other than 
whether they are democratic in two senses: (a) decisions must be made 
by democratic procedures, and (b) they must also not unduly 
undermine or threaten [retrospectively or prospectively] the 
possibility of democratic procedure into the future.  
 
Further, he regards it as “a particular kind of flight from the substance” (ibid., 
86). Estlund is skeptical about the possibility of a plausible and appealing 
version of intrinsic proceduralism. Yet for me, given the contingency and 
difficulties of justificatory and epistemic versions of proceduralism, intrinsic 
proceduralism seems a tempting option. 
Intrinsic procedural approaches have been influentially challenged lately 
from the direction of both epistemic proceduralism and instrumentalism. As 
discussed earlier, Estlund seems to be on the right track when criticizing 
purely procedural approaches. However, what seems crucial is that his 
dynamic of retreat seems to ignore a possible alternative (or family of 
alternatives). That is to say, despite the problems of purely proceduralist 
approaches it does not necessarily follow that one should bring wholly 
procedure-independent substantial standards into the picture as the core 
value, as epistemic proceduralists do. (As argued in Chapters Two and Three 
and also here, substantial procedure-independent standards carry their own 
complications.)  
In the fourth chapter, I presented another possibility: an approach based 
on substantial standards that are nevertheless not entirely procedure-
independent. This hybrid view lays emphasis on values that are substantial yet 
not independent of procedure in a broad sense – an alternative that does not 
merely lean on the outcomes of processes but emphasizes their value as such. 
Following Christiano, I present a promising candidate of that type: intrinsic 
proceduralism.129 Christiano defends democratic procedures because he sees 
                                               
129 Christiano does not himself label his view “intrinsic proceduralism” but he defends the intrinsic 
value of democracy. I first came across the label in a positive context in the work of Ceva (see, for 
example, Ceva 2012, 2016) who uses it to refer to approaches that focus on the inherent qualities of 
 
113 
them as intrinsically just. One main challenge for the type of hybrid view that 
rests on a procedural footing lies in justifying deliberation. Yet, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, it seems that a defender of the intrinsic worth of 
democratic procedures (here shortened to an “intrinsic proceduralist”) could 
face that challenge. Deliberation can have both instrumental and intrinsic 
value. Christiano, for example, maintains that on the intrinsic side it can 
embody the ideal of equal respect, the commitment to advance justice and the 
common good in society, and public realization of equality in itself. He also 
defends dimensions of the distribution of deliberation that ought to be 
constrained by egalitarian principles, such as cognitive conditions for effective 
exercise of citizenship, the distribution of opportunities to influence collective 
decision making, and equality of respect. Thus, despite the contingency of 
instrumental benefits, deliberation also has an egalitarian function 
(Christiano 2008, 192). 
However, while deliberation could be justified via democratic equality, the 
intrinsic proceduralist should also be able to show that the value of democratic 
procedures is not procedure-independent. If it were, intrinsic proceduralism 
would count as a subtype of epistemic proceduralism. Yet the explanation of 
the intrinsic value of democratic procedures is complicated; many candidates 
fail at the task, as discussed below. Thus, in this chapter I concentrate on the 
possibility of the intrinsic worth of democracy, and on whether democratic 
procedures could be valuable as such, not just instrumentally or for their 
prospective outcomes. Could there be a possible and plausible version of non-
instrumentally justified democracy? 
In order to make sense of the intrinsic worth of procedures, one should 
focus on democratic procedures themselves, as they seem to have certain 
special features that are relevant for understanding their intrinsic worth. The 
questions discussed in this chapter evolve especially from instrumentally 
oriented, critical insights. Instrumentalists evaluate democratic procedures on 
the basis of their consequences. Yet the consequences are to be interpreted 
both as direct and indirect outcomes, thereby not only including mere 
decisions but also other types of outcomes. Arneson has presented (2003) 
influential instrumentalist viewpoints that reject the possibility of intrinsic 
value of democratic procedures. He asserts that there is no intrinsic value that 
could not in the end be interpreted via instrumental value. In what follows, I 
examine his argument, and consider whether democratic procedures could 
have intrinsic value. I also analyze potential candidates for what could be 
considered the source of intrinsic value, although it seems that most of them 
are prone to Arneson’s instrumentalist criticism. However, there is one 
exception. In the latter half of the chapter, I suggest that the value of 
democratic procedures should be understood in a constitutive manner.  
                                               
procedures. But, as mentioned, Estlund (2008, especially Ch. 5) also uses the label, although in a less 
positive tone. 
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There are different ways to understand constitutive value. Interesting work 
related to intrinsic worth and constitutive relations has been done lately by 
Anderson (2009), Ceva (for example 2016), Kolodny (2014a, 2014b), Jeremy 
Moss (2009), and Rostbøll (2015, forthcoming). In the third part of the 
chapter, my reflections take inspiration from their work. The minimalist 
intrinsic proceduralism I end up defending is a combination of these 
approaches, while not fully equivalent to any of them. It brings together into a 
coherent perspective many elements from the work of Ceva (2016) and 
Rostbøll (forthcoming). Ultimately, I maintain that the justification of 
democratic procedures should consist of a notion of constitutive value with an 
undetachable norm of an egalitarian relationship as its core. Democratic 
procedures constitute this valuable egalitarian relationship, which cannot be 
conceived independently of procedures. (In the Coda chapter, I return to the 
concept of deliberation and consider how intrinsic proceduralism fits together 
with a deliberative view, sketching a combination of minimalist intrinsic 
justification and wide understanding of deliberation.) 
5.2 THE POSSIBILITY OF INTRINSICALLY VALUABLE 
PROCEDURES  
In this section I discuss two types of justifications for democratic procedures, 
instrumental and intrinsic (or simply non-instrumental as some prefer; see, 
for example, Rostbøll forthcoming). Typically (non-democratic) procedures 
merely have instrumental value. I maintain, however, that democratic 
procedures are exceptional in that they have intrinsic value in addition to 
instrumental value. Nonetheless, most scholars – even those who also favor 
non-instrumentalist justifications – think that instrumentalist justifications 
for democracy are powerful. As Kolodny (2014b, 290–291) maintains: “To be 
sure, a large part of the justification of democracy is simply instrumental.” 
Democratic procedures are instruments that are valuable because of certain 
outcomes. Indeed, Arneson, a defender of a purely instrumentalist view 
himself, argues (2003, 122) that “what renders the democratic form of 
government for a nation morally legitimate (when it is) is that its operation 
over time produces better consequences for people than any feasible 
alternative mode of governance”.  
Yet instrumentalists differ from each other in their account of the merits 
for which they consider democratic procedures valuable. Some of them value 
democratic procedures for strategic reasons (see, for example, Arneson 2009; 
Barry 1989; Buchanan & Tullock 2003; Christiano 2003): by including every 
citizen in the collective decision-making process, democracy takes everyone’s 
interests into account. Some others value democratic procedures for epistemic 
reasons. As discussed in Chapter Three, they might maintain that democratic 
processes are more likely to result in better decisions (see Estlund 2008; Marti 
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2006).130 The third group value democratic procedures for reasons related to 
virtuosity: via participation in democratic procedures people take the views of 
others into better account, develop more dynamic discussion skills, and so on 
(see Tocqueville, Mill, and Dewey; for a critique of the virtuosity view see 
Elster 1997[1986]). Finally, some favor instrumental insights merely because 
they are skeptical about the alternatives. Ronald Dworkin (2003[1996]) 
argues that the complexity of decision making is incompatible with the 
realization of intrinsic fairness in the decision-making process. Therefore, he 
argues for the evaluation of democratic institutions primarily in terms of 
outcomes (Christiano 2003, 7–9).131  What is common to all these different 
types of instrumentalism, and potentially others, is that the value of 
democratic procedures is attributed to certain outcomes of democratic 
procedures (or combination of outcomes).  
Here the emphasis is on the plausibility of intrinsic proceduralism. An 
intrinsic proceduralist would not deny the instrumental merits of democratic 
procedures, but would in addition hold that democratic procedures can also 
be valuable as such. To be more precise, logically there are two alternative 
interpretations for a defense of intrinsic qualities. As Arneson stipulates 
(2003, 124), the mixed view holds that both the intrinsic worth and the 
instrumental merits have effect on the justifiability, whereas the purely 
intrinsic view holds that the justifiability of democratic procedures is 
dependent only on their intrinsic qualities. Yet the latter version seems merely 
theoretical. In this work, intrinsic proceduralism refers to the mixed view that 
holds that both intrinsic and instrumental qualities are relevant. This 
obviously raises questions about balancing these two elements, and even 
potential conflicts caused by this two-fold structure, but I turn to that later. 
5.2.1 INSTRUMENTALIST CHALLENGE 
Arneson maintains (1993) that “democratic procedures, like all procedures, 
should be evaluated according to the moral value of the outcomes they would 
be reasonably be expected to produce”. He presents in his paper “Defending 
the purely instrumental account of democratic legitimacy” (2003) an 
intractable argument against the possibility of the intrinsic value of democratic 
procedures. Considered from his perspective any procedural value ultimately 
                                               
130 David Enoch (2009) has argued that Estlund’s view turns out to be an instrumentalist one as 
well. Estlund defends a qualified acceptability requirement – or, more precisely, as Estlund himself 
(2008, 40) maintains, a family of requirements – according to which justifications must be acceptable 
to all qualified points of view. It is the qualified acceptability requirement that is central to making 
Estlund’s view a hybrid of procedural and outcome justice. Enoch argues that the requirement fails, and 
that makes Estlund’s view merely instrumental. Additionally, Christiano (2009) argues that Estlund also 
faces difficulties in balancing the two types of fairness, procedural and substantial, which makes his view 
instable. 
131 Apparently, Dworkin’s argument is not actually against the possibility of intrinsic value as such. 
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turns out to be an outcome value of some sort. Arneson contrasts intrinsic 
value and consequential value (i.e., instrumental value) and argues that the 
possibility of the first is mere illusion. He writes (2003, 130):  
the appearance that we must balance intrinsic fairness and 
consequential fairness when assessing the democratic political 
procedure is an illusion because in every case of procedural 
assessment, it turns out that our conviction that this or that procedure 
is intrinsically fair or unfair are driven by assessment of the likely or 
certain consequences of following the procedure. 
 
Thus, he claims that there is no meaningful sense in which democratic 
procedures could be considered just intrinsically, that all the value of 
democratic procedures is related to their outcomes (Arneson 1993, 2003; see 
also Griffin 2003). 
Arneson argues against what he considers a pretheoretical commonsense 
position, one according to which democracy is justified partly because its 
procedures have intrinsic value and partly because the operation of democratic 
procedures leads to desirable consequences. He maintains that democratic 
procedures are valuable only instrumentally. What appears to be intrinsic at 
first sight is in the end all about the consequences. One should nevertheless 
note that Arneson’s scope of consequences is exceptionally broad. In his 
accounting, consequences involve not just the outcomes of democratic 
procedures narrowly understood, such as types of decisions, but also all the 
other types of consequences, such as the consequences of the operation of 
democratic procedures on people and their rights, for example (Arneson 2003; 
see also Ceva & Ottonelli 2012). 
5.2.2 PROSPECTIVE SOURCES OF INTRINSIC VALUE 
An intrinsic proceduralist holds that democratic procedures are different from 
many other procedures in this respect: they undoubtedly have instrumental 
value but, in addition, they can have intrinsic value. But what kind of value is 
that? Ceva has illustrated different types of inherent and instrumental values 
with a four step taxonomy (Ceva 2016, 83–84) that I have visualized below in 








Outcome-related Due process is likely to lead 
to outcomes that are 
inherently just, or 
contribute to establishing 
the truth of facts,  
or both 
 
Due process is likely to lead 
to outcomes that have 
positive consequences on or 
for the parties and on or for 
society at large  
 
Procedure-related Due process realizes in 
itself normative 
commitments concerning 
the kind of treatment due 
to the parties (intrinsic 
proceduralism) 
 
Participation in due process 
has positive consequences 
for the parties 
 
Figure 2. 
Accordingly, out of the four alternative quadrants, only the one with 
procedure-related inherent value counts as intrinsic proceduralism. It seems 
obvious that the intrinsic worth in question is not related to the consequences 
of the procedures, but that it is procedure-related. But what could be the 
normative commitments that a due process realizes in itself? There are 
different prospective candidates. A proceduralist might wish to try several 
potential strategies that can rest on: (1) positive impact(s); (2) expression of 
important value(s); (3) constraining exercise of political power; or (4) 
authorizing political power (Ceva & Ottonelli 2012). How do they manage 
against the instrumentalist challenge? There is also a fifth alternative 
discussed in more detail in the latter parts of this chapter, namely, constitutive 
value. 
Firstly, democratic procedures could potentially be considered intrinsically 
valuable because they have a positive impact on citizens and their civic 
virtues. This impact is independent of the outcomes of the decision procedure 
as such. Participation in the mutual decision making process can, for instance, 
provide citizens with instruments to protect their interests and wellbeing. 
Democratic participation can also have effect on their virtues as citizens. 
Taking part in public reasoning processes develops the ability to see things 
from a broader, public perspective, improving citizens’ understanding of their 
society and fellow citizens. The deliberation process also improves skill in 
bringing important insights into public knowledge. It can, furthermore, 
improve citizens’ self-esteem and foster societal solidarity. Christopher Griffin 
(2003) argues against Arneson, observing that democratic procedures are 
valuable since the universal political participation these procedures enable has 
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a positive, salutatory impact both on citizens’ self-respect and reciprocal 
recognition (Ceva & Ottonelli 2012).  
In this sense, the value of democratic procedures does not directly depend 
on the qualities of the outcomes as such, but on the indirect impacts that 
participating in those procedures has on citizens and their civic virtues. 
Therefore, one of the reasons to value democratic procedures resides in the 
virtues these procedures are capable of cultivating, which are analytically 
different from the outcomes. However, this does not count as intrinsic value. 
Even though the positive impact could be distinguished from the outcomes, it 
would nonetheless be valued because of the consequences of the procedures in 
a broader sense. Consequently, valuing democratic procedures because of 
their impacts would count as valuing them instrumentally in an Arnesonian 
account. Democratic procedures would be valuable because they are 
instruments that bring about these positive impacts (Ceva & Ottonelli 2012; 
see also Arneson 2003). 
Secondly, democratic procedures may be considered to qualify as 
intrinsically valuable because they express important values.132 For example, 
Christiano (2011, 2–3) maintains that democracy’s intrinsic value is 
conditional on its expressive function; if democracy manages to realize 
equality, then it has intrinsic value, he argues. In other words, if democratic 
practices or the rules of a procedure treat persons according to the 
requirements of justice, then the procedure could be interpreted as the locus 
where the commitment to just treatment of persons is realized. The 
institutionalized practices express certain considerations in their structures. 
The treatment provided by the democratic procedures reveals the kind of 
considerations of which the institution consists. For example, democratic 
institutions and practices can be considered intrinsically valuable if they are 
capable of expressing equal public recognition of persons’ moral and social 
status via equal distribution of power. Such a public recognition is furthermore 
important for persons’ self-respect (Ceva & Ottonelli 2012).133  
At first sight, the expressivist argument might seem like a subcategory of 
the argument based on positive impact. Yet it is not. Ceva and Ottonelli (2012) 
stress the difference between the positive impact argument and the 
expressivist argument: “The crux of the expressivist argument is that 
democratic procedures are valuable because they convey important messages 
to citizens (notably that they are all equals qua worthy of the same 
consideration).” This expressivist function comes before and is, furthermore, 
independent of its consequences. Thus, the main point of the expressivist 
                                               
132 Concerning the expression of important values the ideas discussed originate mainly from Griffin, 
but also from Charles Beitz and Christiano. However, Griffin’s view mixes the impact and expressivist 
views, whereas Ceva & Ottonelli make a distinction between these two. 
133 Charles Beitz has criticized (1989, 91—95) the (Millian style of) argument for a plural voting 
scheme for the educated on an expressivist basis, because giving some more votes than others would 
express a lesser respect for the others as citizens. 
 
119 
argument is independent of the consequences of such a message (Ceva & 
Ottonelli 2012). Arneson is skeptical of the idea that the main task of 
democratic procedures could be expressivist, comprising an expression of 
recognition of persons’ moral equality, for example. More importantly, he also 
notes that even if democratic procedures had such a function, it would count 
in favor of the instrumental side, not the intrinsic. He writes (2003, 132): 
“Expressive consequences … are consequences to be reckoned along with 
others.” Democratic procedures would not be intrinsically valuable; rather, 
they would be valued merely as instruments of expression of certain values 
(Arneson 2003). There is only an extrinsic relation between certain normative 
commitments, such as commitment to equality, and shaping or selecting 
institutional structures to express the values. Ceva (2016, 83) describes this as 
an instrumental form of proceduralism. Moreover, this kind of justification 
would count as a weak one – in a similar manner as instrumental arguments 
generally are. In other words, if democratic procedures are valuable merely as 
expressive tools, they should be replaced in case better ways to express these 
values appear. It also seems that a mere expressivist function is not strong 
enough for justificatory purposes (cf. Estlund 2008). 
One should note that these prospective grounds for the intrinsic value of 
democracy are idealizations of sorts. Most of the approaches defended are 
combinations of different qualities. Some views mix elements both from the 
impact view and the expressivist view (see, for example, Griffin 2003). The 
problems related to the expressivist argument are also of concern to 
Christiano. For example, Ceva and Ottonelli consider positioning his approach 
mainly in the expressivist quarter, yet they do not see it is as a clear case. They 
ponder in a footnote (2012, fn. 19) that “Christiano’s argument shows how 
democracy may be valued independently of democratic decisions, yet it does 
not vindicate its intrinsic value: democratic rights are valued qua public 
expressions of the equal status of citizens”. Christiano also seems himself to 
consider the expressivist element as a necessary but not a sufficient one (2011, 
2–3):  
A democratic assembly realizes public equality by giving each an equal 
say in the process of collective decision-making. This is the sense in 
which democracy has intrinsic value. It just is a realization of public 
equality. A necessary part of this realization is the fact that making 
decisions democratically expresses the equality of all members of 
political society. 
 
It seems that the problems involved in the expressivist strategy might not pose 
serious threats to his approach, if the main elements are elsewhere. However, 
that strategy would require the other elements to provide a strong enough case 
for intrinsic worth, which seems to be the main problem. I return to his view 
and these themes at the end of the chapter when I discuss varieties of non-
instrumental approaches.  
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Thirdly, democratic procedures can be seen as valuable as they function as 
a side constraint for the exercise of political power. Examples of this type of 
reasoning can be found in views that lay emphasis on the essential connection 
between democracy and individual rights and liberties. The rights and liberties 
in question are considered valuable prior to democratic institutions, 
whereupon the respect in which they are held defines democratic procedures. 
Their value is considered independent of democratic procedures and, 
moreover, independent of the expected qualities of democratic outcomes. 
David Held (1996) calls this kind of conception protective liberal democracy. 
Democracy functions as a tool that protects the freedom and autonomy of 
individuals (Ceva & Ottonelli 2012).  
Clearly the value of democratic procedures is independent of the outcomes 
according to this constraint type of view. Nevertheless, constraining the 
exercise of political power would not count as an intrinsic worth of democratic 
procedures. While democratic procedures would be valuable independently of 
the outcomes, what makes them valuable is a mere instrumental relation to 
other values. These others are considered the fundamental values and 
democratic procedures are valued merely as a means of protecting them. 
Democratic procedures thus function as side constraints for democratic 
decision-making structures and institutions. As Ceva and Ottonelli expound, 
procedures are justified as instruments for protecting certain extra-
democratic values and principles by constraining the decision-making 
institutions and behaviors of citizens during political decision making. Yet that 
does not explain why democratic procedures would be valuable per se. 
The fourth sense in which democratic procedures might be taken to be 
intrinsically valuable relates to their potential role in authorizing political 
power. Ceva and Ottonelli develop an idea from Estlund’s epistemic 
proceduralism as an example. Epistemic proceduralism differs from so-called 
correctness theories in that for the epistemic proceduralist it is not the actual 
correctness of democratic decisions that matters, but the general tendency of 
democratic procedures to produce just decisions. Ceva and Ottonelli (2012) 
assert: “This might induce one to believe that there is an intrinsic value in 
democratic procedures which makes their outcomes authoritative despite 
their intrinsic merits.” In a similar vein, insights from Cohen’s deliberative 
democracy could also be taken as an example. Yet it seems that from the 
observation that democratic procedures are not purely outcome-oriented one 
cannot jump to the conclusion that these procedures are intrinsically just. I 
doubt that Estlund would favor such an interpretation either. What makes 
procedures valuable is the need for stability, predictability, reliability, and 
effectiveness of decision-making institutions, preventing primary bads and 
also maintaining social trust related to the predictable operation of these 
institutions. Even if the democratic procedures were not directly instrumental 
in furthering these aims, these aims are what motivate the acceptance of the 
procedures rather than some intrinsic procedural value. Therefore, the 
procedures are valued because of their consequences (Ceva & Ottonelli 2012). 
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It seems that none of these four strategies can be counted as intrinsic value 
as such. They might play a part in an argument for the intrinsic value of 
democracy, but the main weight of the argument has to be elsewhere. While 
they focus on procedural qualities, the qualities are themselves valued for 
instrumental reasons, broadly understood. As Ceva and Ottonelli (2012) state, 
the problem with these strategies is that all of them “draw attention to values 
and aims which may be realized through democratic procedures, rather than 
those values that are realized in them”. Yet, although actual approaches would 
combine these strategies, it seems that none of them can serve as an intrinsic 
justification and provide a case against Arneson’s instrumentalist challenge. 
However, the strategies above are not the only options for an intrinsic 
proceduralist. Certain features seem relevant for a defense of intrinsic 
proceduralism that are non-instrumental but relational. This is a fifth 
alternative, a constitutive one. The intrinsic value of democratic procedures 
could be interpreted in a constitutive manner. As Ceva (2016, 64–65) argues, 
“there are modes of human interaction that are inherently valuable as they 
treat persons in an inherently morally acceptable way; so long as certain 
procedures are constitutive of such modes of interaction, they are inherently 
valuable”. If the value of democracy is understood constitutively, it might 
proffer a way to answer both Estlund’s charge of instability (discussed in 
Chapter 4.3 of this thesis) and Arneson’s instrumentalist challenge. In the next 
section I elaborate in more value-theoretical terms what constitutive value 
could mean and, in the one after, I examine a few more developed proposals 
for intrinsic value with different forms of constitutive value, as well as 
Christiano’s version. 
5.3 ON CONSTITUTIVE VALUE 
I now turn briefly to considerations concerning democratic equality in order 
to reach a better comprehension of intrinsic value. In his influential article, 
“Equality and Priority” (1997), Derek Parfit argues against the possibility that 
equality could have intrinsic value. He distinguishes the value of equality in 
telic and deontic views. (However, one should note that Parfit says that his 
distinction does not concern political equality [see for example 1997, 215], as 
he seems to interpret political equality in a more singular manner. Yet to me it 
seems that for a democratic proceduralist the nature of political equality does 
matter, as there seems to be a variety of potential interpretations that coincide 
with the value-theoretical views.) Briefly put, according to Parfit, in a telic view 
(ibid., 204), “It is in itself bad if some people are worse off than others.” It 
would not matter if people were equally well off or badly off, as long as they 
were equal. (Telic views could be further divided into pure and pluralist ones.) 
In the deontic view, “it is not in itself bad if some people are worse off than 
others”. In the deontic view we ought to aim for equality “always for some 
other moral reason” (ibid., 207). Furthermore, deontic views are typically 
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comparative: equality is a question of comparative justice. People are unjustly 
treated if they are treated differently from others. Parfit (ibid., 208) 
summarizes the difference between the views as following: “On the Telic View, 
inequality is bad; on the Deontic View, it is unjust.” For a telic egalitarian it is 
irrelevant how the unequal state of affairs has arisen, whereas for a deontic 
egalitarian it does matter how it came about. 
The trouble with the telic view is that it is prone to the leveling-down 
objection: the idea that making everyone equally badly off by leveling down 
those better off to the same level as the worst-off must, in one way, be a change 
for the better because people would no longer be unequal. Yet the typical 
intuition is that it would be wrong or even monstrous to produce equality by 
leveling down; in other words, the solution, “if some suffer, let’s make 
everyone suffer so that no one is treated unequally”, does not sound like a 
proper solution. Estlund’s modified version of the objection (comparison of 
the equality of democratic procedures to the equality of a coin flip) aims to 
show that the proceduralist must base democracy’s justification on something 
else (i.e., substantial procedure-independent values, in his opinion) in 
addition to pure fairness. Parfit’s version, on the other hand, aims to illustrate 
that telic egalitarians need to be committed to appreciating the intrinsic value 
of the equal outcome to the extent that the idea of inequality’s disappearing is 
a change for better, however this change occurs. Or to be more precise, as 
Parfit points out, telic egalitarians could be moral pluralists and care about 
other things as well, not just mere equality. Thus, according to Parfit, the 
“objection must be that, if we achieve equality by levelling down, there is 
nothing good about what we have done” (1997, 211). Nevertheless, a telic 
egalitarian would need to be able to answer that, or admit that equality is not 
intrinsically valuable. 
The deontic view is not prone to the leveling-down objection. The problem 
with deontological egalitarianism is its limitedness. Parfit uses an example to 
illustrate this called the divided world, in which the world’s population is 
divided into two unconnected halves, worlds A and B, that are totally unaware 
of each other.134 He then asks us to consider the following example. Which one 
of the following state of affairs is better? 
(1) Half A at 100 and half B at 200 
(2) Everyone at 145 
 
Option 1) is better on average, but, according to Parfit, 1) is worse than 2), all 
things considered. The question concerns the reasons one would have for 
preferring option 2) over 1). The inequality between worlds A and B is not 
deliberatively produced, or maintained, and neither does it involve any 
wrongdoing. As the halves are not connected to each other, one cannot appeal 
                                               
134 It seems heuristically easier to consider two populations living on two different planets to grasp 
the idea of non-connectedness of the interests of the halves. 
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to inequality’s bad effects. For a telic egalitarian the answer is that 2) is better, 
since inequality is intrinsically bad. For a deontic egalitarian there is no such 
explanation available. Therefore, Parfit argues that if one thinks that 2) is 
better, then, the reason for this must be based on the idea that inequality is 
intrinsically bad, that is, a telic interpretation (1997, 206, 212).135  
Nonetheless, Parfit’s distinction has also been criticized since it does not 
capture the scope of all relevant alternatives (see, for example, Moss 2009; 
O’Neill 2008; Lippert-Rasmussen 2007). As Jeremy Moss (2009) notes, 
Parfit’s distinction seems to combine two separate dimensions: the 
outcome/genesis distinction and the intrinsic/non-intrinsic distinction, yet 
the telic/deontic offers only two combinations. Telic egalitarians would value 
equal outcomes for intrinsic reasons, while (although not so clearly) deontic 
egalitarians value equality because it is connected to some other moral value, 
not because it makes the outcome better. However, it seems that there could 
be other options. Christine Korsgaard’s idea of extrinsic value is useful here. 
Korsgaard (1983) has distinguished between the intrinsic/extrinsic value and 
the final/instrumental value of goodness. She contrasts intrinsic value, 
according to which something is valuable because of its intrinsic properties136, 
with extrinsic value, whereby something is valuable because of some other 
sources of value. Yet final value, when something is valuable for its own sake, 
is in contrast with instrumental value, when something is valuable only as a 
means to something else. For Korsgaard something can be extrinsically 
valuable and yet not merely instrumental. For instance, literature and works 
of art could be valuable as part of the good life. These parts derive their value 
from something else, yet they are worthy in themselves for the role they play 
in the good life (Korsgaard 1983). In a similar manner, Martin O’Neill (2008) 
defends an extrinsic and non-instrumental view of the value of equality, 
arguing that it results in desirable states of affairs that can be valuable non-
instrumentally, but not intrinsically. Nevertheless, O’Neill’s interpretation 
does not seem to fit with egalitarian proceduralists’ intuitions. If equality were 
not intrinsically valuable, then it would be weak if conflicted with something 
else, something more valuable, as Moss (2009) contends.  
According to Moss, deontic egalitarians could value equality for some other 
moral reasons and yet also intrinsically. This type of relationship counts as 
constitutive value.137 Moss (2009, 4) points out in a Korsgaardian vein that 
                                               
135 However, to me the choice does not seem obvious. If what matters is the relative equality of a 
population that shares a common world (i.e., in circumstances in which a group of people is deeply 
interdependent on each other in terms of how their world is structured, as, for example, in Christiano’s 
concept of a common world [2008, 80]), then it might not matter in relation to democratic equality if 
other populations who do not share the world have more or fewer political resources. 
136 There might be reason to value something for its own sake even if it is not intrinsically valuable. 
On the “wrong kind of reason problem” see, for example, Rabinowicz & Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004.  
137 The idea of constituent value can already be found in Aristotle’s Nikomachean Ethics, how a good 
life constitutes eudaimonia. 
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“an object can have intrinsic value in virtue of being a part of something that 
itself has intrinsic value”. Nonetheless, it is crucial that the part that 
constitutes something that has intrinsic value is something without which the 
whole would be less good (as the good life is a part of eudaimonia, for 
example). Furthermore, a constitutive good must contribute to the value of the 
whole – it must be “one of the reasons why the good has the value that it does”. 
Were the contribution merely instrumental, it could be replaced with 
something else.138 But if something is constitutively good, then it is not just 
instrumentally valuable, as it is valuable as a component of the whole yet also 
part of what makes the whole intrinsically valuable. On the other hand, an 
instrumentally good component could be causally necessary for an intrinsic 
good as a whole yet not be a part of the goal or definition of the whole good. 
The relevant difference here between a constitutive and an instrumental part 
is the part-whole relation: whether the component has a role in what makes 
the whole valuable (Moss 2009).139 
Estlund sees no difference in procedural fairness between a coin flip and 
democracy. How does he interpret this procedural fairness that he sees as 
unnecessary for democracy?140 He does admit that appeals to procedural 
fairness are attractive as they seek full neutrality from “any conception of good 
ends other than the procedure itself” (Estlund 2008, 81), but he claims that 
only full anonymity would fulfill that criterion: “Anything less than full 
anonymity imports nonprocedural and potentially controversial values” 
(ibid.). The idea of equality to which he refers seems extremely thin. If I am 
not wrong, this critique is based on an assumption that democratic justice is 
of a telic sort, potentially a sort of prospective fairness, because Estlund seems 
to think that its value can be considered separately. Valuing such a thing for 
its own sake does seem hollow – the pointing out of which seems to be his 
explicit aim. Estlund takes the hollowness to count against non-epistemic 
proceduralism, whereas, for someone with egalitarian sympathies, it seems 
more like a reason to argue against the desirability of such an interpretation of 
democratic equality. Why would an intrinsic proceduralist desire such a 
                                               
138 A more theoretically oriented question is whether a constitutive part of a whole could be replaced 
with something else. Russ Shafer-Landau seems to be implying as much (see, for example, 2003, 75—
79). Yet it seems to depend on the context and possible replacement whether the whole, if realized with 
a new constitutive component, would still count as the same whole. Another question is whether this 
matters for egalitarian proceduralism. 
139 This is an interesting debate, yet, for the purposes of this thesis, it does not seem to be a game-
breaker, so to speak. It could also be enough for the purposes of this thesis to defend non-instrumental 
value instead of intrinsic, as does Rostbøll (forthcoming).  
140 Interestingly, it seems that Estlund has changed his position in respect to the requirement of 
procedural fairness. In (1997) he maintained that democratic procedures should be both procedurally 
fair and epistemically valuable, but in 2008 (66) he states that epistemic proceduralism should give 
“little or no role to procedural fairness” (see also Saunders 2010). The theme is further discussed at the 
end of Chapter Three. 
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course? Interpreting democratic equality in that way does not seem to make 
sense. As Christiano points out (2009, 233), “the equality of a lottery is a pale 
shadow of the equality in democracy”. Democratic equality is important, but 
this does not require defenders of democratic equality to be equality fetishists, 
as Estlund seems to claim.  
What kind of egalitarian core could provide grounds for intrinsic 
proceduralism?141 For a non-fetishist intrinsic proceduralist the task is to 
provide two explanations. First, one should be able to explain why procedural 
equality is valuable. Second, the intrinsic proceduralist should be able to 
explain how procedural equality is connected to substantial yet procedural 
elements. It seems that what a democratic egalitarian should be after is 
something thicker than the telic interpretation has to offer. Equality is not 
important just in itself, intrinsically, but for other moral reasons as well. This 
would also count in favor of preferring the constitutive interpretation to the 
telic one. If the value of democracy is interpreted in a constitutive manner, it 
seems to proffer a way to answer both instrumental and epistemic challenges. 
Nonetheless, the essential question then is: what is it that “being democratic” 
constitutes that is of intrinsic value? One promising line of answer for an 
egalitarian proceduralist is that it is a constitutive part of social equality. The 
answer is not procedure-independent in itself, as the context does matter. 
Christiano seems to take the same line about procedural justice. He writes 
(2009, 231) that “fairness is a feature of collective activities, processes and 
procedures that varies in part of depending on the nature of the 
enterprise”.142  
5.4 VARIETIES OF INTRINSIC WORTH 
As already noted, the aim of this chapter is to provide grounds for defending 
intrinsic proceduralism. How could intrinsic proceduralism answer the 
challenges of the epistemic proceduralist on the one hand, and by the 
instrumentalist on the other? In order to do so one should be able to provide 
an explanation of the intrinsic value of democratic procedures that is not 
merely consequential, outcome-dependent, tautological, or sectarian. At the 
beginning of the chapter I discussed a few explanations that do not succeed in 
doing so. What would it require to understand democracy as a good in itself? 
In the following I consider intrinsic worth both as constitutive and as a part of 
the egalitarian relationship. It seems that if the intrinsic worth of democracy 
is understood in a constitutive manner, that will enable the intrinsic 
                                               
141 In Estlund’s vocabulary, this type of view would be counted as fair deliberative proceduralism. 
However, that name seems to put too strong an emphasis on the role of deliberation, whereas it is the 
egalitarian core that seems more crucial a contrast to epistemic proceduralism, the equal moral worth of 
persons and how well people are compared to each other democracy-wise 
142 My italics. 
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proceduralist to answer both the epistemic challenge and the instrumental 
challenge. In this part I lean on Rostbøll’s recent threefold analysis 
(forthcoming), although, to conclude, I point out divergence between his 
account and the more minimalist version I prefer.  
5.4.1 DEMOCRACY AS A CONSTITUENT OF AUTONOMOUS LIFE 
An alternative way to explain democracy’s intrinsic worth is to refer to the idea 
that democratic procedures realize certain distinctively human capacities. 
Democracy can be seen as a constituent of good, autonomous, or, in some 
other relevant respect, worthy human life.143 This idea can have several 
variants144, but an essential part of it is that participation in democratic 
procedures constitutes the good life. Anderson (2009, 226) defends 
democracy as a form of collective autonomy, describing it “as a way of life of a 
community of equals” and contrasting it with the instrumentalist approach. As 
she maintains (2009, 222), a standard instrumentalist approach first 
establishes the intrinsically valuable states which democratic procedures 
should yield, and then uses these states to justify actions that can causally 
contribute to bringing them about. She emphasizes that the standard 
instrumentalist model fits some important aspects of democracy. It can, for 
example, help to avoid oppression and the neglect of minority voices. Yet she 
rejects the idea that we could comprehensively identify the proper goals of 
democratic procedures independently of procedure itself. On the contrary, 
outcomes should be devised via collective, democratic, decision-making 
processes. Thus, she argues that democracy should be characterized as a mode 
of collective autonomy: “democracy is a mode of collective governance 
whereby citizens work out together what goals they shall share” (Anderson 
2009, 222; see also Rostbøll forthcoming).  
Anderson also criticizes instrumentalist models for bringing the 
justification to an end in the wrong place. According to her, certain states of 
affairs do have intrinsic value in the instrumentalist model, and democratic 
procedures are considered valuable extrinsically as instruments to bring about 
these intrinsically valuable states. Yet, as she argues (2009, 223), “[t]he proper 
point of politics is to serve people [and] the states of affairs properly sought in 
politics do not figure in political justification as intrinsic values”. For her the 
                                               
143 Rostbøll calls views that underline the intrinsic worth of democracy as a constituent of 
autonomous life Aristotelian non-instrumentalism, because they rely on Aristotelian ideas. “First, that 
the good of a thing depends on the nature of that thing. Second, that the good of a living being is to be 
able to exercise its natural, highest, and distinctive capacities. Third, that human beings, as by nature 
political animals, realize their natural and highest capacities through political participation” (Rostbøll 
forthcoming). 
144 According to Rostbøll, this type of idea has been defended by Hannah Arendt (see, for example, 
Arendt 1958, 1961; Rostbøll forthcoming). John Stuart Mill has also presented this sort of argument in 
his Considerations on Representative Government (inter al.). 
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worthy elements are people as autonomous and equal sources of claims. “The 
proper form of political justification starts from the premise that people are 
intrinsically valuable, in the sense that they are self-originating sources of 
claims, and have equal authority to make claims” (ibid.; see also Rostbøll 
forthcoming). 
Anderson goes on to offer a test of intrinsic value of her own (2009, 225; 
cf. Super Episteme example at the end of Chapter Three, this thesis): “The 
proper test of the noninstrumental goodness of an activity is not whether we’d 
prefer to do it, even if it didn’t result in desirable consequences. It is rather 
whether we’d still prefer to engage in it, even if the same consequences could 
be brought about by other (passive) means.” What is intrinsically valuable 
about democratic procedures for Anderson are their expressions of collective 
autonomy and manifested form of collective learning. These autonomous 
activities are expressions of our higher faculties, and give higher pleasures. 
That line of argument would not seem totally obscure to someone like 
Christiano either, who maintains (1997, 245) that participation in democratic 
deliberation procedures is valuable as “an essential part of the good life for an 
individual”. 
It seems that this would count as intrinsic worth. Democracy’s justification 
as a constituent of the good, autonomous life does not seem prone to the 
instrumentalist challenge. The intrinsic value of fulfilling participation is 
undoubtedly related to the instrumental value of participating. John Elster 
(1997[1986], 25) describes the fulfillment gained from democratic 
deliberation in more critical tones, however, when he writes that “the 
satisfaction one derives from political discussion is parasitic on decision 
making”. Nonetheless, the point that intrinsic worth might be conditional on 
instrumental worth does not necessarily seem troublesome, as such, in respect 
to the intrinsic worth, as long as the latter cannot be reduced to the former 
(Anderson 2009; see also Rostbøll forthcoming). 
Yet Anderson’s test highlights a problematic aspect of this type of intrinsic 
justification: the idea that citizens should prefer to engage in democratic 
procedures, procedures that are considered to realize certain distinctively 
human capacities. This is related to the perfectionism underlying the idea, 
which seems complex. Participation in collective decision making is 
considered to perfect citizens as human beings: participants become what they 
are supposed to become by participation. This is related to the view that 
participation in democratic procedures should be a fulfilling activity. But the 
problem is that not everyone finds, or even ought to find, that political 
participation in democratic procedures constitutes the good life. It is not 
unreasonable that some do not find politics fulfilling. People can have other 
meaningful conceptions of value.145 If this is so, however, then the idea seems 
                                               
145 One might reasonably prefer vita contemplative, for example, to vita active in Arendtian terms 
(Arendt 1958), i.e., a life devoted to contemplating philosophical questions instead of active, public, 
participatory citizenship. 
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to be dependent on a certain claim of what constitutes the proper way to live, 
which one could promulgate, of course, even if not everyone is obliged to agree. 
But were the claim to be based on the view that political participation 
constitutes the good life, then it would frame the latter as an outcome 
standard. If one wished to avoid a sectarian outcome standard, the other 
option would be to argue that those that find political participation a 
constituent of the good life should be provided an opportunity to participate – 
but that is a complicated move. As that opportunity would require quite a lot 
from others, would it be merely one possible constituent of the good life?146 In 
order to provide the opportunity to engage in democratic politics for some 
citizens (along with providing the institutionalized structures), their fellows 
would be required to participate in this activity as well. This seems 
problematic. As Rostbøll (forthcoming) asks:  
How can I be morally bound by a political procedure that is justified 
on the basis of a good that I do not share, and that I am not 
unreasonable to reject? How can it be legitimate to make me part of an 
activity and subject to its results simply for the sake of that others can 
fulfill their conception of the good life?  
 
Thus, even if the structure employed by Anderson (2009), according to which 
democratic procedures are constitutive of something valuable, is promising, 
when it comes to the instrumental challenge, it nonetheless seems sectarian. 
The idea of democratic participation as constituent of the good, autonomous 
life does not seem to respect the plurality of diverse conceptions of good. It 
seems that we should not regard one conception of fulfilling human life as a 
feature that would explain democracy’s intrinsic worth.  
5.4.2 THE EGALITARIAN EXPRESSIVIST RELATIONSHIP 
A second strategy to justify democratic procedures non-instrumentally builds 
on a specific, important value or norm and then shows how this value is 
expressed by democratic procedures. Rostbøll (forthcoming) calls this kind of 
strategy justice-first non-instrumentalism “because it justifies democracy on 
the basis of a norm that is specified in a theory of justice that is developed 
independently of democracy”. These approaches, just like Christiano’s, can 
employ expressivist elements (see 5.1.2 above); starting from some key value 
or norm, they then defend democratic procedures on the grounds that the 
procedures express this norm. The key feature is that the value of the 
particular norm is explained independently. According to Rostbøll, the value 
“stems from an independently conceived theory of justice in the sense that this 
value or norm can be and is fully described independently of any reference to 
                                               
146 Cf., for example, expensive taste. 
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the idea or institutions of democracy”. The particular value in question is 
considered to be somehow fundamental.  
These theories can also be motivated by disagreement. As Rostbøll 
(forthcoming) describes, disagreement theories “begin with the fact that 
people disagree on the justice of outcomes and argue that this is the reason 
why democracy must be defended non-instrumentally”. Democracy cannot be 
defended on the basis of its good consequences if people disagree about what 
counts as a good in the context. Of course, one could wonder whether 
disagreement theories are then pure proceduralist ones; but this is not the 
case. Rostbøll (forthcoming) explains that the “problem of disagreement does 
not touch on the justice of democratic procedures, in this view, because 
democratic procedures are tailored to the fact that people will disagree on the 
substance of justice”.  
Non-instrumentalist approaches of this type, of which Christiano’s may be 
considered representative, can simultaneously be expressivist and 
disagreement theories.147 The key value for Christiano is equal well-being.148 
He defends democratic procedures as intrinsically valuable because they are 
public expressions of the principle of well-being. In this view, if democratic 
procedures manage to realize equality, then they have intrinsic value. The 
disagreement aspect is also vital, as Christiano (2015, 237) defends democracy 
as “an intrinsically justified way of dealing with disagreement on matters of 
public concern in the context of collective decision making”. As already noted, 
he considers even democracy’s intrinsic value as conditional on its expressive 
function (Christiano 2011, 2–3). “The principle to be defended is the principle 
that well-being ought to be distributed equally by the institutions of society” 
(Christiano 2008, 25). Moreover, “the equal dignity of persons grounds the 
fundamental value of well-being and the generic principle of justice” (ibid.). 
However, it seems that Rostbøll (forthcoming) makes a valid point when he 
claims that “Christiano's justification of democracy relies on democracy's 
ability to promote the justice-based aim of equal advancement of interests”. 
In comparison to the previous variant of intrinsic worth’s focusing on 
constituting autonomous life, the expressivist variant seems at first sight to 
take the threat of sectarianism into account, as it starts from disagreement. 
What is more, it emphasizes democratic egalitarian relations as its core. The 
problems is, however, as discussed in 5.1.2, that expressivist strategy might 
not succeed answering the instrumentalist challenge. Rostbøll also shares this 
worry that the variant might not be able to provide direct justification for 
democracy with non-instrumental credentials. Expressivist approaches 
assume that citizens have some independently defined interest, such as equal 
well-being in Christiano’s case, with democracy being considered a means to 
fulfill this interest. Bluntly put, democracy is considered the provider of a 
                                               
147 Rostbøll maintains that Valentini’s and Griffin’s approaches would also count as of this type. 
148 Christiano (2008, 4) defends the “public realization of the equal advancement of the well-being 
of the citizens”. 
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certain benefit. Yet this justification seems to lose the connection to the 
constitutive dimension that is present in the autonomous life account. If the 
value of egalitarian relations can be explained independently of democratic 
procedures, the account cannot provide a constitutive justification of 
democracy. As Rostbøll appropriately worries, these expressivist justice-first 
theories “do not provide a truly constitutive justification of democracy, which 
is characterized by the idea that the value of democracy is non-reducible, that 
is, that the latter cannot be based on some value the meaning of which is given 
independently of democracy”. Along with that we miss something truly 
essential: “the idea that democracy creates something new and unique, which 
we can understand only with reference to democratic institutions and 
practices” (Rostbøll forthcoming). I agree with Rostbøll here. The problem is 
not just that regarding democracy as a mere expression of a norm that is 
defined independently of democratic procedures ceases to answer the 
instrumentalist challenge; it goes deeper. As Rostbøll (forthcoming) states:  
The reason why democracy cannot be understood and justified with 
reference to a norm specified in a prior theory of justice is that this 
approach fails to take fully into account the political-institutional 
character of the relationships created by constitutional democracy and 
the unique nature and non-instrumental value of these. 
 
Thus, it seems that this justification strategy is either prone to the epistemic 
or the instrumental challenge. If democratic procedures are not themselves a 
part of the justification, then the justification is prone to the epistemic 
challenge, the modified leveling down, since it will face difficulties in 
explaining why democratic procedures would be better than any other 
decision-making procedure that treated citizens equally. If, on the other hand, 
democratic procedures were taken as a part of the justification – for example, 
by claiming that only democratic procedures can express a certain kind of 
equality or treat citizens in the right way – then a specific kind of equality, or 
a theory explaining the “right way”, would be required. However, this would 
be prone to instrumentalist challenge. The third alternative for the expressivist 
would be to argue for a notion of equality designed for democratic procedures, 
in which equality cannot be detached from these procedures (which could be 
the direction towards which Christiano is aiming, based on a recent paper in 
2015). Nonetheless, the third alternative would require a constitutive structure 
in order to avoid the instrumental charges, which would convert it to the third 
intrinsic variant, which is the next to be discussed.  
 
In relation to this, I should add that Christiano’s approach is a complex one. 
In a recent paper (2015) he argues that his approach is not an indirectly 
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instrumentalist one as has been claimed.149 He argues (ibid., 240) that 
democracy’s “intrinsic value consists in its affording equality in the means by 
which people pursue their aims”, arguing that this is so because of what he 
calls the public standpoint. Christiano (2015, 244) explains the public 
standpoint as “the standpoint of the group of persons who are involved in the 
effort to establish justice and pursue the common good among themselves. It 
is not the standpoint of any particular citizen or that of a perfectly rational 
being.” The public standpoint brings certain impartiality along with it, yet he 
adds that it is “a standpoint that is limited by imperfect rationality in the 
creation of beliefs. Human beings, in their individual and their collective 
efforts, always fail to achieve perfect rationality” (ibid., 245). He seems to 
approach the more relational understanding of intrinsic worth when he 
maintains that “the standpoint gives us improved view of our relations with 
others” (ibid., 257). However, even here his defense of the intrinsic side builds 
on the expressive argument when he adds that “when we take the public 
standpoint, the adoption of the public standpoint itself acquires intrinsic value 
because of its inherently expressive value” (ibid., 258). Yet he claims that “the 
adoption of the public standpoint is itself intrinsically valuable because it gives 
us a mutually recognizable way of expressing our equal status” (ibid.). Thus, it 
seems that he considers the expressivist element the main basis for intrinsic 
worth after all.150 With that emphasis, it seems that the reply to the 
instrumentalist is still a pressing one. 
5.4.3 CONSTITUTING RELATIONAL EQUALITY 
What we get from the two accounts discussed above is the realization that in 
order to reply to both instrumental and epistemic challenges, the intrinsic 
justification of democratic procedures should consist of a notion of 
constitutive value with an undetachable norm of egalitarian relations as its 
core. This would enable the avoidance of a sectarian notion of the good life and 
the idea that democracy’s value could be reduced to some norm independent 
of democratic procedures. In the following I take inspiration from the work of 
Ceva (2016), Kolodny (2014a, 2014b) and especially Rostbøll (forthcoming).  
 
The main point is that understanding democracy as a good in itself and not 
as a mere instrument for a certain end requires acknowledging that democratic 
procedures create something good, something that cannot be conceived 
independently of the procedures. As Ceva (2016, 84) emphasizes, the main 
                                               
149 He refers to Amanda Greene and Howard Nye for presenting this accusation (probably in a 
discursive setting). 
150 Since the focus of this thesis is on substantial matters, not on the personal scholarship of specific 
authors, therefore for the purposes of this thesis I will take the liberty to proceed with the assumption 
that Christiano’s approach is of the expressivist type even if there might be a room for debate on this. 
The Intrinsic Value of Democratic Procedures 
 
132 
element of the intrinsic worth of procedures is that “relevant normative 
commitments … are realized in procedures and not primarily expressed or 
promoted through them”. Democratic procedures are special in this sense;151 
typically, procedures are just means to an end.152 The egalitarian relationships 
constituted in democratic procedures are also special – their meaning and 
value can be fully comprehended only along with the idea of democratic 
procedures themselves (Rostbøll forthcoming).  
But what are these egalitarian relations? In the following, I first present 
Rostbøll’s understanding of them, and then I make a few remarks of my own. 
Rostbøll (forthcoming) formulates the core of his non-instrumental 
justification in the following way: “The justification of X is non-instrumental, 
if X is justified by a norm N, which itself can be fully conceived only with 
reference to X.” What to read into Rostbøll’s formulation? This justification is 
constitutive – meaning that X constitutes norm N, and yet norm N justifies 
X.153 The justification is not circular, however, as some might suspect; rather, 
it describes a non-instrumental relationship. Were the justification of X by 
norm N to be independent of X, then it would be an instrumental justification, 
since X would merely be a means to N. The constitutive justification is 
something that Estlund seems to miss as a third logical possibility in his 
critique of non-epistemic deliberative views. The constitutive justification 
structure employs substantial standards that are not procedure-independent. 
Before going into the details, let us examine how this constitutive 
egalitarian justification structure differs from the autonomous life and 
expressivist versions. In comparison with the autonomous life view what is 
here constituted by democracy is a norm of how individuals ought to relate 
each other, whereas in the Andersonian view the constituent of democracy is 
understood with reference to a certain benefit for individuals: a form of the 
good life. Secondly, in the autonomy version it is the political activity, citizens 
exercising their higher capacities by participating in politics, which constitutes 
the value, whereas for Rostbøll (forthcoming) “what constitutes the norm are 
public, binding, and entrenched democratic rights that create the right 
relationship between citizens and government”. There is also a difference in 
how this constitutive relation is seen to have a prescriptive role. For the 
autonomous life version, democracy’s justification is related to an ideal of how 
citizens ought to live, namely, that citizens should ideally exercise their 
capacities as fully as possible. The egalitarian constitutive justification, on the 
                                               
151 I can imagine that special kinds of artistic procedures or creative ceremonies could potentially 
also have intrinsic worth, but typically procedures are valuable only instrumentally. 
152 There are other similar kinds of human interaction procedures, such as certain creative 
procedural forms of art etc., in which the procedural human interaction is valuable in itself. 
153 Rostbøll (forthcoming) considers his justification strategy Kantian inspired. Kant describes in 
Rechtslehre the concept of freedom as independence that can only be fully conceived in relation to an 
idea of public legal order, since realizing it requires the public and reciprocal coercion of the 
constitutional state.  
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other hand, does not consider “democracy as constituting some particularly 
valuable or enjoyable form of life for citizens, but, rather, as constituting a 
particular and obligatory relationship” (Rostbøll forthcoming). 
In contrast to the expressivist justification, according to the egalitarian 
constitutive justification the way in which citizens relate to each other is not 
known to be right or good on the basis of some independently conceived theory 
of justice. Instead, the relationship that is constituted cannot be conceived in 
the absence of democracy. “The norm that justifies democracy is partly created 
by the democratic organization of the political community”, as Rostbøll 
(forthcoming) explains. Rostbøll understands constitutive justification as 
strictly non-instrumental and denies that democratic institutions “should be 
justified with reference to the promotion of any kind of value for our individual 
lives, including the value of the free exercise of choice”. The promotion of 
certain independent values would make the relationship instrumental, 
whereas preferring certain types of lives would be sectarian.154 He asserts that 
even “[t]he idea that we should regard autonomous lives as better lives, 
moreover, is untenably sectarian” (Rostbøll forthcoming).  
Thus, democracy should be understood as a way of constituting society. The 
core of constitutive understanding is “the principle of respect for autonomy, 
which is not an idea that relies on advancement of interests or wellbeing, as 
does Christiano, since it is about relations among persons, rather than a matter 
of maximizing some end external to these relations” (Rostbøll 2015, 270). 
Democratic institutions should respect autonomy, but not promote it. The 
principle of autonomy regulates social relations. Therefore, the principle “does 
not rely on a conception of the good about which there is reasonable 
disagreement, but rather on an idea of a non-instrumentally right way of 
persons relating to each other” (ibid.). This is one relevant point to which to 
attend. The motivation behind the conception of autonomy’s regulating social 
relations is not contingent disagreement over the good or the just, but the idea 
that each citizen has the right to form and follow his or her own conception of 
the good, and political institutions should relate persons who have their own 
purposes. “Autonomy, then, is not understood as a particular relation the 
person has to herself, but as an interpersonal notion of not being subordinate 
to other person’s arbitrary choices” (Rostbøll 2015, 270). 
What are these interpersonal egalitarian relations created by democracy? 
What are these normative ways citizens should relate to each other? They 
cannot be grounded in any particular idea of welfare as then they would be 
instrumental (cf. Christiano’s equality of well-being). Rostbøll (forthcoming) 
suggests that democracy is justified as it constitutes a certain kind of relational 
standing: “democracy is justified by the standing that it affords citizens, and 
standing is not a good that can be maximized. Standing is a relational norm and 
                                               
154 As mentioned in the introduction, democratic theories aim at non-sectarianism, which refers to 
an idea that in the contemporary societies the justification of democratic procedures should be open to 
different conceptions of good, and not dependent on potentially controversial value-commitments. 
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not an individual good; it is something you have in relation to others not 
something you can enjoy on your own.” This is the standing of an equal. But here 
one should emphasize that not just any conception of equal standing is 
enough. It should be democratic equality that consists of more than mere 
formal equality; rather, it should incorporate “the idea of equal standing as co-
rulers or participants in common law-making. … Without democratic equality, 
some members would be subordinate to the will of others in making law” 
(Rostbøll forthcoming). I am with Rostbøll here. Democratic equality requires 
the absence of social inferiority and superiority.  
Rostbøll (2015, 274) further argues that, “[t]he moral importance of 
democracy is explained by the ideal of relating a plurality of persons to each 
other in a political society in a way in which no one is in a position to dominate 
others and in which citizens interact as autonomous beings”. As is hinted in 
his choice of wording, Rostbøll likes to discuss the egalitarian dimension under 
the rubric of freedom, understanding political freedom as participation in 
collective self-legislation. He sees (2015, 267) that “without the norms of 
freedom and autonomy the equality argument is incomplete”. He employs a 
Kantian-neo-Republican idea of freedom in relation to democracy, and argues 
(2015, 274) that only constitutional democracy can achieve what he assesses 
as the most fundamental element, namely, “respect for autonomy and the 
status of being a free and equal participant in processes of collective self-
legislation”. He maintains that political freedom is important because of the 
relational standing of the individual and her co-citizens. “The freedom 
argument for democracy is that political institutions should secure respect not 
only for the private deliberations of individuals each pursuing their own ends, 
but also for the public deliberations of citizens judging the legal order itself” 
(Rostbøll 2015, 274). 
It seems that Rostbøll effectively manages to characterize what is relevant 
for the constitutive egalitarian justification of democracy. It is both relational 
and non-instrumental and this seems to me the right way to go for an intrinsic 
proceduralist. Yet I am not sure whether the freedom element should be 
highlighted as he does. On the one hand, it is relevant that citizens are free, I 
agree, but then, on the other, I am not sure whether we should discuss these 
themes under the rubric of freedom. I might prefer not to do so. Depending on 
interpretation, the difference between Rostbøll’s Kantian-Republican freedom 
and social equality can be virtually non-existent. For example, Kolodny 
(2014b, forthcoming) defines social equality as avoiding relations of social 
superiority and inferiority. In fact, this definition approaches the very same 
elements as discussed by Rostbøll (forthcoming) under rubric of freedom.  
Rostbøll, however, refers to neo-republican freedom as non-domination. 
For example, Pettit (1997, 2012), to whom Rostbøll directly refers, defines 
freedom as non-domination, as the absence of structural dependence on 
arbitrary power to interfere. But Kolodny has presented an argument against 
this very same interpretation that focuses on freedom as non-domination, on 
which Rostbøll builds. Kolodny argues that the claim that democracy could 
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protect people from domination turns out, on more detailed examination, to 
be too ambitious. The structural dependence on arbitrary power to interfere is 
something that democracy cannot protect one from. Kolodny argues that 
Kantian-Republicans should actually defend a less ambitious interpretation of 
the non-domination thesis; that they should strive for the absence of social 
inferiority instead of domination. Where domination is “a matter of exposure 
to another will, which need not be that of a superior, but may be of an equal, 
inferior, or none of the above” (Pettit 1997, 52), social inferiority is “a matter 
of inferiority to another individual” (Kolodny forthcoming). Furthermore, 
where “domination is a matter of exposure to another will, which need not be 
the will of an individual, but may be the will of a collective” (Pettit 1997, 52) 
social inferiority is “a matter of inferiority to another individual” (Kolodny 
forthcoming). Kolodny also notes that Pettit’s own descriptions of non-
domination – “the idea that citizens could enjoy this equal standing in a 
society” (Pettit 2012, 2) – often tend to describe social equality, instead of the 
more demanding “freedom as non-domination”. Kolodny maintains that 
instead of arbitrary domination, what is objectionable is actually “being under 
the power of a superior person, and that is rooted in a wider concern for social 
equality” (Kolodny forthcoming). Nonetheless, I will not analyze these 
similarities or differences at more length here. I just wish to note that it seems 
that these themes can be discussed either under the rubric of a relational 
positive interpretation of equality or certain relational interpretations of 
freedom that approach equality. 
Whereas Rostbøll's constitutive egalitarian justification highlights the role 
of freedom, Ceva (to whose concept of interactive justice I refer in the next 
chapter) emphasizes rights and human dignity155 as foundations for hers (cf. 
Christiano; see for example 4.2 of this thesis). She maintains that the basic 
tenet of human dignity demands that everyone should be recognized “in their 
capacity as sources of potentially valid claims.” (Ceva 2016, Ch. 1, 17, 93.) 
However, instead of Rostbøll's freedom or Ceva’s rights, duties, and dignity I 
prefer here, for the purposes of the thesis, to concentrate on relative equality 
from the perspective of democratic procedures without taking a stance on 
fundamental normative commitments. 
It is even more complicated to identify where my views differ from Ceva’s 
(2016). Most of her views match my own intuitions, and I lean heavily on her 
approach and concepts, especially in Chapter Six. Young’s and Anderson’s 
relational approach to justice has strong influence on her formulations of the 
paradigm shift from redistributive framework to recognizing relational 
                                               
155 One way to discuss these egalitarian relations is under the rubric of dignity. Treating people with 
the due dignity is a matter of democratic justice. Ceva argues (2016, 77) that human dignity demands 
that “people interact in a way that gives them due consideration in their capacity of potential makers of 
valid claims. As long as people possess such agential capacities, they ought to be reckoned with – their 
claims ought to be given due consideration by others and by institutions.” (Ceva 2016, 77—79; see also 
Waldron 2012b and footnote 102.)  
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structures (see Ceva 2016, 32 fn 6). While, as Ceva also notes, many relational 
approaches, such as Young’s, present oppressive social relations as unjust by 
virtue of their negative impact, so do the terms of instrumental proceduralism 
(see also Estlund 2002).156 But, as Ceva writes (2016, 96), even if Young fails 
to recognize the procedural aspects explicitly, they might be implicit in some 
of her views concerning domination and oppressive social relations.  
In addition to Youngian ideas, Ceva (2016, 95-97) also refers to Anderson’s 
critique of luck egalitarianism (1999) in which she claims that it does not refer 
to the kind of equality relevant for democratic equality. In Anderson’s 
interpretation, luck egalitarianism refers to mere distribution of goods. “Social 
relationships are largely seen as instrumental to generating such patterns of 
distribution” (Anderson 1999, 313; see also Ceva 2016, 96). However, as I see 
it, Anderson’s interpretation of luck egalitarianism seems rather narrow, even 
too narrow (see, for example, Lippert-Rasmussen 2015 for a critique; see also 
Fraser 2003; Toppinen 2005 for broader understanding of distribution). In 
contrast, I would prefer a more pluralist take on relative equality involving not 
only the dimensions of respect and recognition, but also that involving the 
distribution of cognitive conditions for the exercise of citizenship, and 
opportunities for influencing decision making, such as suggested by Christiano 
(2008, 197; see also Chapter 4.4.2 in this thesis.) In this thesis I do not go in 
detail into the definition of relative equality although that would be an 
interesting topic for further study. 
Kolodny (2014b, 287) also argues that the justification of democracy rests 
“on the fact that democracy is a particularly important constituent of a society 
in which people are related to one another as social equals, as opposed to social 
inferiors or superiors”. In his view, relations of social equality are actually 
constituted by equal opportunity to influence; at a more general level, what 
matters for relations of social inferiority and superiority is “equality of 
opportunity for power, authority, and consideration, where equality of 
opportunity is understood not as equal ex ante chances, but instead as ongoing 
freedom (both formal and informal) to exit relations of inequality” (2014b, 
315). The emphasis should not be on the exercise of opportunity, but on the 
opportunity as such (Kolodny 2014b, 304). 
Ultimately, one does not necessarily have to take a stance on this issue. It 
seems to me that for the purposes of this thesis, relational equality could be 
defended in rather minimal terms in relation to normative commitments (I 
                                               
156 Young’s own justification of democratic procedures is somewhat epistemic. She defends her 
politics of difference on an epistemic basis because it leads to better consequences. See, for example, 
Young 1997, and also footnote 39 of this thesis. Nonetheless Young has also defended an idea that justice 
is relevant in considering the institutional relations individuals have with each other, not just 
distribution: how one’s “doings and havings are structured by institutionalized relation that constitute 
[one’s] positions” (Young 1990, 25; see also Ceva & Ottonelli 2012). Young understands these 




return to this theme in the next chapter). What is relevant, however, is that 
democratic procedures can be justified intrinsically as constituting 
egalitarian relations. This relational egalitarian justification can avoid both 
instrumental and epistemic challenges, and be non-sectarian. It is interesting 
that in her classic paper, “What is the point of Equality?” (1999), Anderson 
also argues that the fundamental egalitarian aim is to eliminate oppression 
and create egalitarian social relations. Describing “the distinctively political 
aims of egalitarianism” she writes (1999, 288–289): 
The proper negative aim of egalitarian justice is not to eliminate the 
impact of brute luck from human affairs, but to end oppression, which 
by definition is socially imposed. Its proper positive aim is not to 
ensure that everyone gets what they morally deserve, but to create a 
community in which people stand in relations of equality to others. 
 
5.5 INTRINSIC DELIBERATIVE PROCEDURALISM AND 
THE QUESTION OF STABILITY 
As already discussed, Estlund (2008, 6, Ch. IV) presents a pressing challenge 
for the procedural justifications of democracy in the form of a modified 
leveling-down argument, that is, a comparison to a coin flip. He argues that 
mere procedural fairness – full anonymity – is not sufficient to justify 
democracy, and therefore democratic proceduralism must include substantial, 
procedure-independent elements. As seen, however, democratic procedures 
can be justified by egalitarian relations, which are created and made 
conceivable by democracy itself. They are not independent of democratic 
procedures in the sense Estlund describes. Thus, an intrinsic proceduralist can 
maintain that democratic procedures involve something that is substantial, yet 
not procedure-independent: something thicker than mere, thin fairness as 
anonymity. Additionally, as mentioned, Estlund has argued that even hybrids 
of epistemic and procedural considerations should rest on procedure-
independent elements. He argues that putting too much weight on procedural 
equality would lead to difficulties, as it would make the approach instable. This 
is an objection to consider. The tricky part is the connection between 
procedural and substantial elements – how the elements are knit together and 
how the knitting is justified. Epistemic proceduralists use epistemic criteria, 
as all the choices are made on epistemic basis, whereas, if no epistemic 
criterion is used, Estlund claims that there are no stable justifiable criteria 
(2008, 93–97).  
Interestingly, Cohen has argued in his paper, “Pluralism and 
Proceduralism” (1994), against the distinction between proceduralism and 
substance. As already discussed in Chapter 2.4., Cohen asserts that outcome 
justice and procedural justice are joined together. Cohen maintains (1994, 
593–594) that “it is not a fundamental distinction in political justification” and 
The Intrinsic Value of Democratic Procedures 
 
138 
continues that “[p]rocedural and substantive concerns stand on a common 
footing in democratic theory”. He has a point here. Doubtlessly disagreement 
affects not just decisions concerning the outcomes but also decisions 
concerning the procedures. Yet, as Ceva points out (2016, Ch. 3), these 
elements are distinct social and political entities (as discussed in 2.4 of this 
thesis). The questions concerning them are, in fact, two separate sets of 
questions. There are different normative considerations concerning 1) 
procedural justice, such as how procedural cooperation should be structured 
in order to be structurally just; and 2) outcome justice, such as how costs and 
benefits of procedural cooperation should be distributed. Yet Cohen gives no 
reason why these should be considered interdependent on each other.  
Ceva’s point that these are two separate sets of questions seems to provide 
an insight that is also relevant to Estlund’s worry concerning instability. 
Procedural and instrumental values form two separate sets, as do many other 
norms and values concerning living together in a society. Sometimes different 
norms contradict but, as Ceva points out, these two distinct elements can be 
considered as separate. Estlund argues that there are no stable criteria 
between procedural and outcome features if outcome features are not 
considered a supreme value; thus, a view combining both these sets of values 
would be unstable. Yet this does not seem to me a valid argument against 
valuing the intrinsic worth of procedures and not subordinating the intrinsic 
worth below outcome value. At least for a (non-monist) value pluralist, the lack 
of supreme value does not seem problematic as such. And as Rostbøll 
(forthcoming) puts it, “the point of democratic non-instrumentalism is to 
show that democracy is also good in itself and that this is an essential part of a 
justification of democracy”. It is a separate question then, whether these 
normative considerations in relation to procedures and outcomes suggest 
different ways of acting in particular circumstances. I touch on this question 
lightly in the following, Coda chapter of the thesis, although the main concern 
is a summary of the points made in this work and a brief discussion of minimal 
intrinsic proceduralism in relation to the limits of democratic inclusion. 
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6 CODA: MINIMAL INTRINSIC 
PROCEDURALISM AND DELIBERATION 
AS INTERACTIVE JUSTICE 
6.1 SUMMARY 
In this last, coda chapter I first briefly summarize the main points of the 
previous chapters. I then provide a sketch of what minimal intrinsic 
proceduralism could mean in the deliberative context. This thesis has 
discussed the role of equality in democratic deliberation procedures and the 
variation of procedural and substantial aspects in the justification of those 
procedures. Thus, an important question concerns the role egalitarian 
elements play in the justification of democratic procedures. Chapters Two–
Four discussed three deliberative approaches to these themes, and Chapters 
Four–Six further discuss intrinsic proceduralism. 
In Chapter Two I examined Cohen’s mainstream deliberative approach in 
which ideal deliberative reasoning as a core of the deliberative process has a 
sort of four-dimensional character. It functions as an ideal but also as 
something which actual democratic practices should mirror. Cohen’s ideal 
connects procedural and substantial elements into a single framework in 
which the legitimacy of democratic decisions depends on both procedural 
values and on the substantive quality of the outcomes that the ideal 
deliberative decision-making procedures generate. It is strongly democratic 
since the people’s participation in the justificatory processes of deliberative 
democracy is required for political legitimacy. The deliberative procedures are 
justified on the basis of hypothetical consent given under the imaginary 
conditions of the ideal deliberative process. Yet, as I argue, the ideal remains 
at a distance from actual conditions, therefore its justificatory force suffers. 
The problem lies with the demand for consensus on substantive reasons in 
circumstances of pluralism and disagreement; yet consensus is the basis of 
Cohen’s hypothetical justification. Besides, given the temporality of political 
decision making and the path-independency of deliberation, it seems that this 
interpretation of deliberative democracy faces difficulties in justifying the role 
of deliberation in actual political decision making, because it is not clear why 
actual decision-making procedure should aim to mirror an ideal. The ideal 
deliberative situation cannot be realized in democratic societies. The question 
then becomes what would be the second-best alternative. Cohen maintains 
that isomorphism between the ideal and actual would make actual 
deliberation as the second-best alternative even without ideal conditions (see, 
for example, Cohen 2009b, 339). There are no guarantees, however, that 
trying to approximate the ideal situation via redressing measures would bring 
better outcomes than some other solution. Furthermore, the alternative 
solution of combining deliberation with voting is less solid than it appears. The 
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problem is that the absence of consensus in the deliberative case also means 
the absence of consent, while “consent” reached via achieving consensus is the 
basis of legitimacy of the (justificatory) deliberative ideal. Therefore, 
justificatory deliberative theory should be able to connect the voting rule and 
the epistemic virtues of deliberation, to make the connection between the 
epistemic benefits of both. On the other hand, combining voting with 
deliberation has one more difficulty related to the path-independence of the 
deliberation process. In the absence of consensus as a reference point, one 
cannot evaluate the phase of the deliberation process. Consequently, it is not 
necessarily an epistemic improvement to first deliberate “for some period” and 
then vote. The combination of both substantive and procedural perspectives 
that Cohen defends is relevant for plural democracies, yet the way they are 
joined together in the justificatory approach suffers certain shortcomings, as 
discussed above. Meanwhile, the epistemic aspect of the view does not seem 
to carry the justification over these difficulties. Simultaneously, as discussed, 
Cohen’s interpretation of the egalitarian character of democratic procedures 
seems inadequately developed to serve a justificatory purpose.  
The third chapter focused on what may be the most influential procedural 
approach currently, that is, epistemic proceduralism. Of especial importance 
in this and the chapters that followed is the question of what kind of 
substantial commitments a democratic procedure should involve. Estlund 
argues for procedure-independent substantial standards, and claims that if 
there is a possibility to hold to certain epistemic, and not just procedural, 
standards, the epistemic should always have primacy over the procedural. The 
core of epistemic proceduralism is the qualified acceptability requirement 
(QAR) according to which political justifications must be acceptable to all 
qualified points of view. This idea reflects similar features as Cohen’s 
consensus ideal in the previous chapter. Yet, whereas Cohen seeks ideal 
consensus via actual deliberators, Estlund prefers a hypothetical setting. He 
explains (2008, 286 fn. 6) that he refers loosely to Cohen’s ideal but the 
theoretical role he gives to this imaginary situation of ideal deliberation is 
explicitly epistemic, whereas for Cohen the deliberative ideal is constitutive. 
Estlund considers the deliberative situation “an ideal epistemic situation” 
(2008, 18). He has criticized competing approaches for not being able to justify 
deliberation, but it is not entirely clear how democratic deliberation is justified 
in his own version either. In order to avoid the problem of second best, he 
suggests that ideal deliberation should be understood as a template for 
marking and measuring the deviations from the ideal and devising 
epistemically remedial responses. However, for me the role of deliberation 
seems unclear in this picture. What would be the reason for deliberating in a 
non-ideal way in the first place? What is the justification for actual 
deliberation, if ideal deliberation is used as a template and actual deliberation 
does not aspire to ideal circumstances?  
Albeit Estlund is quite modest about democracy’s epistemic prospects, only 
aiming for better than randomness, there will always be a certain 
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indeterminacy in saying that epistemic proceduralism is better than random. 
Estlund describes his method as a provisional leap (2011, 357–358), in which 
the core idea is to offer a plausible and appealing theory, but I am so far not 
convinced that epistemic proceduralism appeals as a more plausible 
alternative to intrinsic proceduralism. Estlund relies more on laying the 
burden of proof on others and on the appeal of his approach, than on offering 
solid proof himself. My aim in the chapter was to turn the balance in the 
opposite direction. It also seems that drawing the line between epistemic 
proceduralism and epistocracy is not such a simple task; it seems strange that 
outcome values would dominate procedural equality lexically in the context of 
democratic procedures to such an extent. Estlund seems to assume that his 
qualified acceptability requirement could replace procedural justice, and do it 
in epistemic terms. Yet it seems to me that epistemic proceduralism might in 
the end have difficulties defending democracy. If a justification of democratic 
procedures does not refer to the intrinsic value of democratic procedures, but 
mere consequences, it is an instrumental one in a broad sense (see Arneson 
2003, 2009). Therefore, I presented a caricaturized science fiction example, 
“Super Episteme”, in order to highlight the undemocratic tendencies of 
epistemic proceduralism. I also emphasized that if (and only if) the qualified 
acceptability criteria (or reasonability) were to play the main role in 
democratic theory, then there should be equal opportunities to be qualified (or 
to attain reasonability) in order to avoid the approach turning from democracy 
into meritocracy. 
In the fourth chapter I described Christiano’s hybrid view, one that rests on 
values that are at the same time substantial yet not independent of procedure 
in a broad sense. Procedures are not defended on epistemic grounds because 
of the promotion of substantially just outcomes, but instead because they are 
seen as intrinsically just. However, this intrinsic value is conditional. For 
Christiano democratic procedures can have intrinsic value if they realize 
public equality. He takes diversity, disagreement, fallibility, and cognitive bias 
as starting points. His argument proceeds from pervasive disagreement to the 
request for equality of wellbeing. Since we face pervasive disagreements about 
justice, the common good, and the value of substantive laws and policies, 
therefore democratic decision making should publicly treat each citizen as an 
equal. He argues that if we recognize these challenges of plural societies, the 
only way to ensure that people are treated equally is to give each an equal say 
in shaping a common world characterized by deep interdependence of 
interests among citizens.  
I also introduced Christiano’s wide conception of deliberative democracy, 
which is perhaps the most noticeable difference between Christiano’s view and 
justificatory proceduralism. It requires that equality of all citizens in public 
deliberation is institutionally supported and reinforced by other necessary 
background conditions in society. Furthermore, in a well-functioning 
democracy, citizens are committed to the process, open to the arguments of 
others, and ready to shape or even change their preferences if needed in the 
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course of deliberation. However, the wide conception rejects the tenet that 
deliberators should only appeal to reasons that can be accepted by all other 
reasonable deliberators; instead they should appeal to the most compelling 
reasons from their own perspective. There are three distributional dimensions 
to the procedures: cognitive conditions for the effective exercise of citizenship, 
opportunities for influencing the agenda for collective decision making, and 
equality of respect for each other. These are the dimensions according to which 
the process of public deliberation should be assessed. On the intrinsic side, 
Christiano’s wide understanding of the deliberative process embodies three 
fundamental values: the ideal of equal respect, the commitment to advance 
justice and the common good in society, and the process of deliberation as 
public realization of equality. The inclusivity of the wide view makes it in some 
respects more realistic, even if in others, of course, idealistic as well. 
Nevertheless, while this wide conception of deliberation is quite like the 
version I defend later in this Coda chapter, there are some controversial 
elements in Christiano’s approach. One is that he argues for equality of 
wellbeing. This definition seems controversial, however, and I suppose the 
intrinsic proceduralist could take a more minimalist stance towards the 
interpretation of equality. 
It seems that none of the three deliberative approaches discussed in the 
first part of the thesis offers a fully satisfying justification for democratic 
procedures. Christiano’s version comes closest. Its strengths are its prominent 
egalitarian character, wide understanding of deliberation, and also the feature 
that the ideal is built with unideal circumstances, as well as the ideal level, in 
mind. This approach is tailored to take into account the fact that people 
disagree. Consequently, Christiano’s procedural account is also more robust 
towards unideal circumstances than that of Cohen or Estlund. In my view, a 
further strength is that it is in line with the idea that there is a difference 
between epistemic and egalitarian dynamics in relation to the motivation 
behind deliberation. Nonetheless, it seems that one weakness of Christiano’s 
account is a too detailed notion of equality. The equality of wellbeing that 
Christiano defends seems too controversial a commitment to be used as the 
currency of equality. In addition, it seems prone to the instrumentalist critique 
discussed in Chapter Five, because Christiano’s account does not employ a 
constitutive justification of democracy; instead, procedures are defended on 
more expressive grounds. 
In the fifth chapter I examine Arneson’s instrumentalist challenge and 
defend the possibility of a plausible and appealing version of intrinsic 
proceduralism. Drawing on the work of Ceva, I discuss a few alternative 
strategies for trying to defend intrinsic proceduralism, but none of them seem 
to work alone; thus, it seems that in order to defend the intrinsic value of 
democratic procedures that cannot ultimately be interpreted via instrumental 
value, the value of democratic procedures should be understood in a 
constitutive manner. I then follow Rostbøll’s line of argument and discuss 
some further alternative approaches that employ constitutive or egalitarian 
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relations as their core. It seems to me that if democracy is understood as 
constituting egalitarian relations, such an understanding will enable the 
intrinsic proceduralist to answer both the epistemic and the instrumental 
challenge. On the one hand, the constituting relation cannot involve strongly 
sectarian elements; on the other, if the value of egalitarian relations can be 
explained independently of democratic procedures, the account cannot 
provide a constitutive justification of democracy. Promotion of procedure-
independent values would make the relation instrumental. Therefore, intrinsic 
justification of democratic procedures should consist of both a notion of 
constitutive value and an undetachable norm of egalitarian relations as its 
core. These relations cannot be constituted independently of democracy as 
they require the absence of social inferiority and superiority; in other words, 
equality of democratic opportunities. As Kolodny argues, only democracy can 
offer the kind of equal opportunity to influence decision making that avoids 
subordinating some to the decisions of others. Democratic procedures 
constitute valuable egalitarian relations that cannot be conceived 
independently of the procedures. The minimalist intrinsic proceduralism I end 
up defending combines ideas from Christiano, Ceva, Rostbøll, and Kolodny. 
Yet it seems to me that the egalitarian relationship should be kept as minimal 
as possible, in order to avoid theoretically sectarian commitments; and also 
pluralist, in order to reach all the relevant dimensions of relative democratic 
equality.  
6.2 MINIMAL INTRINSIC PROCEDURALISM 
There are different ways to interpret intrinsic proceduralism, as noted at the 
end of Chapter Five. I prefer a minimalist version in the justificatory sense. 
What does minimalism here denote? The focus is on democratic procedures. 
For intrinsic proceduralism, it is relevant that the substantial commitments 
that are required for the justification are not procedure-independent. Still, 
there seems to be a certain core to which even a minimalist should commit.  
Cohen (2004) makes a distinction between substantive and justificatory 
minimalism. (Note that the label “justificatory” refers here to minimalism, not 
deliberation as in Chapter Two.) The substantive version is minimal with 
regard to the content of normative principles, seeking minimal prescriptivity, 
whereas the justificatory version is minimalistic in terms of theoretical 
independence, seeking a wide acceptability of the prescriptions for people 
holding a variety of different value commitments (Cohen 2004; see also Ceva 
2016, 84–86).157 It seems to me that democratic proceduralism should take 
                                               
157 Cohen explains this via human rights (2004, 192). Substantive minimalism endorses the idea of 
minimal prescriptivity: “The central idea of substantive minimalism is that human rights are confined 
to protections of negative liberty.” Justificatory minimalism, however, is not afraid of prescriptivity, but 
wary about too many sectarian commitments: “Justificatory minimalism is animated by an 
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the route of justificatory minimalism and aim for normative principles that are 
independent of particular ethical outlooks, conceptions of good, and other 
value commitments. Nonetheless, one should note that the standpoint is not 
anti-foundationalist, relativist, or sceptic concerning the possibility of 
objectivity. The aim is just to avoid unnecessary commitments. One reason for 
this preference is that, as mentioned in the introduction, the approach 
defended in this thesis is partial. The aim here is not to offer a systematic 
enquiry of how democratic decision making is related to other domains of a 
just society, or even of how the intrinsic worth of democratic procedures 
compares in relation to other procedural values. This is an additional reason 
why it is relevant to keep the justification of intrinsic proceduralism minimal 
and as non-sectarian as possible in order to enable wider applicability.  
For justificatory minimalism, the normative principles should be 
independent of particular conceptions of good and other value commitments. 
For example, the equality of wellbeing defended by Christiano (2008) seems 
controversial. Nevertheless, it seems that the substantial value of relational 
equality employed here in a procedural context is quite minimal in relation to 
normative commitments, albeit demanding in terms of equality.  
This type of defense of minimalism of relative equality is defended in a 
more general setting by Arneson who analyses relational equality in his review 
piece on different types of equality (2013). He maintains that a commitment 
to relational equality does not, as such, necessitate committing to a specific 
more detailed approach concerning the type of equality. He explains (2013) 
that one can both “(1) affirm relational equality and hold that in a just society 
people should relate as free and equal” and simultaneously also “(2) affirm 
luck egalitarianism and hold that people should be equal in their condition … 
except that people's being less well off than others is acceptable if the worse 
off could have avoided this fate by reasonable voluntary choice”. It is possible 
to defend both these ideals simultaneously, even if they obviously sometimes 
conflict. He furthermore emphasizes that commitment to relational equality 
does not in itself require commitment to any particular normative approach. 
The relational equality ideal can be consequentialist, or deontological for 
example. “That people should relate as free and equal might be taken to be a 
goal to be promoted or an entitlement to be respected” (Arneson 2013; see also 
Lippert-Rasmussen 2015 for pluralist understanding of relational equality). 
It moreover seems plausible that the amount of intrinsic value can vary 
and, along with it, justificatory strength. Christiano (2015, 239), for example, 
describes a conception of minimally egalitarian democracy that is 
characterized by “equal voting power, equal opportunities to run for office and 
form political associations, and where the voting of citizens determines who is 
                                               
acknowledgement of pluralism and embrace of toleration. It aspires to present a conception of human 
rights without itself connecting that conception to a particular ethical or religious outlook; it minimizes 
theoretical aspirations in the statement of the conception of human rights with the aim of presenting a 
conception that is capable of winning broader public allegiance.” 
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in power and how they rule”. It also requires a rule of law. This kind of 
minimally egalitarian society has some intrinsic value according to Christiano 
(2015, 239): “The idea is that a society that possesses [the] minimally 
egalitarian character has some intrinsic value and the more egalitarian the 
society becomes along the spectrum from the threshold to the ideal, the more 
intrinsic value it has.” Yet description of merely minimally egalitarian 
democracy sounds quite like the aggregative ideal mentioned briefly at the 
beginning of Chapter Two. Christiano (2008, 298) also notes that “the 
minimum outcome standard is not sufficient for the realization of public 
equality”. If justification of democratic procedures depends on their 
constituting egalitarian relation, the justificatory force of the merely minimally 
egalitarian democracy seems too weak to me to serve the purpose. The 
egalitarian relations should be more robust, in order to provide strong enough 
justification for democratic procedures. 
6.3 PROCEDURALLY RE-EVALUATED DELIBERATION 
– DELIBERATION AS INTERACTIVE JUSTICE 
Minimal intrinsic proceduralism gets a more comprehensive description when 
we return to democratic deliberation, and analyze deliberative procedures 
from that angle. How does intrinsic proceduralism affect our understanding of 
democratic deliberation? For these last pages of the thesis I return to the 
deliberative themes and consider how minimal intrinsic proceduralism could 
be interpreted in a deliberative setting. This elaboration will remain at a rather 
general level and more like a sketch than precise definition, but it will serve 
the purpose of exemplifying the point of intrinsic proceduralism for a 
deliberative approach.  
The typical deliberative approaches, such as Cohen’s, and especially the 
epistemic variants, such as Estlund’s, focus on the prospective outcome justice 
of deliberative procedures. These ideals are outcome-oriented in their 
justification even if they are procedural. Therefore, the deliberative procedures 
are also designed with an eye to the outcomes: just decisions. Nonetheless, as 
I see it, in the light of intrinsic proceduralism it becomes obvious that a switch 
of focus is needed. Democratic deliberative interaction should also be 
considered independently of the outcomes. The two types of procedural 
justifications are distinct, and understandings of the relevant features also 
differ depending on the justification of the procedure. There is a difference 
between motivations: whether the procedures are to be considered morally 
valuable in themselves or merely for their outcomes (see also Chapter 4.4.2; 
Arpaly 2011). How should deliberative processes be understood if intrinsic 
procedural justice rather than outcome justice is the guiding idea? How could 
decision-makers be treated as relationally equal in the process? In the 
following I maintain that when democratic procedures are understood as 
intrinsically justified, the deliberative procedures are to be further adjusted. 
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My suggestion is that this adjustment be made from the perspective of 
interactive justice. This means that elements relevant for intrinsic justice, 
such as democratic inclusion, have more bearing, whereas elements such as 
the consensus requirement and reasonability, discussed in more critical tones 
earlier in this work, require reevaluation.158 
This sketch is composed of ideas related to democratic inclusion and the 
themes discussed in the previous chapters, but most of all I employ Ceva’s 
recent ideas. In her Interactive Justice: A Proceduralist Approach to Value 
Conflict in Politics (2016), Ceva creates a synthesis of political philosophy and 
peace studies. She interprets theories focusing on conflict management 
through a normative, philosophical lens. She explains (2016, introduction) her 
inspiration to use theories of conflict management in order to gain insights 
that could be applied in order to understand procedural dimensions of justice 
in value conflicts. These conflict management theories, developed in practical 
conflictual contexts (on the basis of an empirical learning process), focus on 
the treatment of parties during their conflicts. In the field of political 
philosophy, questions concerning the procedural part of cooperation are often 
mainly assessed on an instrumental basis; only the outcomes are evaluated on 
a normative basis. As Ceva points out, this misbalance of the normative field 
is likely due to the (mis)belief that structure must be merely functional to the 
distribution. However, as she argues, proceduralists should combine these 
perspectives and ask: “On what terms should the conflicting parties interact 
such that they find their interaction inherently morally acceptable?”  
The questions concerning just structures of co-operation open a window 
onto interactional justice. Ceva (2016, 71) defends “proceduralism as a theory 
advocating the importance of the procedures constitutive of interpersonal 
interactions in politics and society as a proper locus of interactive justice”. Her 
view is inspired by Anderson’s (1999) notion of relational equality and Young’s 
                                               
158 What it comes to empirical applications of deliberative ideals, it is interesting to consider what 
kind of justification they build. For example, Saunders (2010, 12—13) points out (referring to James 
Fishkin, the eminent empirical deliberative expert) that a form of of deliberative, citizen juries could fit 
with Estlund’s idea of epistemic proceduralism and his qualified acceptability criteria. Instead of 
universal suffrage, only a smaller sample of citizens would be randomly given the right to participate. 
This would be justifiable on an epistemic basis, as large scale political participation would be costly and 
even infeasible. Yet no regional interest would be offended and there would be no demographic bias if 
the sample were a random cross-section of population and inclusion were decided on the basis of lottery. 
All the significant groups would be represented. (This method would also prevent the group becoming a 
separate faction of society, awarding themselves special privileges.) The arrangement would have 
epistemic value as well, as the smaller size of the group would enable deliberation. Therefore, it would 
fulfill the requirements of epistemic proceduralism. It is an interesting point to consider in reference to 
this type of application that it seems that the idea of citizen juries would fit with epistemic proceduralism, 
and thus also suffer from the complexities of the view in respect of justification. Intrinsic procedural 
justification would instead require reevaluating the deliberative practical settings from a procedural 
point of view. 
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idea of (1990, 25) “relations that constitute positions” and criticism of 
distributive justice (as mentioned in Chapter 5.4.3). Yet she emphasizes that 
her view differs from Anderson’s and Young’s in that, in her view, oppressive 
social relations are not unjust by mere virtue of their negative impact (which 
would count as instrumental proceduralism), but also because of procedural 
injustices. She suggests that the inherent purpose of procedures is to provide 
“a locus where justice-relevant normative commitments are realized”. 
Furthermore, engagement in procedures that give equal voice to conflicting 
participants “constitute an inherently just form of interaction between 
conflicting parties” (2016, 97).  
In the following I suggest an account of the role of deliberation from the 
perspective of intrinsic proceduralism that considers the interactive 
procedural dimension of deliberation. Nonetheless, I accentuate that the 
inherent qualities of procedures are also controversial (see Chapter 5.4.3). It 
is not a retreat from substance, as Estlund alleges non-epistemically driven 
proceduralisms to be. Intrinsic procedures are substantial, although the 
substance is not procedure-independent. As there is wide disagreement over 
outcome justice, interactive justice is also a controversial theme, even if not 
systematically debated to such an extent. Therefore, my aim is to continue to 
maintain the minimal line here as well.159 
6.3.1 SHIFT OF FOCUS FROM CONSENSUS TO SHARED 
DISAGREEMENT 
Interactive justice concerns the collaborative relations of participants during 
a process. As Ceva defines it, for a process to be interactively just, its conditions 
should be morally acceptable to all participants independently of the gains 
they obtain from it. What seems crucial for deliberative interaction from the 
perspective of interactive justice is that democratic procedures are such that 
all the parties are considered due sources of valid claims, that is, considered 
socially equal160, and that the procedures also enable cooperative interaction 
(Ceva 2016, 16, Ch. 2). Ceva (ibid., 18) argues that in order to realize interactive 
justice “what matters primarily is that the state’s institutions discharge their 
duty to establish a political and social system within which people are treated 
in an inherently morally acceptable manner in their capacity as potential 
makers of valid claims”. As discussed earlier (in Chapter 5.4.3), I prefer to 
emphasize the relative equality of interaction, including cognitive conditions 
and conditions of interaction that are constituted by equal opportunity (cf. 
Kolodny 2014b, 304, 315).  
Intrinsically just procedures will doubtless be indeterminate with regard to 
the outcomes, as these procedures are considered in an open-ended manner 
                                               
159 This theme would be an interesting topic for a research project. 
160 I prefer a minimalist understanding here, but it seems that this is open to a wide variety of 
interpretations.  
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(cf. Bohman & Richardson 2009). Nevertheless, it seems to me that outcomes 
also have a valuable function for intrinsic justice. Outcomes can function as 
signs of interactive injustices. For example, in another context, Phillips (2004) 
has defended an idea that the equality of outcomes can serve as a check point 
for equalities of opportunity.161 Thus, outcomes that appear unequal – 
exhibiting, for example, structural inequalities or epistemic injustices (cf. 
Fricker 2007) – should be regarded as potential signals that procedures are 
not as equal as they appear, although this is not necessarily the case. But 
persistent outcome inequalities should be considered a request for further 
analysis (cf. also Christiano’s minimum outcome standard 2008, 288–299; 
Chapter 4.5 of this thesis).162  
The re-evaluated deliberative processes discussed here seem, moreover, to 
be in line with Christiano’s wide understanding of deliberation, discussed in 
Chapter Four. For the most part, Christiano’s deliberative view seems to fit 
with the idea of deliberative procedures interpreted as interactive justice. 
However, according to minimal intrinsic proceduralism, what is relevant in 
deliberation is interactive justice. As mentioned, the conditions of consensus 
and reasonability, examined in a critical light in Chapters Two and Three, 
seem to require re-evaluation from that point of view. In the deliberative 
setting the consensus ideal is related to outcomes and in Cohen’s approach 
simultaneously to the justification. However, it does not play such a role in 
procedural interaction and, as discussed in Chapter Two, it can even have 
negative effects on the interactive process. Democratic communication can be 
characterized more as a struggle than an agreement, especially in structurally 
unequal settings. Young (2000, 44) emphasizes that in situations of this type 
it is of greater importance to learn about the differences which cause the 
conflict than to aim at consensus. As Young points out, if the deliberation 
process does not aim at such understanding, it might be complicated to 
motivate citizens to participate in public processes.163 But this as such does not 
seem to require consensus. It seems that, as Ceva suggests (2016, 146–148), 
the focus should be oriented towards understanding, but this understanding 
should not be interpreted in Habermasian terms as consensus but, rather, as 
understanding of the differences and sources of disagreement.164  
                                               
161 On equality of opportunity see Mason who argues that merely “possessing an opportunity” is not 
the same as “having an available option” (2006, 22) In contexts of equality of democratic opportunities 
I think that friction factors are also relevant (as discussed for example by economists), and also the soft 
constraints (see Lawford-Smith & Gilabert 2012). 
162 Cf. also Christiano (2008, Ch. 7) who argues that existence of persistent minorities weakens 
democratic authority. 
163 However, one should note, as already mentioned in Chapter 5.4.3, that Young’s own justification 
of democratic procedures is somewhat epistemic. 
164 The point is by no means unique; it has also been argued by several other critics of deliberation. 
Jane Mansbridge (1999) maintains that deliberation should not aim for consensus but to clarify the 
sources of conflicts, even aggravating the conflict in order to make the different reasoning and central 
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One central element is the recognition of other citizens as equals, as 
potential makers of valid claims. As Ceva (2016, 145) explains, “the pursuit of 
this kind of understanding is essential for the parties to see that they all have 
moral stakes in the conflict and their conflict is in fact a ‘joint problem’”. The 
participants might not always understand each other’s respective positions, 
but they should accept that those positions are morally relevant in regard to 
the matter under dispute. This requires accepting that political disagreements 
are not always matters of misunderstanding (i.e., the misperfection view, in 
Mason’s vocabulary, discussed in Chapter 2.3.1); there might be genuine 
dissent as well. Ceva raises the principle of Audi alteram partem, that is, to 
“hear the other side”.165 Even disagreeing citizens should overcome their 
reticence and distrust of engaging in a procedurally regulated adversarial 
exchange, one that is guided by principles of procedural equality. When the 
conflict dynamics become antagonistic, it means that the parties have failed to 
recognize each other as equals. As Ceva (2011, 164) highlights, what matters 
are “the reciprocal attitudes of the parties during the process itself as sustained 
by the procedural rules governing the interaction”.166 Interactive justice in 
democratic procedures requires a joint, cooperative description that 
encompasses the perspectives of all the participants. In other words, what is 
to be shared is not consensual understanding, but understanding of the 
disagreement as a shared problem that requires cooperative effort: 
recognizing each other as equals on the verge of disagreement.167, 168, 169 
                                               
problems understandable to participants. Nevertheless, Mansbridge sees the deliberative process as a 
special one that enables this articulation of different viewpoints and disagreements (1999, 226–227; see 
also Bohman 1996). Ceva has a new take on the theme, however, as she also defends the possibility of 
intrinsic proceduralism. 
165 According to Stuart Hampshire (2000, 8–9) this principle was originally presented by Herbert 
Hart. 
166 There are different levels of disagreement between full conflict and a cooperative process. While 
beyond the scope of democratic interaction, it is definitely interesting more generally that Ceva’s insights 
cover an even broader scale of conflict. Ceva suggests applying the peace studies notion that the proper 
scope of a process should depend on the conflict. In the conflictual situation, if it is becoming violent, 
the first focus should be on a process of de-escalation, and then on setting the preconditions for 
motivating the parties to take part in a cooperative process of argumentation. The appropriate scope of 
focus then gradually shifts towards reaching an understanding, from antagonism towards egalitarian 
adversarial collaboration (Ceva 2016, Ch II & V especially 150–152). 
167 This approaches the views defended by agonists, at least Honig 1996 and Mouffe 2000. 
168 See also Christiano’s concept of a “common world”, discussed in Chapter Four. 
169 It is highly interesting, that in a recent empirical study (2017) Brinza & Grossmann have found 
some evidence that people who have lower social class backgrounds tend to be better at taking into 
account the perspectives of those that different from their own in interpersonal conflicts than those who 
have grown up in privileged conditions. But it is far too early to make any further assumptions based on 
these findings. 
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Including such differences in the democratic dialogue is obviously not only 
relationally just, but also beneficial for the democratic process, both 
instrumentally and epistemically. (The latter is the essential idea of the whole 
deliberative approach.)170 But nonetheless one should note that the outcome 
benefits are contingent. While public deliberation can improve rationality by 
diminishing shallow misunderstandings, discussion and debate are also likely 
to bring disagreements to the fore.171 A more egalitarian setting can also 
produce more numerous points of conflict, as those who in other settings may 
have stayed quiet and kept their differing views to themselves, may also 
express their opinions. As Christiano (2008, 196; also see Young 2000 inter 
al.) notes: “Differing points of view cannot be eliminated when there are 
participants with differing social and economic backgrounds and experiences 
in life and the evidence always falls short of proof.” What is relevant here is 
that the focus is not on the outcomes (as it is even for Young) but on the 
interactions as such, and on taking equal responsibility for shared 
disagreement. This is related to recognition of the epistemic equality of 
participants – the acceptance that disagreement is not necessarily caused by 
the mere error or irrationality of “others”.  
6.3.2 REASONABILITY AND LIMITS OF INCLUSION 
The request for reasonability employed by Cohen’s deliberative ideal (and 
Estlund’s epistemic version in the form of QAR) also requires re-evaluation 
from the perspective of interactive justice. The principle of reasonableness 
limits the scope and manner of public deliberation. Christiano has critically 
pointed out that Cohen’s deliberative ideal is based on the notion of 
reasonability as it requests a narrow conception of public deliberation (see, 
for example, Christiano 2008, Ch. 5). From the perspective of wide 
deliberation and interactive justice it is not clear why one would prefer the 
narrow notion, and thus refrain from proposing terms of association that are 
based on reasons which (one believes) are true but which are incompatible 
                                               
170 For a more empirical approach to the instrumental benefits of diversity in complex systems such 
as societies, see, for example, Scott E. Page (2010, 3) who makes a convincing case (2010, 2) that diversity 
is “of paramount importance for the continued flourishing of societies, economies and ecosystems”. 
Homogenous groups tend to see things in the same way, whereas diverse groups tend to see things from 
multiple directions and they do not get stuck in the same places. “Diversity can provide insurance, 
improve productivity, spur innovation, enhance robustness, produce collective knowledge, and … sustain 
further diversity. But diversity, for all its benefits, is no panacea: It can contribute to collapse, conflict, 
and incomprehensive mangles.” As discussed earlier, the instrumental benefits are contingent, yet they 
are one reason to favor the inclusion of diverse perspectives and democratic equality. 
171 Furthermore, I should mention here that Estlund also emphasizes that actual democratic politics 
requires sharp and disruptive action, even, momentarily, activity that interferes with communication, as 
he puts it – although, for him this is not relevant to his ideal, but only the actual politics (see also Estlund 
2008, Ch X, especially 184—186). 
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with reasonable doctrines accepted by some members of society. This is 
especially true of plural societies in which people hold a wide variety of views 
on moral and political questions. Christiano (2008, 229–230 fn 54) even 
claims that “we have a reason to think that the principle of reasonableness is 
inegalitarian”. Views building on the narrow notion of reasonability do not 
value the inclusion of the unreasonable, even in those versions that do not 
directly require excluding them legally.172  
However, while the reasonability requirement seems too narrow as it 
stands, inclusivity cannot be unlimited. If the request for reasonability is given 
up, there needs to be some other limit for inclusion. Where should the line be 
drawn? Wider inclusiveness seems to complement the idea of interactive 
justice. Ceva provides a more detailed proposition for the scope of inclusivity 
that appears to draw the line at a more suitable place from the perspective of 
a minimal intrinsic proceduralist. She starts her description of the limits of 
inclusivity from the (Rawlsian) ideal of reasonability (cf. Cohen’s reasonability 
and consensus conditions and Estlund’s QAR). A typical (liberal) view of 
ideally reasonable persons conceives them as those who: 1) endorse the idea of 
persons as free and equal; 2) are committed to engage in cooperative 
interaction with others on mutually acceptable terms; and 3) are ready to offer 
others public reasons in defense of their political claims. Correspondingly, 
unreasonable persons are those who violate at least one of the conditions, if 
not more. Violators of the first (and, consequently, also the latter two) would 
be, for example, hardline extremists and those holding racist and sexist views. 
Full violators of the second would count as anarchists, whereas perfectionists 
could be counted as partial violators. The violators of the third condition would 
be those whose reasons are based on comprehensive doctrines or other 
grounds that are not shared. Typically (Rawlsian) liberal theorists, including 
Cohen and Estlund, require the justifications to be acceptable to the ideally 
reasonable. However, it seems that that this is too narrow a scope. Conflictual 
issues of interactive justice occur between people who vary in their degree of 
reasonableness and unreasonableness; in order to justify institutions and 
practices to all of them, the justification of procedures should extend beyond 
the ideally reasonable. On the other hand, how wide and inclusive should the 
process be? Inclusivity has to be limited in order to enable democracy. Ceva 
suggests a “moral acceptability test”. The first condition could not be violated, 
that is, democracy must require that participants endorse the idea of persons 
as free and equal. However, the “non-ideally reasonable” that violate condition 
three – such as religious groups that accept conditions one and two but make 
public use of non-public reasons; and those partially violating conditions two 
and three – such as liberal perfectionists refusing to engage in cooperative 
                                               
172 Christiano doubts that even this non-exclusion can be seen as related to the difficulties of drawing 
a line that might exclude some potentially reasonable individuals among the unreasonable. Estlund’s 
views seem to support this interpretation; i.e., that the basis for non-exclusion is the difficulty in making 
the distinction, as Estlund admits (2008, Ch 3). See also Chapter 3.2.1 of this thesis. 
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interaction with their religious opponents who hold views that the 
perfectionists consider deeply morally corrupt – could pass the test (Ceva 
2016, 119–120). She argues that egalitarian adversarial argumentation as 
constitutive of a form of cooperation should be morally acceptable to all the 
conflicting parties as, during such interaction, all the parties are given due 
consideration, and none is treated as inferior. She does admit that the binding 
force of the test does vary depending on the different degrees of reasonability 
and unreasonableness involved. By this she means that 
[a]s long as the conflicting parties do not reject the idea of persons as 
free and equal beings (despite their different, and possibly 
incompatible, specific interpretations of this general idea), they have 
binding reasons to consider a procedurally egalitarian treatment as 
giving them due consideration. (Ceva 2016, 121–122)  
 
This seems a suitable understanding of the limits of inclusion for the purposes 
of intrinsically justified, re-evaluated deliberation procedures.  
6.3.3 PLURALITY OF PROCEDURAL VALUES 
One of my basic assumptions is value pluralism. Intrinsic procedural value 
should be understood as acomplementing other types of value.173 Thus, I do not 
wish to contest that democratic procedures and deliberation have 
instrumental worth. Quite the opposite; deliberation has immense factual and 
even innovative capacities. As Lawford-Smith and Gilabert (2012, 814) put it, 
deliberation has great creative potential: “a central role of political 
deliberation is to imagine ways in which current economic, institutional, and 
cultural configurations can be changed so that allegedly infeasible but highly 
desirable improvements are introduced”.174 Yet the point here is that the 
instrumental value of democratic procedures is ontologically distinct from 
intrinsic procedural value. What matters for the purposes of this thesis is that 
democratic procedures may be intrinsically just, independently of their 
outcomes. Democratic procedures constitute something unique, something 
that does not exist without democracy and that we can fully comprehend only 
by referring to democracy – an egalitarian relationship that has value beyond 
the instrumental.  
                                               
173 Someone with more monist intuitions might, of course, like to join the dimensions together and 
define the elements in more detail. The idea of epistemic proceduralism could be combined with an idea 
of egalitarian proceduralism, for example. But in that case the equal opportunity to be reasonable should 
be among the aspects to develop. 
174 In addition, aggregative democratic processes also have significant instrumental value in the 
process of pooling facts and beliefs without or after deliberation. As Robert Goodin states (2003, 16) 
“democratically pooling the independent opinions of several agents can be a very powerful device indeed 
for resolving issues of sheer fact”. 
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In addition, even if the currently most prominent version of epistemic 
proceduralism seems to require some revisions, I do not wish to argue here 
that any specific procedural value should have supreme position in contrast to 
other procedural values per se. (Cf. Estlund who holds that epistemic 
considerations should always be preferred.) Yet one could maintain, in the 
same vein as seems typical in the field of conflict management, that the more 
controversial the cooperative situation is, the more there seems to be reason 
to focus on interactive justice. (Because epistemic value seems more prone to 
the effects of disagreement, it also seems relevant to consider practical 
limitations such as those of knowledge and time constraints in regard to the 
outcome-oriented deliberation process.) Nonetheless, one should note that 
intrinsic value is not dependent on the disagreement condition, as Rostbøll 
(forthcoming) emphasizes. In conflictual situations prioritizing interactive 
justice and enabling the collaborative process become more pertinent. In more 
conflictual situations burdened by disagreement the request for intrinsic 




                                               
175 The significance of outcome justice and interactive procedural justice can also depend on the 
context. In some situations, there could even be reasons to make trade-offs between realizing outcome 
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